Concept
Usage Evidence and Written Contracts
Usage of trade
Usage Evidence and Written Contracts
Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code sorts outside evidence into two groups and sets a different gate for each. A writing the parties intended as the final expression of their agreement cannot be contradicted by a prior or contemporaneous agreement, but it 'may be explained or supplemented' by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade, and by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to be a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.1 A finding of completeness and exclusivity therefore shuts out consistent additional terms and leaves usage in.
| Evidence offered | If the writing is final and the court finds it complete and exclusive |
|---|---|
| Usage of trade, course of dealing, course of performance | Still admitted to explain or supplement the writing |
| Consistent additional term, such as an oral side promise | Excluded |
| Prior or contemporaneous term that contradicts the writing | Excluded |
Usage clears the completeness gate because it is already part of the deal. 'Agreement' is a broader word than 'written contract': it takes in the parties' course of dealing and course of performance and the trade usage of their industry.2 Evidence of those sources can therefore supplement a writing whether it is partially or fully integrated, because the evidence is considered part of the agreement already.3 The Code treats even a total integration as a partial one for this purpose, so the only question left is whether the evidence contradicts the writing.4
The official comment explains why the Code reads writings this way. Writings are to be 'read on the assumption that the course of prior dealing between the parties ... [was] taken for granted when the document was phrased,' and 'unless carefully negated they become an element of the meaning of the words used.'5 Parties who take such practices for granted may never mention them in the writing, even one that is otherwise fully integrated.6
Because usage belongs to the bargain, a court may not hold it back until the words prove ambiguous. In Nanakuli the trial judge came close to doing exactly that. He said he was inclined to grant a motion in part because the express price term was unambiguous, and he excluded dealings evidence on the strength of a merger clause and a printed waiver paragraph.7 The appellate court rejected both devices. Commentators likewise call unwise the common-law decisions that hear usage only when the writing is ambiguous or has a gap, because contract principles turn on 'the moving stream of events' around formation and not on a single moment.8
A writing can look clear only against some background. In one decided case, the words 'delivery June-August' could be shown to have acquired a special meaning in the retail clothing trade that ruled out delivery of the entire lot in August.9 A court that tested the words for ambiguity before hearing the trade would never learn that meaning. The point fits the modified objective approach that modern contract law has adopted in place of the extreme objectivist one. In Corbin's formulation, a court asks whose meaning controls the interpretation of the contract and what that party's meaning was.10
Courts can admit usage without an ambiguity gate because it carries none of the dangers the parol evidence rule exists to stop. Trade usage cannot be manipulated as long as the court requires it to be definite and widespread. A course of dealing or performance, unlike an oral statement of the deal or proof of subjective intent, can be objectively verified, so the danger of perjury is small. And documents usually bear witness to a course of performance or dealing, which keeps faulty memory from revising the contract.11 An oral promise made at the signing table, by contrast, rests on one side's memory and subjective intent.
Ordinary admission rulings show the pattern. In Grace Label, Inc. v. Kliff, the seller offered evidence of prior transactions to show that the parties expected it to use the same materials in printing the cards as it had used before, and it argued that it was therefore not responsible for the problem with the cards.12 The court overruled the buyer's objection because the evidence merely explained and supplemented the written term and did not contradict it.13
Outside the sale of goods the rules are less uniform. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 gives no guidance on contextual evidence; it speaks only to parol terms allegedly agreed during the dealings that led to the writing, whereas § 2-202(a) specifically permits an otherwise integrated agreement to be supplemented by course of dealing and trade usage.14 Under the common law, many jurisdictions let a usage or course of dealing be added as a term if it is not inconsistent with the agreement, while some still exclude the evidence unless the writing is ambiguous or contains a gap.15 Two Restatement sections point toward the more open view. Section 221 provides that a reasonable usage supplements or qualifies an agreement if each party knows or has reason to know of it and neither knows or has reason to know that the other has an inconsistent intention.16 Section 202(5) directs that the parties' manifestations of intention be interpreted wherever reasonable as consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.17 On a problem outside the sale of goods, ask first which approach the jurisdiction follows.
Admission is only the first step, because a usage that comes in has not yet won. The Code requires that express terms and usage 'be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other.' When that construction is unreasonable, the express terms control both course of dealing and trade usage, and course of dealing controls usage of the trade. That rule does not bar evidence; it supplies the criteria for evaluating it.18 Where express terms and usage truly contradict, the express terms prevail.19
Students often merge two questions that the Code keeps apart. The first is whether the court will hear the usage, and in a sale of goods the answer is yes regardless of integration or ambiguity. The second is what the usage does to the writing once heard. It must meet the conditions of § 221, which are knowledge or reason to know on both sides and no known contrary intention, and it must be reasonably consistent with the express terms.20 Some courts fold the second question into the first. The Nanakuli test asks whether the usage evidence negates the written contract, in which case it is inadmissible, or merely qualifies it, in which case it is admissible. A usage that 'operator shall not pay contractor' completely negates the pay term, while 'operator shall pay contractor unless operator is not himself paid by the working interest owners' only qualifies it.21 However a court sequences the inquiry, the consistency question stays separate from any ambiguity or integration gate.
Drafters pay for this openness. Because the Code strongly presumes that parties contract in light of their own and the market's customary practices, even a fully integrated writing may leave those practices unmentioned, so a party that truly wants to exclude them must use very clear and specific language.22 A boilerplate merger clause is not enough. Such a clause at most shows that the writing is complete and exclusive, which excludes additional terms but not prior dealings.23 The Nanakuli court said the same of a narrow waiver paragraph: its limited exclusion should not bar all dealings evidence for any purpose unless the parties showed a clear intent to contract with no reference whatsoever to such evidence.24 The party that wants usage out should say so in terms.