Concept
Supplied Terms in Related Doctrines
Court supplies an omitted essential term
Supplied Terms in Related Doctrines
Section 204 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts gives a court a power. When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed on a term essential to determining their rights and duties, the court supplies a term that is reasonable in the circumstances.1 Earlier sections taught that power through a missing price, but its logic reaches further. Whenever the parties made a deal that says nothing about the question a dispute has made unavoidable, the court must either choose a reasonable answer or leave the loss where the silence happens to put it.
Three doctrines outside the ordinary gap-filling cases present that choice under other names: conditions the parties never wrote, relief when an event after contracting upsets performance, and the allocation of the risk of a mistake. The commentary on each explains the court's answer by reference to the power to supply a term.2 In each, the agreement is silent on the very point that now matters, and the court answers because the deal cannot be applied to the dispute without one. Each doctrine has its own elements and its own full reading, so the subsections below aim at recognizing the shared structure.
Recognizing that structure also shows what limits the court's answer. A supplied term must be reasonable in the circumstances, and it may not displace what the parties actually chose, the two restraints that bounded § 204 earlier in this chapter. A court may not use a condition, an excuse, or a risk allocation to override the parties' own words. Constructive conditions come first because they show the power in its most direct form: the court decides that an event must occur before a duty arises, although the agreement never said so.
Constructive Conditions
A court that supplies a reasonable term under § 204 sometimes makes an event a condition.3 A condition is an event, not certain to occur, that must occur, unless its nonoccurrence is excused, before performance under a contract becomes due.4 When the supplied term has that effect, it is often called a constructive (or implied in law) condition.5 A constructive condition is therefore § 204 applied to one kind of omission: the parties' failure to say whether one side's duty depends on some event.
Conditions reach a court by three routes, and the label records which one. Express conditions arise from the parties' words, implied-in-fact conditions arise from their other conduct and are inferred from the facts, and constructive conditions are supplied by the court.6 The first two come out of interpretation, which asks what these parties actually meant. The third comes out of construction, in which the court makes the term as a matter of lawmaking.7 Because the court builds a constructive condition itself, it builds the condition to do justice between the parties.8
Kingston v. Preston shows the approach at work. The court said that whether covenants are dependent or independent is to be gathered from the evident sense and meaning of the parties. However the covenants are arranged in the instrument, it added, which must be performed first depends on the order in time that the intent of the transaction requires.9 The inquiry looks to the substance of the exchange, not to the order in which the promises happen to appear on the page. The same question arises in modern construction disputes: is a homeowner's promise to pay the balance due on a house conditioned on the perfect completion of all the work, or is it independent of it?10
A sale of goods can produce an unwritten limit on one side's duty by a different route. Suppose course of performance, prior dealing, or trade custom shows that the buyer was expected to pay a 25 percent deposit before the seller began manufacture. Payment of the deposit is then a condition of the seller's duty to perform. It is not express, because the parties used no words of condition. It is not constructive either, because the usual default for sales of goods makes payment due on delivery under UCC § 2-511(1), and justice is served by following that default. If a condition exists here, it can only be implied in fact.11 The two examples share an unwritten limit on one side's duty and differ in the source of the term. In Kingston the court looked to the sense of the transaction, while in the deposit example the evidence of the parties' own expectations did all the work.
Courts often cannot say which process they are using. Whether a court is inferring a condition from the parties' unclear expression or constructing one as lawmaking is often unclear, because the processes overlap: the values that lead a court to construct a condition were usually present when the parties negotiated, and they also support inferences about what the parties actually intended.12 The overlap does not make the classification idle, since the label sets how demanding the court will be. In your answer, say which process you rely on and point to the fact that supports it.
A party who clearly made an event a condition by a term of the agreement can be confident that a court will ordinarily feel constrained to apply that term strictly. The same court may regard itself as having considerable latitude in tailoring a condition it supplied itself.13 The usual shorthand is that an express condition must be strictly performed, while a constructive condition is satisfied by substantial compliance. The difference tracks authorship: the parties chose the first, and the court shaped the second to do justice.
Step two is where students most often go wrong. An implied-in-fact condition is also unwritten, and an unwritten condition is not constructive for that reason alone. The test is the source of the term. If it rests on what the parties expected, it is implied in fact, and if it rests on the court's own judgment of what is reasonable, it is constructive. A stem in which the parties said nothing about whether one performance depends on the other, and nothing in their dealings or trade fills the silence, points to step three.
Unforeseen Events
The power to supply a reasonable term15 also reaches events no one foresaw, because a contract can be silent about a catastrophe that arrives after the deal is made. A promise written in absolute terms may sit beside no word at all about what happens when the usual shipping route is blocked or the occasion that gave the deal its point is cancelled. Two excuse doctrines respond. Impracticability applies when performance can be done only at an excessive and unreasonable cost.16 Frustration, typified by the coronation cases below, applies when an event destroys the point of the deal. Both begin from the same problem: the agreement says what each party promised and does not say who bears the loss when the world changes in a way the parties never considered.
Courts have explained excuse in several ways. The doctrine has been freed from the earlier fictional and unrealistic strictures of tests such as the 'implied term' and the parties' 'contemplation.'17 One account treats excuse as stemming from a rule of law and not from inferences drawn from the facts.18 The most recent account, consistent with one of the earliest American impracticability cases, reasons that a promise absolute in its words was not intended to cover the situation that in fact arose, so the court is free to supply a term that will do justice.19 The Restatement (Second) states the idea generally: since in a case of impracticability or frustration the contract does not cover the case that has arisen, the court's function can be viewed as supplying a term to deal with the omitted case.20
The supply-a-term account is the most candid about what the court is doing. An implied-term test treats the parties as having agreed about an event they never considered, which is the fiction the older tests carried. This account says openly that the contract has a gap and that the court fills it. It also answers the objection that excuse rewrites a promise the parties made in absolute terms. A court that fills a gap overrides no term the parties chose, so relief does not interfere with freedom of contract.21 The limit from the introduction carries over. If the agreement or the circumstances show that a party assumed a risk greater than the one the law would impose, no gap exists, and the assumed risk stays where the parties put it.22
Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States gave the idea a working test. The charter there named the ends of the voyage but not the route. After the ship sailed on the usual course through the Suez Canal, the canal was closed, and the ship went around the Cape of Good Hope. The carrier sought extra pay, arguing that the charter carried an implied term of the usual and customary route and that the closing made performance impossible, and the court rejected the claim. It described its task as constructing a condition of performance based on the changed circumstances, through at least three reasonably definable steps, and it added that the plea of excuse fails unless all three requirements are satisfied.23
Each step does its own work. The first screens for events outside the assumptions on which the deal was built. The second preserves the parties' own allocation, since a court can supply a term only for a case the contract leaves uncovered. A risk that agreement or custom already assigned leaves no gap to fill. The third sets the severity threshold. The doctrine marks the line at which the community's interest in enforcing contracts according to their terms is outweighed by the commercial senselessness of requiring performance, and the measure is cost that is excessive and unreasonable.24 A performance that merely costs more than the promisor hoped has not reached that line.
The coronation cases show the doctrine from the other side. In Krell v. Henry, a person had engaged rooms to watch a coronation procession, the coronation was called off, and the defendant was excused from paying for use of the premises.25 The contract did not cover that event, so the court supplied the answer the parties had not, and the answer was that the duty to pay fell away. The event had removed the very thing the rooms were rented to see. The Suez carrier, by contrast, kept the object of the deal and complained of the burden of the route, a grievance the third step measures against the standard of excessive and unreasonable cost.
Excuse does not end the court's work, because discharge leaves behind questions the contract never answered. Total supervening impracticability or frustration discharges the excused party's remaining duties. The other party is discharged as well, because the excused party's performance will not be forthcoming.26 Parties who have already done something then need an adjustment. If the excused party rendered part performance before the event, recovery may be available under the doctrine of divisibility, and the Restatement (Second) suggests that a court may sever a contract in the interests of justice even when the normal tests for divisibility are not met.27 A court may also reshape the contract so that the parties' duties continue, by allocation, by the rules on temporary or partial impracticability, or by supplying a term that is reasonable in the circumstances. That last option is the language of § 204 applied to the aftermath of excuse.28
The results depend on where the parties stood when the event occurred. In the related case of Chandler v. Webster, the defendant had made a substantial down payment and had agreed to pay the balance in advance of the coronation. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to restitution and was liable to pay the balance.29 The rule was simply that the parties should be placed in the position they would have been in at the occurrence of the frustrating event, and courts have had difficulty applying restitution in this setting.30 A stem that pairs an absolute promise with an unexpected event therefore asks two questions in order: whether the three steps are met and, if they are, what adjustment justice requires.
Allocating Mistake Risk
Section 154 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts answers a question that arises when a party was wrong about a fact that existed when the contract was made: who bears the loss? A party bears the risk of the mistake when the agreement allocates it to that party, when that party knew at contracting that its knowledge of the relevant facts was limited but treated the knowledge as sufficient, or when the court allocates the risk to that party on the ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.32 The third route has the structure of § 204. The parties left a point unaddressed, and the court selects a reasonable answer.33
Framing mistake as an allocation of risk spares the court artificial and specious distinctions, such as those between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' mistakes or between mistakes going to the 'identity' or 'existence' of the subject matter and those going merely to its 'attributes,' 'quality,' or 'value.'34 The only question is who absorbs the loss when the contract does not say.
To make the allocation, the court considers the purposes of the parties and uses its general knowledge of human behavior in bargain transactions, as it does in the analogous situation in which it is asked to supply a term under § 204.35 The Restatement's illustration is the seller of farm land who learns, along with the buyer, that valuable mineral deposits lie beneath it. The price was negotiated on the assumption that the land was suitable only for farming, and the effect on the agreed exchange is material. Even so, the seller generally cannot avoid the contract. A court will ordinarily allocate the risk of the mistake to the seller, who must perform regardless.36 The example shows that a mistake about a basic assumption behind the price does not by itself release a party.
The court's allocation is a default, and the order of authority is the same as for any supplied term. Subsection (c) is subject to contrary agreement and to usage, so a court reaches it only when neither the parties' words nor the customs of their trade have already placed the risk.37 An insurer that expressly undertakes the risk of loss of covered property as of a date already past has allocated the risk by agreement, and the court has no gap to fill.38 The farm-land seller and the insurer differ in one respect that decides the result. The insurer spoke to the risk, and the seller was silent. Silence invites a reasonable allocation, and an express undertaking displaces it.