Concept
When the Gap Filler Yields
Omitted time for performance
When the Gap Filler Yields
Section 2-309(1) makes the time for shipment, delivery, or any other action a reasonable time only if that time is “not provided in this Article or agreed upon.”1 The condition has two parts, and both must hold before the default applies. The parties must not have fixed a time themselves, and Article 2 must not have supplied one for the act in question. If either part fails, the reasonable-time standard has no work to do, and a court applies whichever source spoke.
The default yields in both directions because it is a presumption about what parties who named no date probably expected, and a presumption has force only until better evidence of expectation appears. An agreed time is that evidence in its strongest form. A court that measured a dispute after the fact against a reasonable time would be overriding a term the parties chose before it. Article 2's own timing rules outrank the default for a different reason: they address particular acts with rules shaped to the transaction, and a general phrase that overrode them would leave them nothing to govern. Every timing problem therefore begins with two questions. Did the parties fix the time, and did Article 2? Only a double no sends the analysis to a reasonable time.
Agreed Times Control
The first question in any timing dispute is whether the parties fixed the time themselves, because the Code measures both sides' performance against the contract: the seller delivers, and the buyer accepts and pays, “in accordance with the contract.”2 Time, place, and manner of delivery are open to agreement between the parties.3 An express date or period answers the question, and once it does, § 2-309(1) has no gap left to fill. A default approximates what parties would have wanted when they were silent. Once they have spoken, a court that applied a reasonable time over their date would enforce its own estimate in place of their choice.
A delivery window shows how this works. A contract calling for delivery “during January” has an agreed time even though it names no single day, so the default is never triggered and the only question is whether the seller delivered in January. Section 2-309(1) answers silence, not imprecision.4
A time can be agreed without appearing as a date on the page. Conduct can show an intended time as well as words can. In one treatise illustration, an offer went out by mail, and the offeror then mailed a revocation on the tenth day. The treatise reads that step as “some indication of an intent that the offer remain open at least to that time.”5 The setting is the life of an offer rather than a delivery date, but the same sort of evidence bears on whether the parties themselves fixed a delivery time.
The harder question is what happens when a party offers proof of an agreed time against a writing that is silent on the point. The reasonable-time term is a rule of law that the court reads into the agreement to fill a gap. Under some cases, evidence that performance would occur at a particular time is excluded because it contradicts that implied-in-law term, and Williston and Corbin appear to favor the rule that an implied-in-law term may be contradicted. There is no clear line between implications of fact that become part of the agreement by consent and rules of law that fill its gaps. The UCC cases hold that a term is inconsistent only if it contradicts an express term of the integration, and many non-UCC cases disagree.6 A writing silent on time contains no express time term, so under the UCC cases proof of an agreed date does not contradict it.
Parties can also agree on how reasonableness will be judged instead of agreeing on a date. Section 1-302(b) lets them set standards for the reasonable time of tender by agreement.7 Agreement does not always displace reasonableness entirely, however. Tender must still be made at a reasonable hour, and tendered goods must stay available for the period reasonably necessary for the buyer to take possession.8
Exchanged forms raise the same question. When both parties' forms state the same delivery date, that term is one on which the writings agree, and under § 2-207(3) terms that “agree” are neither additional nor different terms, so the shared date is the agreed time.9 A conflict between the forms on time is a battle-of-the-forms problem, and the source notes that the treatment of conflicting terms is contested.10
Specific Article Rules Control
Section 2-309(1) is a residual rule. Its words “not provided in this Article” mean that the default gives way whenever another section of Article 2 already speaks to the act in question.12 The reason is structural. The drafters wrote particular sections for particular acts, each shaped around what the act is for, and a general phrase that reached every other action would swallow those sections if it competed with them. The habit to build is a question asked before § 2-309(1) is ever cited: has Article 2 already said when this act must happen?
The buyer's payment is the standard example. The Code states the buyer's duty in general terms, to accept and pay for the goods in accordance with the contract,13 and Article 2's payment provision then dates the duty: unless the parties agree otherwise, payment is due at the time and place the buyer is to receive the goods, so a sale that says nothing about payment is presumptively a cash sale. Payment on receipt keeps the buyer's performance in step with the seller's tender, which requires the seller to put and hold conforming goods at the buyer's disposition.14 Applying § 2-309(1) to payment would let a buyer who has the goods hold the price for an open-ended reasonable time and turn every silent sale into a credit sale on terms no one negotiated. A credit sale needs an agreed credit period, such as thirty days, and the parties must supply it.
The place of delivery follows the same pattern and shows that each open term is checked on its own. The place-of-delivery section begins by making the seller's place of business, or the seller's residence if there is no place of business, the place for delivery, subject to the exceptions that follow.15 That rule answers where. Section 2-309(1) answers when, and neither displaces the other.
One contract thus yields two different answers for two open times, and the difference lies in whether Article 2 has a section for the act.
The habit reaches past payment and place. Article 2 gives the buyer a right to reject goods or a tender that fails to conform to the contract, § 2-601,18 and it gives the inspection right, § 2-513, and the seller's right to cure, § 2-508, sections of their own.19 The time for rejecting comes from the rejection provisions, not from § 2-309(1): § 2-602(1) requires rejection within a reasonable time after delivery or tender and seasonable notice to the seller. The phrase “reasonable time” appears there too, but as part of a rule written for rejection, so the analysis starts from that section.
Some rights attach to an event instead of a period. A buyer that has paid some or all of the price of identified goods may recover them from the seller in certain circumstances, § 2-502, and that right “vests upon acquisition of a special property, which occurs upon identification of the goods to the contract.” A buyer that has not paid in full must be ready to tender the rest of the price.20 See Transammonia Export Corporation v. Conserv, Inc.
Students most often skip the third step, because the default feels like a complete answer whenever a contract is silent. Silence on the seller's tender leads to § 2-309(1), while silence on payment in the same contract leads to receipt of the goods, and a buyer who confuses the two will misdate its own duty.