Concept
Sources of Conditions
Conditions (express and constructive)
Sources of Conditions
Every condition comes from somewhere, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 226 names two sources: an event may be made a condition either by the agreement of the parties or by a term supplied by the court.1 Earlier sections of this chapter took the condition as given and asked what its failure does to a duty. This section asks where the condition came from, because the answer controls how a court treats it. Sometimes the parties made the event a condition, and the court’s task is to read their words and conduct correctly. Sometimes the parties omitted a term their exchange needed, and the court adds one.
The two sources call for two different judicial tasks. When the parties claim to have made an event a condition, the court decides by interpretation whether their agreement did so.2 When the court supplies the condition, it does not look for any intention the parties manifested. It asks what justice demands, and court-imposed conditions do not find their source in the parties’ intention.3 These two processes are sometimes called interpretation and construction.4
The source of a condition matters most for how strictly a court enforces it. Parties who clearly make an event a condition can be confident that a court will ordinarily feel constrained to apply the term strictly, while the same court has considerable latitude in tailoring a term it supplied itself.5 An express condition generally demands full and literal compliance, whereas a court-imposed condition need only substantially occur.6 The standard illustration is the rule that, absent contrary agreement, the court will impose a condition that the builder build first before the owner must pay. That rule has done its work once the builder substantially completes the construction.7 The three labels that follow, express, implied in fact, and constructive, sort conditions by source. Later sections take up how strictly each must be satisfied.
Express Conditions
A condition created by the parties’ own words is an express condition. Spotting one requires no special vocabulary. “On condition that,” “provided that,” and “if” often signal a condition, but no particular form of language is necessary, and the parties may manifest an intention to make a duty conditional through the general nature of their agreement as well as through specific words.8 Even so, the word express does not mean that any term in the writing will do. A condition is so powerful that courts require it to be stated explicitly, most often through clear conditional language such as “if,” “unless,” “provided that,” or “on the condition that.”9
Interpretation settles whether the parties made an event a condition, and the same process governs any other term. It gives the parties’ purpose great weight and, between reasonable meanings, generally prefers the meaning that operates against the drafter.10 The same process determines what the conditioning event is.11 Express conditions earn their place by letting parties conclude a contract despite substantial uncertainty. In a merger or acquisition, for instance, the parties bind themselves now and state the conditions that must be satisfied before a closing date months away, and both remain bound in the meantime.12
Stating a promise does not state a condition. A land contract that contains the seller’s express promise to transfer title and the buyer’s express promise to pay $500,000 makes neither performance expressly conditional on the other. The promises become express conditions only if the contract also says that each party’s obligation to perform is conditional on the other’s performing.13 In the same way, a clause saying only that “the horse shall be free of disease” reflects not a condition but a promise by the other party that the event will occur.14 The difference shows when the event fails. A duty subject to a condition cannot become due unless the condition occurs or its nonoccurrence is excused.15 A promise that the event will occur makes its failure a breach, while a condition makes its failure only a bar to the duty.
A condition can also appear without the usual vocabulary when the structure of a promise makes the dependency plain. In one Restatement illustration, a tenant promises to pay $1,000 for “such repairs as an architect appointed by B shall approve.” The landlord’s appointment of an architect and the architect’s approval of the repairs are conditions of the tenant’s duty to pay, although the clause contains no “if.”16 In another, physicians form a partnership in which a member may withdraw on three months’ written notice. If the executive committee asks him to revoke his notice and he refuses, he may not practice medicine within twenty-five miles. The committee’s request is a condition of his duty not to compete.17 Until the committee asks, the restraint never comes due.
Seemingly conditional words do not settle the question either, because interpretation looks to what the words were for. Suppose a buyer promises to pay $5,000 for an automobile “on demand,” and the seller sues for the price without ever demanding payment. The seller can recover. Attached to an otherwise unconditional promise to pay money, “on demand” serves to fix the time after which interest at the legal rate is payable. A demand is therefore not a condition of the buyer’s duty.18
A clause that does allocate risk looks different. A quarterback’s contract pays $4,000,000 plus an $800,000 bonus if he passes for more than 3,000 yards in the regular season. Passing for that total is an express condition of the team’s duty to pay the bonus, because the event is uncertain and the bonus depends entirely on it, and a court will generally require full and literal compliance with a condition the parties negotiated.19 If he finishes with 2,900 yards, the condition fails and no bonus is owed. He is not in breach, because he never promised to reach that total, and he keeps the $4,000,000 for his services. The two clauses differ in what the stated event does. In the car sale, “on demand” only marks when interest begins on a promise that was otherwise unconditional. In the football contract, the stated event decides whether a duty to pay arises at all. Later sections of this chapter take up how literally an express condition must be satisfied and when its failure is excused.
Implied-in-Fact Conditions
Section 226 lets the agreement of the parties make an event a condition, and the agreement it has in mind includes more than the words the parties chose to write.21 The Restatement’s commentary describes conditions made by agreement as made either by the parties’ words or by their other conduct, and labels them “express” and “implied in fact” (inferred from fact).22 An implied-in-fact condition therefore has the same source as an express one, the parties’ own intention, and differs only in how that intention is shown. Without any express language of condition, contextual evidence may still support the inference that the parties meant a performance to be conditional. Like other terms, a condition can be implied in fact by interpreting the parties’ words in light of the circumstances surrounding formation.23
A course of dealing shows how this works. Suppose a buyer of goods and a manufacturer have repeatedly proceeded on the shared understanding that the buyer pays a 25% cash deposit before production begins, and their new written contract says nothing about a deposit. The condition is not express, because the parties used no express language of condition. It is not constructive either, because justice does not call for a court-made condition when the usual default rules in sales of goods already provide that payment is due on delivery.24 Any condition found here would therefore be implied in fact, resting on the parties’ own understanding as their dealings reveal it.25
Conduct decided Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Neumeier, in which a doctor sought to recover fees directly from a patient. The patient had given his medical insurance information to the doctor’s office, and the court held that this showed the parties intended the doctor’s right to recover from the patient to be subject to an implied condition precedent: the doctor had to submit a claim to the insurer first.26 Handing over the insurance information was the evidence from which the parties’ shared expectation could be inferred. Until the claim went to the insurer, the doctor’s right against the patient had not arisen.
The agreement is equally silent in both settings, and the evidence of expectation is what differs. An express condition and an implied one have the same legal effect, and the difference lies in the evidence. An express condition is apparent from the language of the contract itself, where the parties’ actual words are the best evidence of what they intended. An implied condition must be established by contextual evidence showing that the parties did intend it.27 If the agreement is in writing, the parol evidence rule may bar contextual evidence that varies an integrated term or conflicts with the writing, but the law has traditionally recognized an exception for evidence offered to show that the contract was subject to a condition precedent.28
Because the proof is inferential, courts do not rigidly apply strict compliance to an implied condition. The parties have not made it clear in their language that exact compliance is required.29 Take a land contract that says only that the seller undertakes to get the tax liens on the property discharged by July 31. If the context shows that the parties meant the buyer’s duty to close to depend on the discharge, the court will treat the discharge as an implied condition. Because the parties did not express it as a condition, the court may accept a discharge on August 1 as substantial fulfillment.30 Had the contract expressly conditioned the buyer’s duty on discharge by July 31, a court would ordinarily hold the parties to that date.31
An implied-in-fact condition must also be kept apart from a constructive one. In the first, the court finds that the parties actually, if silently, intended the event to come first. In the second, the court supplies a term because it is reasonable and just. The line is blurry in practice, because the values that lead a court to construct a condition were usually present when the parties negotiated and so support inferences about their actual intentions.32 The usual error is to demand conditional words before finding any condition, or to treat every silent contract as an invitation to add whatever condition seems fair. The first question is whether the facts show that the parties themselves expected the event to come first.
Constructive Conditions
The third source of conditions is the court itself. Section 226 lets an event become a condition by a term the court supplies, and the commentary names the occasion: when the parties have omitted a term essential to a determination of their rights and duties, the court may supply one that is reasonable in the circumstances.34 Where the supplied term makes an event a condition, it is called a constructive, or implied-in-law, condition. The label sets it apart from express and implied-in-fact conditions, which the parties make themselves by their words or other conduct.35 Express and implied-in-fact conditions come from interpretation, in which the court reads what the parties manifested. A constructive condition comes from construction, in which the court fills a gap the agreement left.
The method differs from that of an implied-in-fact condition, although both operate where the contract contains no conditional words. A constructive condition does not require evidence that the parties actually agreed to it. A court implies it as a matter of law if the circumstances and nature of the contract compel the conclusion that the parties, had they addressed the issue, reasonably would have intended it.36 The court is concerned with the demands of justice, not with any manifested intention.37 The line between the two kinds remains blurry, because the same values that move a court to construct a condition usually support inferences about what the parties meant.38
The most common constructive conditions arise in exchanges. Suppose a contract for the sale of land states a price and the seller’s promise to convey, but says nothing about which performance comes first, and nothing in the circumstances shows that the parties discussed it. In an exchange transaction, unless the language of the contract or its surrounding circumstances clearly indicate a contrary intent, the parties must almost always be taken to have expected that the principal promises would depend on each other. These are the constructive conditions of exchange. Without them, a party could be forced to perform even when the other had failed or refused to do so.39 The court therefore supplies the dependence itself.
Hogan v. Goldsmith applied this reasoning to an option. A buyer held an option to purchase land, exercised it, and sued to enforce the contract. The contract did not expressly say that the buyer had to tender payment, but the court held that the seller’s obligation to transfer the land was subject to a construed condition precedent. The buyer had to show, at the time of exercising the option, that he had the price available in cash and was ready, willing, and able to pay it. He failed to satisfy that condition and was not entitled to enforce the contract.40 The Restatement contains a parallel term, which requires an offeree under an option contract to complete or tender the invited performance as a condition of the offeror’s duty.41
A second kind of court-supplied condition arises when an obligor cannot perform without some act by the obligee. A painter who agrees to match a color sample the owner will furnish cannot begin until the sample arrives, and if the contract is silent, a court may make the furnishing of the sample a condition of the painter’s duty.42 Often the obligee’s own obligation of good faith and fair dealing already requires the act, so that a material failure to perform it has the same effect as the nonoccurrence of a condition under the rules for performances exchanged for each other. The constructive condition does independent work only where no duty to do the act exists.43 Cooperation and notice are taken up in a later section of this chapter.
A court supplies a term only where the agreement has a gap, so a contract that already settles the point leaves nothing to construct.
Origin governs strictness. A court-made condition exists to do justice, and applying it literally so that a party lost the value of its performance over a small shortfall would defeat the purpose that justified supplying it. The general rule is therefore that an express condition must be strictly performed, while a constructive condition is satisfied by substantial compliance.44 A clause that makes exact conformity to the plans the price of payment is applied as written, but the court-supplied rule that a builder builds before the owner pays is satisfied when the builder substantially completes the work.45 This section only classifies conditions by source. The later section on constructive conditions of exchange develops dependent promises, order of performance, and tender, and the section on substantial performance develops how much of a shortfall a constructive condition tolerates. The usual error is to demand proof of the parties’ intention before recognizing a constructive condition, or to treat silence as permission to add whatever condition seems fair. The first question is whether the contract omitted a term essential to the parties’ rights and duties, and the second is whether the term the court would add is reasonable in the circumstances.