Concept
Constructive Conditions of Exchange
Conditions (express and constructive)
Constructive Conditions of Exchange
When parties trade promises and say nothing about who must perform first, or about what one side’s default does to the other’s duty, a court fills the gap. The Restatement recognizes that an event may become a condition either by the parties’ agreement or by a term the court supplies,1 and the court-supplied kind is the constructive condition. Its effect follows from the basic rule of conditions: a duty subject to a condition cannot become due unless the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is excused.2 Constructive conditions of exchange therefore settle, in every silent bilateral contract, when each side may demand performance and when it may hold back.
Four questions follow, in this order. Is one party’s performance a condition of the other’s duty at all? Who goes first? Performances that can be rendered together are exchanged together, and a performance that takes longer goes before one that takes less time. What must the obligee do, by way of cooperation or notice, to trigger the obligor’s duty? And how closely must a party perform before the other side’s duty falls due? The last answer, the substantial performance standard, depends on where constructive conditions come from. A court creates them to do justice between the parties, and they carry a flexibility that express conditions lack.
Dependent Promises
In an exchange of promises, each side’s promise is presumed to depend on the other’s performance unless the contract’s language or its surrounding circumstances clearly indicate a contrary intent.3 Each performance is then a constructive condition of the other party’s duty, so a party who has received none of what was promised need not hand over what it promised. The rule sounds obvious today, but the common law reached it late. Early English courts began from the opposite premise.
In Nichols v. Raynbred, a seller sued for the price of a cow, and in 1615 the King’s Bench held that the seller did not have to plead that the cow had been delivered. The buyer could sue separately on the seller’s promise to deliver, but could not raise nondelivery as a defense to the price. The promises were “independent.”4 A buyer who had received nothing still owed the price, and his only recourse was a second lawsuit against a seller who might be unable to pay a judgment.
Kingston v. Preston, decided by the King’s Bench in 1773, changed the rule. The plaintiff was to buy the defendant’s business and furnish security as part of the bargain. The defendant refused to convey because the security was never furnished, and the plaintiff, electing to demur, argued that the defendant’s obligation to sell was independent of the plaintiff’s duty to furnish security, so that any remedy lay in a separate action.5 Lord Mansfield disagreed. The “greatest injustice” would result, he thought, if the defendant had to trust the “personal security” of a plaintiff admitted to be “worth nothing.”6 The purpose of the transaction and the “evident sense and meaning” of the agreement showed that the parties, without saying so, had intended their promises to be conditional and mutually dependent. Because the plaintiff had failed to furnish adequate security, the defendant’s performance obligations were excused.7 Without entirely discarding prior law, Mansfield signaled that a contract formed by an exchange of promises would be read from then on to require an exchange of performances as well.8
The opinion also gave the law its vocabulary. Mansfield sorted covenants, the period’s word for contractual promises, into three kinds:9
- Mutual and independent promises, where either party may recover damages for the other’s breach and it is no excuse for the defendant to allege that the plaintiff has also breached.
- Dependent promises, where one party’s performance depends on the other’s prior performance, so the other is not liable to suit until that prior performance is rendered.
- Mutual conditions to be performed at the same time, where a party who was ready and offered to perform has fulfilled his engagement and may sue if the other neglects or refuses to perform.
The second and third kinds became the order-of-performance rules taught in the next two subsections: performances that can be rendered together are due together, each conditioning the other, while a performance that takes longer goes first.10 The first kind survives only where the contract shows that the parties meant their promises to stand alone.
The modern presumption rests on what an exchange is. Each promise is given in return for the other, so a rule that let either promise stand alone would produce the bizarre result that a party could be forced to perform even though the other had failed or refused to.11 Dependence prevents that result by giving each party a remedy it can use without a lawsuit: it may hold back its own performance until the other side performs or offers to, and it need not extend credit to a counterparty whose solvency it cannot judge. The presumption also tracks what parties in that position almost always expected, which is why a court may supply it when the contract is silent.12 No proof that the parties discussed the point is needed, because the condition is implied by law from the nature of the exchange. Evidence such as common commercial usage, prior dealings, or statements made during negotiations could support the same conclusion as a matter of fact.13
Only the contract’s own language or circumstances overcome the presumption. A clause making the buyer’s duty to pay absolute and unconnected to delivery puts the contract in Mansfield’s first category, and the buyer must then pay even if the seller has defaulted, leaving the buyer to sue separately.14 Silence has no such effect. The common error is to read the absence of conditional wording as showing that each party must perform regardless of the other, when dependence needs no wording and independence has to be shown.15 Once dependence is established, two questions remain: which performance goes first, and how closely a party must perform before the other’s duty ripens. The next subsections take them up.
Concurrent Conditions and Tender
Where two performances can be rendered at the same moment, neither party has to go first. Mansfield’s third category, mutual conditions to be performed at the same time, produced that rule, and Morton v. Lamb applied it. A buyer sued a seller who had not delivered corn at Shardlow, and the seller objected that the buyer had never alleged readiness to pay. The court agreed. The corn was to be delivered for a price to be paid at the time of delivery, so “the readiness to pay should have been averred by the plaintiff.”17 Justice Grose stated the principle generally: if one party covenants to do one thing in consideration of the other’s doing another, each must be ready to perform at the time he charges the other with non-performance.18
The Restatement carries the rule forward. Unless the parties agree otherwise, performances that can be rendered at the same time must be rendered at the same time, as when money is exchanged for a deed to real estate.19 The reason is the one that moved the law toward dependent promises. A party who performs first extends credit, and neither side wants to “stick its neck out” and trust that the other will perform later.20 When both performances can be given at once, the law spares both parties that risk by making each performance a condition of the other. The seller’s duty to convey depends on the buyer’s performance or tender of the price, and the buyer’s duty to pay depends on the seller’s performance or tender of the deed.21 “Concurrent conditions” is not a separate kind of condition. The phrase describes mutual constructive conditions, each duty waiting on the other party’s act.
The consequence is that no one breaches until someone tenders. If the seller has not tendered a deed, the buyer has no duty to pay the price. If the buyer has not tendered the price, the seller has no duty to deliver a deed. If both fail to tender, neither is in breach.22 A party who wants to hold the other to the bargain must therefore perform or tender, because one may not treat the other as in breach of promises calling for simultaneous performance until one has performed or tendered one’s own.23 An old decision made the same point in pleading terms: the acts were “reciprocal acts, to be performed by each other at the same time,” so “performance, or the offer to perform, must be pleaded on the one part, in order to found the action against the other.”24
Tender is the act that ripens the other side’s duty. In its stricter sense, tender is an offer coupled with a present ability to fulfill all the conditions resting on the tendering party, and it must be followed by actual performance if the other party shows itself ready to proceed.25 Both elements matter. The offer shows willingness, and the present ability shows that the willingness is more than talk: a buyer who says he would gladly pay but has no funds has not tendered. A comment adds that something less than the strict tender can suffice to put the other party in default.26 The reward for tendering is leverage. If one party is available to tender and the other cannot or will not, the tendering party is excused from delivering its performance and may sue for breach.27
The two closings differ by a single act. Both contracts impose the same concurrent conditions, but only Sylvia did the thing that ripened the other side’s duty.
The sales statute applies the same idea. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer’s duty to accept the goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to the buyer’s duty to pay for them, and tender entitles the seller to acceptance and payment according to the contract.28 What counts as tender of goods is taken up in the later section on sales of goods.
These rules are defaults. The parties may fix any order they like, for example that the buyer pays and the seller conveys two weeks later, or that the seller conveys and the buyer pays after inspecting the property. Only when they have not fixed an order does contract law fill the gap by requiring concurrent performances.29 Where one performance takes time, a different default applies, and the next subsection takes it up.
The usual error is to find a breach in whichever party failed to act first, as though someone had to move first. Under concurrent conditions no one has to, and a party who has not tendered cannot complain of the other’s non-performance, because that party has not shown readiness to do its own part.30 The question to ask is who tendered, and whether the tender came with present ability to follow through.
Longer Performance Goes First
When the performances cannot be rendered together, the default order follows their length: the party whose performance takes longer must go first.32 Morton v. Lamb drew the same line when it set the corn sale apart from cases in which a party was to pull down a wall and then be paid. In those cases the work was a condition precedent to the payment, and the price came due only after the work.33 The longer performance is therefore a constructive condition of the shorter one, and the party who owes the shorter performance has no duty to render it until the longer one is done.
A design contract shows the rule at work. Archie agrees to design a house for Kalinda for $25,000. Designing takes longer than paying, so Archie’s completing the design is a condition of Kalinda’s duty to pay.34 Archie cannot demand payment before he finishes, and Kalinda does not breach by waiting. Whether a design that falls short in some detail counts as finished is a question of material breach, taken up in the last subsection.
Someone has to go first, and the law’s choice rests on two observations. Each party would rather the other carried the risk, so left to themselves both sides would say “you go first.”35 And the general practice is to pay people after they perform services, not before, so parties who had thought about the question would probably have chosen that order themselves.36 The same practice explains why the longer performance goes first. An owner who pays in advance extends credit for the whole period of the work, while a builder who finishes first waits only for a payment that can be made in an instant.
The result is lopsided. The owner’s promise of later performance depends fully on the builder’s completion, but the builder’s performance is subject to no condition at all: it is not contingent on any prior event and is absolute and unconditional.37 A date alone, by contrast, creates no condition. Suppose Y promises to pay X $10 next Tuesday if X climbs a pole. When X climbs, the contract is formed and a single promise remains. Y’s duty is not yet due, but it is unconditional, because Tuesday is certain to come and the passage of time is not a contingent event.38 The constructive conditions in this section are different. They are events, another party’s performance or tender, that may or may not occur, and the dependent duty does not ripen until they do.
Stewart v. Newbury shows the default operating in a dispute over progress payments. The owner declined to pay for the work billed to date, asserting that it did not meet the specifications, and the contractor refused to continue without payment. The owner then notified the contractor that it considered the contract at an end, and the contractor sued for the $896 billed plus $95 in lost profits.39 The trial judge told the jury that if the parties had agreed on no payment plan and no custom on payment filled the gap, the owner had to pay “at reasonable times.” The New York Court of Appeals held that charge to be error. The correct rule was that the owner had to pay only after the contractor had substantially performed.40
The parties may reorder performances, and construction contracts often do. The presumption that the builder goes first is only a default. The contract could require the owner to pay in advance, which makes the owner’s payment a condition precedent to the builder’s work. Or the parties could break the performance into stages so that the builder’s work and the owner’s payment of part of the price become a series of conditions precedent.41 A contract might require a 10% deposit one week after signing, after which the builder excavates and builds the foundation, then a further 10% payment before the builder frames the house, and so on to the final installment.42 Each stage is a promise by one party and a condition precedent to the next stage of the other’s performance. If the owner fails to pay after the foundation is complete, the builder may refuse to frame the house and may also sue for breach.43 The same logic reaches any deal with performances at several points in time: each party’s duty at a given moment depends on the other having timely rendered every earlier performance the contract requires.44
The usual error runs in two directions. One is to treat every silent contract as a simultaneous exchange, when that rule belongs to performances that can be rendered together, such as a deed for a price, and a house that takes months to build cannot be exchanged in one act. The other is to apply the longer-first default to a contract that sets deposits or progress payments, where the parties’ own sequence controls and the owner’s early payments are conditions of the builder’s later work. How complete the longer performance must be before the shorter one falls due is a separate question, and the last subsection answers it.
Cooperation and Notice
When an obligor’s duty cannot be performed without some act by the obligee, a court supplies a term making that act a condition of the obligor’s duty.46 The obligor owes the performance and the obligee is entitled to it, so the added term protects the party who owes. Cooperation is the standard example of a constructive condition,47 and notice is a close relative: a duty that cannot be performed without knowing that performance is wanted depends on that knowledge in the same way. In neither case did the parties write a condition. A court adds one because the exchange could not work without it.
The logic is fairness about who holds the missing piece. An obligor cannot fairly be charged with failing to do what it had no way to do without the other side’s help, or what it had no way of knowing was due. The act or information sits in the obligee’s hands, and the obligee can supply it at the least cost. Making it a condition lets the obligor wait, because a duty subject to a condition cannot become due until the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is excused.48 Without the condition, the obligor would have to guess whether performance was wanted and would face a claim of breach whichever way the guess fell.
Notice conditions follow the same reasoning, and the Restatement’s illustrations show two of them. A landlord promises to make necessary interior repairs on a leased building but reserves no privilege of entering it. The tenant’s giving reasonable notice of any necessary interior repairs of which the landlord would otherwise be unaware is a condition of the landlord’s duty to make them, although the tenant is under no duty to give notice.49 Because the landlord cannot go inside, only the tenant can discover a leak or a crack, and notice is the one way the repair duty can learn that it has arisen. Until the tenant speaks, the duty is not due, and leaving the repairs undone is no breach. The limiting words of the illustration mark the edge of the rule. The condition covers only defects the landlord would otherwise be unaware of, so a landlord who learned of a defect some other way cannot point to the missing notice as a reason to do nothing, since the notice would have told the landlord nothing new.
The second illustration puts the same structure in a larger contract. A general contractor builds a sewer system for a town and agrees to defend any action against the town arising out of the work and to pay any damages recovered. The town’s giving reasonable notice of the commencement of any action of which the contractor would otherwise be unaware is a condition of the contractor’s duties to defend and to pay, although the town is under no duty to give notice.50 A defense cannot be mounted in a lawsuit the contractor has never heard of, and the town, as the named defendant, learns of the suit first. The loading dock called for an act and these two illustrations call for information, yet in each the obligor’s duty waits on something only the obligee can supply.
Neither illustration places any duty on the person who must supply the notice, and that is what makes the term a condition and not a promise. The non-occurrence of a condition is not a breach unless a party is under a duty that the condition occur.51 A silent tenant has therefore not breached, because the tenant promised nothing about notice, and the landlord has not breached either, because the repair duty never ripened. This is the failure-without-breach point from the opening sections of the chapter. Often the obligee’s own duty of good faith and fair dealing already requires the act, and a material failure to perform that duty then has the same effect as the non-occurrence of a condition. The constructive condition does independent work where no such duty exists, and the Restatement’s own examples are of that kind.52 Because the court supplied the term, it also has latitude in tailoring it, and the illustrations speak of reasonable notice and not of notice in any prescribed form. A common mistake is to ask whether the silent party breached, when the question to ask is whether the obligor’s duty was ever triggered.
Substantial Performance Standard
How closely must a party perform before the other side’s duty falls due? For a constructive condition, the answer is substantial performance. Each party’s duty is implicitly conditioned on there being no uncured material failure of performance by the other, so a minor deviation does not leave the condition unfulfilled.54 The rule is one aspect of the doctrine of constructive conditions, and Jacob & Youngs v. Kent is the leading case adopting it.55 The case could have been treated as one about express conditions, and the court discussed substantial performance in the language of conditions.56 As Justice Cardozo recognized, even a minor deviation gives the other party a right to recover damages, but those damages may be negligible.57
Strict compliance, the standard for express conditions, does not carry over. A party who clearly makes an event a condition can be confident that a court will ordinarily feel constrained to apply the term strictly, while the same court may regard itself as having considerable latitude in tailoring a similar term that it supplied itself.58 The latitude has a reason behind it. Intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation the reasonable and probable, so a condition constructed by the law is satisfied, and the other party’s performance obligation becomes due, if a party comes reasonably close to fulfilling her contractual obligations.59
A deviation raises two separate questions. The first is whether the contractor breached, and any breach that causes harm supports a claim for damages, however minor it is. The second is whether the constructive condition was substantially fulfilled. If it was, the owner’s duty to pay is due, and the owner must pay the price less the damages the breach caused. Only a material failure leaves the condition unfulfilled and lets the owner withhold payment.60 An owner who overreacts to a minor breach by withholding payment becomes the party in material breach.61 Over a minor breach the owner cannot sue for total breach or suspend its own performance, and is confined to compensation for the shortfall.62 Each half of the arrangement has a reason. Damages make the owner whole for what the defect cost, so paying the balance takes nothing from the owner. A rule letting the owner withhold everything would hand over a house for free because of a defect worth little in dollars.
What makes a failure material? The most important consideration is typically whether the performance fulfilled the essential purpose of the contract, so that the injured party substantially received what it was entitled to expect. If the breaching party then fails to cure a material breach in a timely manner, the injured party’s duty to perform is discharged. Timeliness is judged by the importance of delay under the parties’ contract and by the injured party’s ability to make substitute arrangements.63 Material breach has its own treatment; here it is enough to see that a constructive condition is substantially fulfilled when the failure is not material.
The label on the condition changes how the same clause is treated.
In the second version the analysis starts from literal compliance. Substantial compliance does not apply to an express condition, and failure to perform exactly as promised must be treated as a material breach.64 Even so, because the substituted pipe is of equal quality, the breach was not willful, and denial of payment would cause a forfeiture, a court is very likely to let Acme recover the contract price less Homer’s recoverable damages.65 It reaches that result through interpretation or through the excuse doctrines taught later in this chapter, including relief from forfeiture, and not by applying substantial performance directly.
The usual error is to let a visible defect justify refusing the whole price, when only a material failure carries that right. A second error is to import substantial performance into a clause that makes literal compliance an express condition, where the contractor needs interpretation or excuse to avoid the forfeiture.