Concept
Excusing Conditions
Conditions (express and constructive)
Excusing Conditions
A condition is an event, not certain to occur, that must occur before performance becomes due “unless its non-occurrence is excused.”1 That last clause has done quiet work throughout this chapter, and this unit gives it content. A conditional duty cannot become due unless the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is excused,2 and a condition that can no longer occur discharges the duty only if no excuse applies.3
Excuse decides who must perform. While a condition is unmet and unexcused, the party whose duty depends on it may hold back without breaching, because its duty has not ripened. Once the non-occurrence is excused, the dependent promise ripens into a duty of immediate performance, and a later refusal to perform is a breach.4 Every performance dispute therefore turns, at some point, on whether the condition was fulfilled or excused, because without one or the other there is no breach.5
The law recognizes excuses because express conditions, strictly enforced, can be harsh.6 The recognized grounds include a proper tender that the other party rejects, the failure of a prior condition, repudiation or disablement, waiver or estoppel, impossibility of the condition, and a judicial order to avoid a forfeiture.7 This unit takes four in turn: prevention, waiver with its companions estoppel and election, disproportionate forfeiture, and impracticability.
Prevention and Hindrance
A party whose duty depends on an event cannot rely on the event’s failure if that party wrongfully caused it. The rule reaches the party who blocks the event and the party who withholds cooperation the event needs. In either case the non-occurrence is excused, the duty comes due, and a refusal to perform is a breach.8
The rule follows from what a condition allocates. Parties who make a duty depend on an uncertain event divide between them the risk that the event fails, and the protected party is released if it does. That division assumes the event is left to chance or to outsiders such as a zoning board or a lender. A protected party able to arrange the failure would hold a switch for turning its own duty off, and the other side never bargained to hand one over. Excuse removes the temptation by removing the gain, since the duty comes due as though the event had occurred.
Wrongfulness, measured against the contract, separates prevention from bad luck. Conduct excuses a condition only when it breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing that the agreement imposes on the party holding the condition.9 Malice is unnecessary; the question is what risk the other side reasonably assumed when it signed. A buyer whose duty to close depends on a local authority’s decision breaches that duty by persuading a neighboring landowner to file an objection or by lobbying board members to vote no, because he works against the approval on which the deal rests.10 The extreme case is the veterinarian example from earlier in this chapter: had Bertha kidnapped veterinarian Vetter and held her hostage until after the closing date, she could not have pointed to the lapsed date, because her bad-faith interference excuses the condition.11
Not every act that makes an event less likely is wrongful. Whether a contract forbids obstructing a condition is a question of interpretation, and some contracts contemplate that the party holding the condition may work to avoid it, as when a buyer agrees to purchase goods on condition that he cannot find them cheaper elsewhere and is therefore entitled to look for lower prices.12 In Rastek Construction & Development Corp. v. General Land Commercial Real Estate Co., LLC, a broker’s commission depended on a sale that never closed, and the broker argued that the seller had prevented the condition by refusing to go through with the deal. The court refused to excuse the condition because the sale agreement gave the seller the right to refuse.13 The portrait customer and Bertha had no license to block the event, while the seller in Rastek and the cheaper-goods buyer did. A conclusion that a condition is excused merely because the party relying on it touched the event skips the question whether the contract allowed that conduct.
Both versions end with no variance, so the missing event cannot separate them. What separates them is whether the party relying on the condition did what good faith required. The implied duty of effort reaches the same conduct: that duty supplies the breach, and prevention supplies the consequence that the condition is excused.
Prevention need not take the form of an act, because hindrance also covers a party who withholds something the other side needs to bring the condition about. A builder agrees to build six homes on an owner’s land, with the owner to designate the sites, and the owner’s duty to pay depends on the homes’ being built. The builder cannot build until sites are designated, so the owner’s silence blocks the very event that triggers payment.14 Designation is an implied condition of the builder’s duty to build, its failure excuses the non-occurrence of the building, and the owner’s promise to pay becomes absolute. A court that instead finds an implied promise by the owner to designate the sites reaches the same place by another road, since breaking that promise gives rise to damages for the builder’s lost profits.15 Either way, the owner cannot point to an unbuilt house as the reason payment never came due when the owner’s own inaction kept the house from being built.
Even wrongful conduct raises a further question: did it actually cause the condition to fail? A buyer may fail to obtain a mortgage despite genuine effort, and a rezoning board may refuse an application whether or not anyone interfered. Courts divide. Some apply a strict test and excuse the condition only if it would have occurred but for the obstruction. Others ask only whether the wrongful conduct played a significant role in the non-occurrence.16 The stricter test keeps a party from answering for an outcome it did not cause. The looser test accepts that interference makes it hard to prove what would have happened and puts that uncertainty on the party who interfered.
Prevention concerns what the protected party did to the event. The next ground is its converse, in which the protected party gives up the condition’s protection.
Waiver, Estoppel, and Election
A condition usually protects one side, and that side may prefer to forgo the protection and go ahead with the deal. The Restatement gives effect to that choice: a promise to perform all or part of a conditional duty despite the non-occurrence of the condition is binding, whether made before or after the time for the condition to occur, subject to exceptions that include a condition that was a material part of the agreed exchange and that the promisee had no duty to bring about.18 Timing and the other party’s response then decide what the promise is worth, because the same assurance has different consequences at different moments.
Such a promise is commonly called a waiver, though the label overstates what happens. In other contexts waiver means the intentional relinquishment of a known right, but a contractual waiver relinquishes no right and ends no reciprocal duty. It excuses the non-occurrence of a condition on the waiving party’s own duty, which becomes unconditional, while the other party’s duty stays in place.19 The waiver needs no consideration to be effective, because the doctrine exists to relieve against forfeiture and requires neither a price paid nor prejudice to the other side.20
Whether a waiver can be taken back depends on timing. A party that waives a condition without consideration before the time for the condition to occur may retract the waiver and reinstate the requirement, unless the other party has relied to such an extent that retraction would be unjust; UCC § 2-209(5) takes the same approach for sales of goods.21 The rule has a reason on each side. Before the deadline the waiver is a gratuitous promise, and a party who changes its mind harms no one so long as the other side can still satisfy the condition in time. Reliance changes that, because a party told that the condition will not be enforced may stop working toward it and commit its resources elsewhere, and a retraction after the chance to comply has passed would spring a trap. Estoppel marks the point of no return, precluding a party from asserting a right to the detriment of another who was entitled to rely on its conduct and did.22
The two doctrines rest on different foundations. Waiver rests on the protected party’s own knowing and voluntary choice to go ahead, while estoppel rests on words or conduct that lead the other party justifiably to take detrimental action on the belief that the condition will not be enforced.23 A fact pattern is therefore sorted by what the other side did as well as by what the protected party said.
The rule changes once the time for the condition has passed. When the time expires without the event, the party whose duty is conditional may treat its duty as discharged, which is the default result for a condition that can no longer occur,24 or it may disregard the non-occurrence and treat its duty as unconditional. Having chosen the second path, it is bound: a waiver made after the time cannot be retracted, even without reliance, because such waivers smack of election.25 Without that rule, a party could wait and watch, insisting on performance if the market moved its way and pointing to the missed condition if it did not. Insurers are the parties most often bound by such elections.26
Karen’s acceptance shows what an election does and what it leaves alone. It gives up the perfect-working-order condition as a ground for refusing the player, because she has treated her duty to pay as unconditional. It leaves Frederick’s duty and liability intact, so the breach is treated as partial and her remedy is damages for the defects.27 A buyer who accepts goods despite known defects has likewise signaled that she is treating the seller’s breach as partial, and her obligation to pay is not discharged.28
One limit keeps waiver from reaching too far. A promise to forgo a condition does not bind without more when the condition was a material part of the agreed exchange and the promisee was under no duty that it occur.29 A condition at the heart of the bargain is part of what the promisor is buying, so a promise to ignore it is a promise to take less than the contract gave, and the policy against forfeiture does not reach that far. Without a price paid or reliance, the promise is a gift that the law leaves unenforced.
Drafters sometimes insert a clause providing that no action or inaction by a party waives any condition of its duty, and such a clause may help a party fend off a claim of waiver. Courts, however, do not always honor these clauses,30 and parties and courts alike often ignore or waive conditions despite the litany of non-waiver boilerplate.31
The usual error is to treat every assurance as a waiver and to ask only whether it was supported by consideration. The questions that decide the case are when the assurance was given, whether the other party relied on it, and whether the condition was central to the exchange.
Disproportionate Forfeiture
To the extent that the non-occurrence of a condition would cause a disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the non-occurrence unless the condition’s occurrence was a material part of the agreed exchange.33 The power matters because a conditional duty cannot become due unless the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is excused, and this rule supplies one ground on which the duty ripens although the event never happened.34 A forfeiture is the loss of a benefit, such as the right to be paid or to collect insurance proceeds, that the party would have received had the condition been satisfied. Two questions control: whether the loss is out of proportion to the importance of the term that was missed, and whether that term was a material part of what the parties exchanged.
Strict compliance, taught earlier in this chapter, asks only whether the described event occurred and never how much the lapse matters. Its results can bear no relation to the importance of the term: an insured who misses a simple notification requirement may lose the entire insurance payment.35 Section 229 acts as a counterweight, giving courts some flexibility to avert harsh and unfair results where noncompliance with a condition is minor or technical.36
The same reasoning confines the doctrine. If courts excused every condition whose failure caused hardship, no express condition could be relied on, and a party who negotiated a condition to allocate a risk would lose the allocation whenever enforcement hurt. Courts therefore apply the doctrine warily, and cases in which they apply it are rare. The party seeking excuse must show undue hardship, the beneficiary of the condition must stand to gain inappropriately extensively, and the balance is struck in light of the condition’s relationship to the exchange as a whole.37 The power is discretionary, since the rule says a court “may” excuse, and unlike prevention or waiver it depends neither on wrongful conduct by the party relying on the condition nor on that party’s choice to give the condition up.
Each question in § 229 has its own purpose. The first asks whether the forfeiture is disproportionate, which invites the reply: disproportionate to what?38 The measure is the importance of the term in the exchange. A loss is out of proportion when it far exceeds anything the term was meant to protect, and a large loss that flows from a term that mattered a great deal is not out of proportion at all.39 The second question protects freedom of contract. A condition that records a risk one side refused to assume is part of what that side bought, so excusing it would hand the other side something the contract never promised. Because one inquiry into what the term was for settles both questions, they tend to merge in practice, and the pilot-instructor illustration shows how.
In that illustration, X buys a $500,000 life insurance policy that pays only if X is instructed by Jane Carpenter. On a busy Thursday afternoon at the Carpenter School, X is told that Jane is already flying but that her brother Tom, who is equally credentialed and experienced, can give the lesson. The plane crashes, X is killed, and the named beneficiary sues the insurer for the $500,000.40 Whether a court should excuse the missed condition depends on why the policy named Jane alone. Suppose the insurer had underwritten the risk on Jane’s record and treated her presence as the thing it was insuring against. Then death with a different instructor was not a risk it agreed to assume, the forfeiture is not disproportionate, and the condition stands. Suppose instead that her name merely ensured a qualified instructor and Tom is just as qualified. Then losing $500,000 over the substitution is out of proportion to the term’s importance, and a court could excuse the condition. The cause of the crash may also bear on materiality. A catastrophic wing failure that no instructor could have detected or prevented points toward the condition’s being immaterial to the loss, while pilot error that Jane’s experience would probably have prevented raises the opposite inference and makes it important what Tom did at the controls.41
The opposite pole appears in enXco Development Corp. v. Northern States Power Co. A developer’s contract with a utility made obtaining a permit for a wind-energy project a condition precedent, and the permit was not obtained by the deadline. The developer argued that temporary impracticability and disproportionate forfeiture prevented the court from strictly enforcing the condition, and the court affirmed summary judgment for the utility.42 On forfeiture, the developer claimed large losses and said enforcement worked a disproportionate forfeiture.43 The court rejected the argument for several reasons: the developer still owned its property and assets and had transferred nothing to the utility, sophisticated parties had negotiated the contract with counsel, the bargain expressly allowed the utility to terminate in these circumstances, and the utility had not obtained valuable property for little or nothing.44
Those reasons answer the two questions in § 229 in order. That the developer kept what it owned and the utility took nothing of value goes to proportion, because a forfeiture is ordinarily one side’s loss turning into the other side’s gain, and no such transfer occurred. That the termination right was negotiated and tied to this very failure goes to materiality, because the parties had already said what would happen if the permit missed its deadline. A missed notice and a missed permit deadline can both end in a large loss, so the size of the loss cannot be what separates them, and treating it as decisive is the usual error. A notice requirement sits at the edge of an insurance bargain, where the insurer’s real promise concerns the insured risk, while the permit deadline sat at the center of the wind-project deal.
Weighing hardship against gain is the working method, and the option example from the strict-compliance discussion shows the two columns a court has to fill. Sprawling Malls’s notice reached Sue a day after the option’s deadline, so strict compliance costs it the right to buy the land, along with the $10,000 it paid for the option and its expense in studying the project and arranging financing. Against that hardship stands the other column: the option ran for six months and not six months and a day, so excusing the delay would give Sprawling Malls a longer option than it paid for.45 Hardship alone fills only one side of the balance.
An exam problem on this doctrine usually gives each side a believable account of what the term was for, and the answer is the argument on both sides. Carly gives a celebrity a pair of shoes to wear on the condition that she credit Carly as the designer, and the celebrity wears them but never says who made them. The celebrity can argue that the credit was not a material part of the exchange, because the heart of the deal was her wearing the shoes in public and she did that. Carly can answer that the credit was material, because the only reason to give the shoes away was that people who saw them would learn who designed them, and a condition at the center of the exchange cannot be excused.46 Each argument turns on the same question: what was the credit for?
This ground differs from the earlier ones in what it requires. Prevention needs wrongful conduct by the party relying on the condition, and waiver needs that party’s own choice, while § 229 needs neither and asks only about the loss and the importance of the term, which is why courts use it sparingly. The ground taken up next, impracticability, shares the limit that the condition must not be a material part of the exchange, but it applies when the condition cannot realistically be satisfied and not when satisfying it would be costly.47
Impracticability of a Condition
Impracticability can excuse a condition as well as a promise, but only if the condition is not a material part of the agreed exchange.49 Students usually meet impracticability as a ground for discharging a promise; here it asks whether a party must still perform when an event its duty depends on has become impossible for reasons outside either party’s control. The grounds taught so far turn on what a party did or on the size of the loss, while this one turns on the event itself, and the limit does most of the work. It separates a condition that merely supports or verifies the performance from a condition that is the performance.
A building contract shows the excusable kind. A builder agrees to construct a house, and the owner promises to pay $375,000, provided the builder obtains a certificate from a named architect. The builder finishes the house to the specifications, but the architect dies before a certificate can be issued. The certificate is an express condition of the owner’s duty to pay, yet it is incidental to the basic performance the parties bargained for, so impossibility excuses it and the owner’s duty to pay becomes due.50 The owner bargained for a house, and the certificate was a way of confirming that the house met the plans. Enforcing the condition would cost a builder who did everything the contract required the whole price, because of a death neither party could have prevented, while the owner kept a finished house for nothing. Both elements of excuse are present: the condition is not a material part of the exchange, and enforcement would work a forfeiture on a contractor who has substantially performed.51
Each element has its own reason. The material-part requirement keeps the excuse in step with the bargain. A party who made its duty depend on an event usually did so to avoid paying unless it received something in return, so if the event is the very thing being bought, excusing it would make that party pay for what it never received. The forfeiture element supplies the occasion for relief, since a party who loses nothing it was promised needs no protection from enforcement. The Restatement’s rule on impracticability as an excuse for the non-occurrence of a condition, § 271, rests on these two requirements, and the cases in which a court applies it are rare.52 The forfeiture here need not be as extreme as the separate forfeiture rule contemplates. The usual immaterial conditions are those that merely fix the time or manner of performance or provide for notice or the supplying of proofs.53
An exam stem in which a performer falls ill and the client refuses to pay invites the architect analysis, and applying it there produces the wrong answer. X agrees to sing at Y’s wedding for $500, and X becomes seriously ill. X’s duty to sing is excused, but the condition of Y’s duty to pay, which is the singing itself, is a material part of the bargain. It is therefore neither fulfilled nor excused, and Y’s duty to pay never arises.54 The architect’s death left the owner with a finished house, while the singer’s illness leaves Y with an empty wedding, and a $500 charge would pay the singer for a performance never given. The pair also shows that excusing a promise and excusing a condition are different questions. The first asks whether the promisor must answer in damages for failing to perform, and the second asks whether the other side must perform anyway. A court can answer yes to the first and no to the second in a single case, so an excused promise says nothing by itself about whether the counterpart duty has ripened.
The same reasoning explains why constructive conditions of exchange rarely qualify for this excuse. Each party’s own performance is the constructive condition of the other’s duty, and that performance is by its nature a material part of the agreed exchange.55 Once a music hall owner’s duty to license the hall has been discharged, the owner cannot claim the price on the theory that the condition of making the hall available was excused as impracticable, because the other side would then pay for a hall it never received.56 The doctrine therefore operates mainly on express conditions that sit at the edge of the bargain.
Insurance contracts show where courts divide and where the analysis changes. An insured who, because of impracticability, fails to give notice or furnish proofs of loss within the stated time has been excused by some courts and denied excuse by others. The situation is different for a missed premium, which is the price of the coverage, so a condition requiring its timely payment goes to the heart of the exchange.57 Notice and proofs resemble the architect’s certificate, since they are procedural aids to a performance already bargained for, while the premium resembles the singing.
The developer in enXco also pressed temporary impracticability when it missed the permit deadline that the contract made a condition precedent, and the court affirmed enforcement of the condition.58 A permit deadline is a poor candidate for this excuse. It was a negotiated term at the center of the deal, and an event that the contract assigned to one party to accomplish is not an event that has become objectively impossible for reasons beyond everyone’s control. A party who fails on impracticability may still invoke other grounds such as disproportionate forfeiture, though the developer lost on that ground too.59