Concept
Excuse by Prevention
Excuse of conditions
Excuse by Prevention
A condition shields the party whose duty depends on it. When the condition fails on its own, the shield works as bargained: the duty never arises, and no one has done wrong. When the shielded party caused the failure, the shield becomes a weapon, because that party would be pointing to its own conduct as the reason it owes nothing. Excuse by prevention takes the weapon away.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 245 states the rule in one sentence: where a party’s breach by non-performance contributes materially to the non-occurrence of a condition of one of its duties, the non-occurrence is excused.1 Excuse does not pretend the condition happened. The condition still failed, but the plaintiff may recover on the contract anyway, provided the plaintiff would have been ready, willing, and able to perform but for the prevention.2 Three questions organize what follows: what the rule requires, which conduct counts as the breach it demands, and how closely that breach must connect to the failure of the condition.
The Prevention Rule
Section 245 asks two questions in order. Did the promisor breach? And did the breach contribute materially to the failure of the condition?3 When both answers are yes, the failure no longer protects the promisor, and the plaintiff may recover on the contract despite the condition’s non-occurrence.4
A condition that fails on its own and one that fails through the promisor’s breach receive different treatment because only the second involves a wrong. If the promisor could invoke the failure, its own breach would become its defense. The same fault premise appears in the Restatement’s impracticability rule, which discharges a duty only when performance becomes impracticable “without his fault” through an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract.5 A later section takes up impracticability of a condition.
A plain case shows the rule at work. A plaintiff sued his uncle for payment, although he had not fulfilled the constructive condition precedent to the uncle’s duty to pay. He recovered on a theory of excuse, because the uncle’s wrongful conduct prevented the condition from occurring.6
The breach need not violate an express promise. Every contract imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing, and every contract includes an implied condition that one party will not prevent performance by the other.7 Where one party’s right to compensation depends on rendering a service, it is nearly always a breach for the other to act so as to prevent that performance, and the breach exists only because the court finds a promise by implication not to prevent or hinder.8 The duty reaches every part of a contract: express conditions, constructive conditions, and covenants alike.9
Maness v. Collins applied the principle to an employment contract. A company’s production manager was terminated, and the trial court credited testimony that a company officer had fomented dissent against him, undercut his authority, and sought to get rid of him. Those acts effectively prevented the manager from doing his job, so the company lacked cause to terminate, and he recovered under the contract.10
Because the implied duty is a promise, interference supports damages as well as excuse. In Patterson v. Meyerhofer the seller told the buyer he did not own the land but expected to acquire it at a foreclosure sale, and the buyer outbid him there. The buyer’s conduct violated the implied covenant not to intentionally prevent the other party from performing. Two results followed: the seller was excused from his inability to convey, and, since an affirmative obligation had been violated, he was entitled to damages.11
Excuse clears the condition away and does nothing more. The plaintiff must still show that the plaintiff would have been ready, willing, and able to perform but for the prevention.12 A contractor with no crew and no materials loses nothing when the owner bars the site, because performance was never going to happen.
Wrongful Conduct and Cooperation
Section 245 excuses a condition only when the promisor’s breach contributed to its failure, so the first task is to decide which conduct counts as a breach.14 Courts call breaching conduct wrongful and measure it against the obligations the contract creates, including its duty of good faith and fair dealing. No mechanical rule decides the question. A court looks to the commercial setting, the ethical position of the parties, the understanding they probably would have reached had they considered the matter, and many other factors.15 A promisor who lets a condition fail without breaching anything, or who does only what the contract permits, has not prevented it wrongfully, and the condition stands.
Affirmative interference is the clearest wrong. Consider a buyer whose duty to purchase depends on a local authority’s decision on an application. The condition is a pure one, with no promise by the buyer to obtain approval. Even so, the buyer’s general obligation of fair dealing creates an implied promise not to act in bad faith to prevent the condition’s occurrence, so the condition may be excused if the buyer persuaded a neighboring landowner to file an objection or lobbied board members to vote no.16 Fateh v. Rich is a comparable regulatory case: the buyers of a restaurant business needed the liquor authority’s consent to transfer the license and hired as manager a person with a criminal record, contrary to the authority’s policy, and the court treated that choice as wrongful prevention of the consent.
Undoing the deal is also affirmative interference. A broker whose commission depends on a closing is entitled to it if the seller agrees with the buyer to rescind a contract the buyer has not breached, because that agreement is affirmative conduct preventing the condition.17 Drake v. Hosley reached the same result for a commission payable “at time of closing”: the seller’s frustrating conduct in selling the property to a third party excused the condition.18 In Shear v. National Rifle Ass’n the NRA had decided to sell its District of Columbia headquarters and move to Colorado, and its president had signed a contract of sale, “subject to the approval of the Board,” with a purchaser Shear procured as broker. Shear’s $150,000 commission was confirmed as “contingent on settlement.” After a takeover, the Management Committee declined to recommend the sale to the Board, and the by-laws were amended to prohibit changing the headquarters and to strip the Board of power to approve the sale. The court reversed the dismissal of Shear’s complaint.19
The duty not to hinder has limits, because a promisor owes cooperation, not rescue. In Amies v. Wesnofske a broker’s commission was conditioned on closing of title, and the court held that the vendor’s duty to cooperate did not extend as far as the broker urged.20 In Rastek Construction & Development Corp. v. General Land Commercial Real Estate Co. a broker’s commission depended on a sale that never took place, and the broker claimed the seller prevented it by refusing to go through. The court declined to excuse the condition because the sale agreement gave the seller the right to refuse. Exercising a right the contract grants is no breach, and § 245 requires a breach.21 In Indiana State Highway Commission v. Curtis a settlement depended on approval by the governor and the state transportation department, and the court held that good faith required the state only to consider the approval in good faith, not to secure it.
These limits track the ordinary arm’s-length deal. A party bound by a fiduciary duty has some obligation to act for the other, but where the relationship is arm’s length the commentary asks whether either side may demand more than “sullen acquiescence” from the other.22 Without such a limit, every failed condition would invite the argument that the promisor should have tried harder.
Causation and Burden of Proof
A breach excuses a condition only when it contributes to the failure, and § 245 sets the measure in the same sentence that sets the breach requirement: the contribution must be material.24 The test asks whether the breach was a real contributor. It does not ask whether the condition certainly would have occurred had the promisor behaved. The distinction matters because the question is counterfactual, and the promisor’s interference is what makes it hard to answer.
An earlier, stricter formulation excused a condition only if it would have occurred “except for such prevention or hindrance.”25 The Restatement (Second) takes a more liberal approach: it excuses the condition if the wrongful conduct “substantially contributed to the non-occurrence of the condition,” and it puts the burden of proof on this issue on the defendant.26 The stricter test asks the plaintiff to prove a hypothetical that the defendant’s own interference has made unprovable. The liberal test places that uncertainty on the party who created it.
The two versions differ only in what the lobbying did to the vote, and the burden of proof decides who must establish it. Under the Restatement (Second) the defendant carries that burden.27 Shear suggests one reason: an organization that stripped its board of the power to approve a sale is better placed than the broker to show the sale would have failed anyway.28
The promisor’s burden on causation leaves one element of the plaintiff’s case untouched. Excuse permits recovery only if the plaintiff would have been ready, willing, and able to perform but for the prevention.29 Kanavos v. Hancock Bank & Trust Co. shows the element surviving a clear breach. A bank was obliged to give Kanavos the right to match any offer it was prepared to accept, and it sold the stock without doing so. Because the stock was already sold, Kanavos did not have to make a meaningless tender of the price. Still, one party’s repudiation of a bilateral contract with simultaneous obligations does not normally make immaterial whether the other party could have performed.30 The court added that it has limited a plaintiff who could not have performed an obligation arising shortly after the defendant’s breach to nominal or small damages against a repudiating defendant.31 Repudiation, the next ground of excuse, raises the same ability question.