Concept
Materiality Under Section 241
Common-law breach: material and partial breach
Materiality Under Section 241
Whether a breach is material decides what the injured party may do next. After a minor breach, the injured party must still perform; it may set off the damages the breach caused, but it must pay the net amount due.1 After a material breach, the condition to its own duty has not been fulfilled, and it may withhold performance.2 Only material breaches carry that right, so a party who overreacts to a minor breach by withholding performance becomes the material breacher.3 If the breacher then fails to cure a material breach in a timely manner, the injured party’s duty to perform is discharged.4
Section 241 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts supplies the working test. It names five circumstances that are significant in deciding whether a failure to render or to offer performance is material:5
- (a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit it reasonably expected;
- (b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of that benefit it will lose;
- (c) the extent to which the party failing to perform will suffer forfeiture;
- (d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform will cure, taking account of all the circumstances, including any reasonable assurances;
- (e) the extent to which that party’s behavior comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
The five fall into two groups. Factors (a) and (b) ask whether the injured party will get substantially what it bargained for; factors (c) through (e) turn to what will happen to the breaching party if the court finds a material breach and to the reasons for the breach.6 The second group does not speak directly to the core of materiality. Those factors are equitable considerations that a court may weigh in deciding how heavily the breach should fall.7 The subsections below take each circumstance in turn, add late performance, and end with the weighing.
Loss of Expected Benefit
Of the five circumstances, the first typically matters most: did the performance fulfill the essential purpose of the contract, so that the injured party substantially received what it was entitled to expect?8 Section 241(a) states the inquiry as the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit it reasonably expected.9
Two words in that text carry most of the work. Benefit ties materiality to what the exchange is worth to the injured party. A breach is material when the deficiency is so central to the contract that it substantially impairs the contract’s value and deeply disappoints the injured party’s reasonable expectations.10 Reasonably ties the measure to the agreement rather than to the injured party’s private hopes, because the determination rests on interpreting the contract. Some breaches are obviously material because they go to the heart of the contract; others are less clear and must be evaluated under all the circumstances.11
A house shows the measure at work. A developer builds a house for a buyer, and the buyer discovers defective carpeting in a guest bedroom. The carpet is a breach, but the house can still be used for its intended purpose, human habitation, so the developer has very likely substantially performed: the buyer must take and pay for the home and keeps a claim for damages.12 A roof that admits rain and snow is another matter. A court could readily find that the buyer has lost the essential purpose of the exchange. The difference between the two outcomes lies in how far each defect reaches into the reason for buying the house.
Because Section 241(a) speaks of the extent of the deprivation, the factor is one of degree. If your leaky mower spills gasoline on Alice’s lawn, Alice expected a freshly cut lawn, not one that looks like green Swiss cheese, and the more of the lawn the gasoline kills, the stronger her argument that she did not receive what she reasonably expected.13 The stage of performance matters as well. A breach at the outset that affects the value of the entire exchange is likely to be more material than one near the end that touches only a small aspect of what was promised.14
Because the lease is silent, a court must examine the nature and purpose of the provision in context. The apparent purpose is to ensure that the lessor holds the deposit ahead of the commencement date, and there is no obvious reason why a delay of about 17 hours fundamentally impairs the lessor’s benefit of its bargain.15 Add a clause stating that failure to pay the deposit exactly on time is a material breach, and the result can change, because a court will likely give effect to the parties’ express intent and will not second-guess their decision to treat late payment as material.16
Walker & Co. v. Harrison shows a court reciting the criteria and then saying little about them. Harrison, who owned a neighborhood dry-cleaning establishment, bought a large outdoor advertising sign from Walker & Co., a business that built and serviced signs and billboards.17 Walker did not provide the maintenance it had promised, and Harrison called again and again. After two months, with no payments beyond the first, he telegraphed that Walker’s failure constituted a material breach and that he considered the contract “Voided.” Walker sent a service crew a week later, Harrison still refused to resume payments, and Walker sued for the full amount still due on the purchase price, about $5,200.18
The Michigan Supreme Court held for Walker. It listed the criteria that now appear in Section 241 and concluded that Walker’s failure to clean the sign, however irritating to Harrison, “was not of such materiality as to justify repudiation of the contract.” It affirmed that finding without discussion and without further reference to the Restatement.19 The result seems sound, but the opinion shows none of the work. A careful analysis under factor (a) would first ask what the maintenance promise was meant to deliver and how much of that Harrison lost. Harrison still had the sign he bought; what he lacked was cleaning. The lapse arguably removed only a small part of what he reasonably expected, and his decision to stop paying and treat the contract as void left him facing a suit for the entire balance.
Adequacy of Compensation
The second circumstance asks whether a lawsuit after the fact can repair what the breach took. Section 241(b) directs a court to weigh the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of the benefit it will lose.21 The first circumstance measures how much the injured party loses; this one measures whether money can make up the loss.
The factor can seem puzzling, because every breach that causes foreseeable harm already supports a damages claim.22 The word that matters is adequately. After a breach that is not material, the injured party must keep performing and deduct its damages from what it still owes.23 Suppose a builder departs from the plans but substantially performs: the owner must pay the contract price minus its damages.24 That arrangement is fair when damages can be proved and deducted, because continuing to perform costs the owner little. It is unfair when money cannot repair the harm, because the owner would pay full price for a performance worth less than promised. Harm that damages cannot reach therefore weighs toward materiality.
Alice’s lawn shows the other end of the range. Gasoline-killed grass can be replaced, but Alice also suffers embarrassment over the state of her lawn, which generally is not compensable. The more of the lawn the gasoline kills, the stronger the argument that she did not receive what she reasonably expected and that money damages will not make her whole.25
This circumstance carries one hazard: it can crowd out the others. In Norfolk Southern v. Basell, the contract required Basell to use the railroad for 95 percent of its deliveries, and the district court granted summary judgment on the ground that Basell had not materially breached as a matter of law. The Third Circuit reversed. The district court had focused almost exclusively on adequacy of compensation, and the court of appeals found that all the other Restatement factors could have supported a finding of material breach, including whether the railroad was substantially deprived of the benefit it reasonably expected.26 A loss that a damages expert can calculate does not prove that the breach left the exchange intact. Easy compensation counts against materiality without settling it.
Forfeiture to the Breacher
The third circumstance shifts attention to the breacher. Section 241(c) directs a court to weigh the extent to which the party failing to perform will suffer forfeiture.28 A court may look not only at the deprivation the breach victim suffers but also at the degree of hardship, which is to say forfeiture, the breacher would suffer if termination were allowed.29
The hardship is real because a material and total breach operates as a renunciation of the contract: the breacher forfeits its rights under it and has no contractual claim to enforce.30 The more the breacher has already done, the more that renunciation costs it. If your leaky mower is found to have materially breached, you will not be paid for your efforts, and that prospect may deter a court from declaring a material breach.31
If a court treats each failure as material, the fabricator loses nothing it invested, because it invested nothing, and its refusal strikes at the whole exchange. The contractor, by contrast, would lose the value of nearly all its work in return for a small, cheaply repaired deprivation to the owner. Forfeiture adds no weight against materiality for the fabricator and a great deal for the contractor. That contrast is the one the stage of performance draws: a breach at the outset that affects the whole exchange is more likely to be material than one near the end that touches a small aspect of it.32
Courts also resist forfeiture where the breach is trivial. In one lease case, a landlord could not enforce a forfeiture clause against a tenant who failed to procure renter’s insurance; the breach was trivial and did not justify evicting the tenant in violation of a statutory policy protecting tenants against arbitrary termination.33
Forfeiture is nonetheless an equitable weight, not a trump. The equitable considerations do not speak directly to the core of materiality, so a breacher cannot defeat a finding of material breach merely by pointing to what it stands to lose.34 If your mower kills most of Alice’s lawn, the deprivation she suffers can still make the breach material even though you would go unpaid.35
A material breacher does not always lose everything it conferred. Restatement (Second) § 374 recognizes a right of restitution in favor of a material breacher to the extent the benefit it conferred on the injured party exceeds the injured party’s claim for damages.36 The mower operator who goes unpaid under the contract may therefore recover in unjust enrichment if the benefit it conferred exceeds the damages it caused.37 The details belong to remedies; for materiality, it is enough that this factor measures the contractual loss the breacher would suffer.
Likelihood of Cure
The fourth circumstance looks forward rather than back. Section 241(d) directs a court to weigh the likelihood that the party failing to perform will cure the failure, taking account of all the circumstances, including any reasonable assurances.39 To cure is to repair a defective performance so that the injured party receives what the contract promised. A breach that will probably be repaired soon leans toward partial, and a breach unlikely ever to be repaired leans toward material.
The logic runs in both directions. Where repair is likely, the injured party will end up with what it bargained for, and releasing it would destroy a deal that can still be saved. Where repair is unlikely, requiring the injured party to wait and keep performing makes it carry the risk of an unreliable partner. Timing gives the factor its force: an uncured material breach discharges the injured party only when the breacher fails to cure in a timely manner, which depends on the importance of delay under the contract and on the injured party’s ability to make substitute arrangements.40 The cure must also work. It must produce performance in compliance, or at least in substantial compliance, with the contract, and if the finished product remains significantly deficient, the failure to cure adequately is itself a material breach.41
Sackett v. Spindler shows the unfavorable end. Spindler made numerous requests for the balance due under the contract, and Sackett did not pay it. The court held that the record justified concluding that Sackett was unlikely to tender the balance, or would do so only at his own convenience. Spindler was not required to endure that uncertainty or await Sackett’s convenience, and he could treat the nonperformance as a total breach. On that view, the letter Spindler’s attorney wrote on October 5 was not an unlawful repudiation, and it did not discharge Sackett’s duty to perform.42
The injured party’s own response is at stake too. In an illustration, the owner, Lofty, refused to give the builder, Standard, a chance to rectify a house built with ceilings lower than the contract called for. His refusal is not legally justifiable unless he can show that Standard’s error reveals such incompetence that it would be incapable of properly completing performance under the contract. If cure is feasible and the will to cure is apparent, Lofty risks a court’s later finding that he unreasonably prevented rectification. He would then be the repudiator, denied damages and liable for any damages Standard suffered.43
Both roofers promise to fix the roof, but only the second has the means to keep the promise. The first roofer’s willingness is beside the point if its ability is doubtful, so the likelihood of cure weighs toward materiality; for the second, it weighs toward a partial breach. Reasonable assurances count only as far as the circumstances back them.
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The last circumstance asks how the breach came about. Section 241(e) directs a court to weigh the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.45 Like forfeiture and cure, it belongs to the group of circumstances that focus on the breacher and on the reasons for the breach.46
The factor has two halves that students tend to run together. A breach need not be deliberate or willful to be material, and its importance is not diminished merely because the breacher neither intended nor wanted it.47 Yet in balancing the equities, a court may give some weight to whether the breach was willful or innocent, or a violation of standards of fair dealing.48 The first half follows from what materiality measures: an injured party whose essential purpose has been defeated is deprived whether the failure was an accident or a choice. The second half exists because the breacher’s conduct bears on how much leniency it deserves.
The first Restatement listed the same concern as “the wilful, negligent, or innocent behavior of the party failing to perform,” and listed beside it “the greater or less uncertainty that the party failing to perform will perform the remainder of the contract.”49 The pairing shows how closely good faith and likelihood of cure are linked. In the Sackett dispute, the court said that, in light of Spindler’s numerous requests for the balance due, Sackett’s failure to perform could not be characterized as innocent and could be ascribed only to gross negligence or willful conduct.50 The finding deepened the doubt that Sackett would ever perform.
The defect and the cost of repair are identical. The first roofer’s conduct comports with fair dealing, which weighs toward a partial breach and makes its offer to replace believable. The second roofer’s conduct does not, and its denial makes any later promise of repair hard to credit, so the factor weighs toward materiality.
Students most often misuse the factor in one of two ways. The first is to treat willfulness as a requirement, so that a serious breach is dismissed as immaterial because the breacher meant no harm. If an honest mistake left an owner with a roof that cannot keep out rain, the deprivation under Section 241(a) would be the same as in the second roofer’s case, and innocence would not make the breach minor. The second error is to treat bad faith as enough. A deliberate five-minute shortfall in a long service contract still leaves the injured party with substantially what it bargained for, so the conduct adds weight to the scale without making a trivial breach material. In both directions, the circumstance moves the balance and leaves the judgment to the weighing of all five.
Delay and Time of Essence
Late performance is nonperformance of a duty that was due, and any nonperformance of a due duty is a breach.52 Whether the delay is a material breach is the question this unit has been asking, and it turns first on how far the delay deprives the injured party of the benefit it reasonably expected.53 Delay earns its own treatment because contracts so often speak to timing, most familiarly through a clause declaring that time is of the essence.
Without such a clause, the consequences of lateness are often rather trivial. Unless time has been made “of the essence,” failure of timely performance is traditionally a breach only at law, and in equity no breach is deemed to occur until performance becomes unreasonably late.54 A bare statement that performance shall occur on a given date does not make time essential, although the phrase “time is of the essence of this contract,” or words of similar import, usually does.55
Even the stock phrase does not end the inquiry. Comment d to Restatement (Second) § 242 says that stock phrases such as “time is of the essence” do not necessarily mean that any delay must be deemed material; courts consider them “along with other circumstances.”56 In Foundation Development Corp. v. Loehmann’s, Inc., the en banc court held that a time-is-of-the-essence clause in a commercial lease did not entitle the landlord to terminate when the tenant paid a common-area charge two days late, because the delay was both inadvertent and trivial. In ADC Orange, Inc. v. Coyote Acres, Inc., a land sale contract required the buyer to make an interim payment of $250,000 “in no event later than December 31, 2001.” The New York court held that this wording did not make time of the essence, so a payment two weeks late was not a material breach and the contract was not discharged.57
The parties can take timing out of the weighing. Comment d adds that they may make performance by a stated date “a condition to their agreement,” in which case delay beyond that date will, unless the condition is excused, result in discharge.58 In Elda Arnhold and Byzantio, L.L.C. v. Ocean Atlantic Woodland Corp., the Seventh Circuit enforced a “drop dead” clause in a settlement agreement even though the purchaser missed the closing deadline by only one day and would suffer a $1.7 million loss if the contract were not enforced; the court applied a two-part test that looks to the parties’ intention and to equitable factors.59 Set that beside ADC Orange. A one-day lapse ended the contract in one case and a two-week lapse left it intact in the other, and the difference turned on the parties’ intention as each court read it. Land sale law points the same way: once time is of the essence, tender of strict performance on time is treated as a condition, and one who is late cannot enforce the contract unless the other party waives timely performance.60 In Doctorman v. Schroeder, buyers only thirty minutes late were refused specific performance, although other courts are more lenient, particularly when a late purchaser would forfeit a large earnest money deposit.61
Time can become essential without express words. Circumstances may show that the parties intended it: one party was very concerned about prompt settlement and the other knew it, land values were changing rapidly, or the property was a wasting asset such as a producing mine, an oil well, or a short-term leasehold. Either party can also make time essential by notice, provided the notice allows a reasonable time before the date it fixes.62 Essentiality can be lost as readily as it is made. Courts frequently find waiver in statements, in conduct such as continuing to deal as though the contract remained in force after the date passed, in silence, and in accepting some late performance without objection.63
In the first agreement, the stock recital is one circumstance among several, and a forty-minute delay that cost the customer nothing is a partial breach supporting at most a small damages claim. In the second, the parties made the noon deadline a condition, so the customer is discharged unless something excuses the missed condition.
Weighing the Factors Together
Section 241 lists five circumstances but gives no formula for combining them. It does not require that any one circumstance be present, and it does not say which prevails when they conflict.65 A rule keyed to a single fact would misfire in both directions. A test that asked only whether damages can be calculated would make nearly every breach minor, since a damages expert can put a price on most failures. A test that asked only how much the breacher stands to lose would let a party who had performed most of the bargain ignore the one piece the other side needed. Norfolk Southern v. Basell shows a court of appeals enforcing the discipline: it reversed a summary judgment that rested almost exclusively on adequacy of compensation, because every other Restatement circumstance could have supported a finding of material breach.66
The circumstances differ in kind, so counting how many favor each side does not answer the question. Factors (a) and (b) go to whether the injured party gets substantially what it bargained for, and factors (c) through (e) are equitable considerations about the breacher’s hardship and conduct.67 A serious deprivation of the expected benefit is hard to offset with the breacher’s hardship, and a trivial deprivation is hard to inflate with evidence of misbehavior. In a close case, though, the equitable considerations can tip the result.
The first step matters most, because every later step measures against the expectation it fixes. The last matters for a different reason: a conclusion that shows its weights can be checked and defended, and a bare verdict cannot.
Walker & Co. v. Harrison, whose facts appear above, shows what the steps add. As to factor (a), Harrison still had the sign he bought and lacked only the promised maintenance, so the lapse arguably removed a small part of the benefit he reasonably expected. As to factor (b), cleaning is presumably a cost that money can measure, though the opinion never asks. As to factor (c), a finding of material breach would have cost Walker the unpaid balance of about $5,200, a heavy forfeiture. As to factor (d), Walker ignored Harrison’s repeated calls for two months but sent a service crew a week after his telegram, which suggests that cure was within reach.68 As to factor (e), two months of silence in the face of repeated demands does Walker no credit, but silence is not a deliberate effort to shortchange a buyer. Most circumstances lean toward a partial breach, and the one that cuts the other way is not strong, which matches the court’s result. Because the opinion left its application unstated, it offers little help to a lawyer who must predict the next dispute.
The same defect can land on opposite sides of the line when the purpose behind the term changes. A house with 8-foot ceilings might possibly be substantial performance if the lower ceilings did not affect the house’s value or salability and the owner did not intend to live in it but was building on speculation for immediate resale. Even then, the conclusion would not be assured.69 An owner who means to live in the house has a different purpose, and that purpose fixes what he reasonably expected; compare Lyon v. Belosky Construction. Nothing about the legal test differs between the two owners. The purpose behind the term sets the expectation, and every other circumstance is measured against it.
Prediction is easiest when the circumstances align and hardest when they split, and that uncertainty has a price. A party who withholds performance on a wrong guess about materiality becomes the material breacher.70 The injured party’s determination that there has been a material breach, justifying its own repudiation, is “fraught with peril,” as Walker & Co. v. Harrison illustrates.71 The peril recurs in the termination cases, K & G Construction Co. v. Harris among them. A careful answer therefore applies each circumstance to the facts, says which way each leans, and states a conclusion as a judgment about weight rather than a certainty. The sections that follow turn to what the injured party may do once a breach is material: suspend and wait for cure, treat the breach as total and terminate, or continue and claim damages.