Concept
Suspension and Cure
Common-law breach: material and partial breach
Suspension and Cure
Suspension rests on the dependence of promises in an exchange. Under Restatement (Second) §237, each party’s duty to render a performance still to come is implicitly conditioned on the absence of an uncured material failure by the other party.1 Any dispute over who must perform next therefore begins with a classification: is a party’s promise conditioned on the other side’s performance, or does it stand independently?2 Kingston v. Preston supplies the classic reasoning. Lord Mansfield refused to treat the defendant’s promise to transfer “his stock and business” as independently enforceable, because the “greatest injustice” would follow if the defendant had to trust the “personal security” of a plaintiff admitted to be “worth nothing.” The purpose of the transaction and the “evident sense and meaning” of the agreement showed that the parties, without saying so, intended their promises to be conditional and mutually dependent.3
Dependence lets a party hold back what it owes when it has not received what it was promised, and holding back breaks no promise. Section 235(2) makes nonperformance a breach when performance of a duty is due.4 A duty whose condition has failed is not yet due. The Restatement applies that logic to material breach: an uncured material breach is treated as the nonoccurrence of a constructive condition to the other party’s duty to render any performance not yet due, so that performance may be suspended until the breach is cured, with materiality decided in light of the §241 factors.5
What the injured party may do next depends on two questions, asked in order. Is the breach material under the §241 circumstances? If it is, can the breacher still cure? The answers sort every case into one of three positions: the injured party must keep performing; it may suspend while cure remains possible; or its duties are discharged because cure has failed.
If the breach is not material, the injured party may neither suspend nor terminate. It must keep performing and may recover the damages it has incurred.6 Minor or immaterial deviations do not fail the condition to the other party’s duty to perform; they still support a damages claim, but the damages may be negligible.7 In the Restatement’s terms the breach is partial, the condition is satisfied, and the other party must perform and keeps its right to damages.8 Proportion explains the rule: a small shortfall can be repaired with money, and a right to stop performing over it would give the injured party an exit out of scale with its loss.
The contract can settle materiality in advance. If a lease says that failure to pay the security deposit exactly on time is a material breach, the court will likely give effect to that intent and will not second-guess it.9 Without such a statement, the court examines the nature and purpose of the contract in context. A deposit meant to reach the lessor before the lease begins, paid about seventeen hours late, gives no obvious reason to think the lessor’s benefit of its bargain has been fundamentally impaired, so the delay should not be treated as material.10
A material breach gives the injured party more, but not always an immediate exit. In some instances the injured party initially may only suspend performance and wait for the other party to cure the default.11 Under the Restatement analysis, a builder who has grounds to suspend by “declining to proceed” is expected to do so, and to give the owner a chance to cure, before terminating and treating the breach as total.12 Two opposite dangers explain the compromise. If the injured party could only keep performing and sue, it would carry the risk of working or paying for nothing while the problem stayed open. If it could terminate at once over a defect the other side stands ready to fix, it could end a bargain that cure would have saved. Suspension protects the injured party in the interim and keeps the exchange alive while cure remains possible, and the injured party keeps its claim for the damages incurred to that point.13
Cutting off a builder before cure has been tried requires more. In the analysis of a builder, Standard, that failed to comply with the owner Lofty’s specifications, the owner’s reaction is not legally justifiable unless he can show such incompetence as to lead to the reasonable conclusion that the builder would be incapable of properly completing performance in accordance with the contract.14 If the breach was both material and total, by contrast, Lofty had the right to terminate and claim any expectation damages he suffered.15
Some breaches leave nothing to wait for.
A breach that no later performance can repair cannot be cured in a timely manner, and failure to cure in a timely manner is what discharges the injured party.16
Construction contracts show suspension from the builder’s side. When an owner defaults on progress payments, the builder must decide whether the default is serious enough to stop work, and that is a materiality question under §241. Cases such as Guerini Stone Co. v. P.J. Carlin Construction Co. and Stewart v. C & C Excavating & Construction Co. test that judgment. The Court in Guerini described the builder’s step as “declining to proceed,” which is suspension in the Restatement’s vocabulary, and the Restatement expects a builder who suspends to give the owner a chance to cure before terminating. The question the source then raises is how long a builder, having suspended, must wait before terminating.17
Suspension ends in one of two ways. If the breacher cures in time, the failure no longer blocks the condition, and the injured party’s performance, suspended only until the cure, comes due again.18 If cure does not come in a timely manner, the constructive condition is never satisfied, the injured party is discharged from its duty to perform, and it keeps a right to damages for the breach.19 The breach is then total, because a breach by nonperformance supports a claim for damages for total breach only if it discharges the injured party’s remaining duties.20
Both endings were open in a dispute between Harrison and Walker, who had promised maintenance. Harrison, who owed monthly payments on a purchase price, made the first payment and no more. After two full months he telegraphed that Walker’s failure to provide maintenance was a material breach, that he would make no further payments, and that he considered the contract “Voided.” A week later Walker sent a service crew, but Harrison refused to resume payments, and Walker sued for damages equal to the full amount still due on the purchase price, about $5,200.21 Stopping payment was suspension; declaring the contract “Voided” was termination. Harrison’s position therefore raises both questions this unit has set out: whether the maintenance failure was material, and, if it was, whether the breach had become total before the crew arrived.
Section 242 decides when the waiting ends. Whether an uncured material breach has become total depends on the §241 circumstances plus two further considerations: how far further delay is likely to prevent or hinder substitute arrangements by the injured party, and how much importance the agreement attaches to performance without delay. A comment to §242 adds the reasonableness of the injured party’s conduct in communicating its grievances and seeking satisfaction.22 Each consideration has its own logic. Every week of waiting for a breacher who has stopped working narrows the market of others who could do the job, so a party that needs replacement performance by a fixed date can wait less. A contract that treats prompt performance as important makes even a short delay weigh heavily. And a stated grievance gives the breacher the information it needs to cure, while a party that says nothing and then declares the contract ended looks more like one seeking an exit than a cure.
Agreements often provide for notice of material breach and an opportunity to cure before the injured party may terminate. In L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, the contract required notice of material breach, thirty days to cure, a failure to cure, and notice of termination, and Old Navy had given only notice of termination.23 A contract that supplies its own notice-and-cure sequence must be read before the common-law considerations are applied.
Courts and writers often use “material breach” and “total breach” interchangeably, and the interchange hides a step. The Restatement distinguishes them by their effect on the other party: an uncured material breach suspends the injured party’s duties, and only a material breach that stays uncured past a reasonable time becomes total.24 The usual error is to treat the injured party as free to terminate the moment materiality is found, without asking whether cure is still possible. Materiality does open a choice that a later section develops: the injured party may continue performing and treat the breach as partial, or stop performing and treat it as total.25 Because the Restatement does not always excuse an injured party from performing after a material breach, a lawyer must predict whether the breach is material and, if it is, whether it permits suspension or cancellation.26 A party that terminates when the facts supported only suspension risks acting without legal justification, a risk the discussion of election takes up later.