Concept
Softening the Perfect Tender Rule
UCC sale of goods: perfect tender and revocation of acceptance
Softening the Perfect Tender Rule
Section 2-601 states the strict rule and qualifies it in the same sentence. The buyer’s options arise when the goods or the tender of delivery “fail in any respect to conform to the contract,” but they arise subject to the Article’s provisions on installment contracts and unless otherwise agreed under the limits on remedy in §§ 2-718 and 2-719.1 The drafters wrote exceptions into the rule itself, and other provisions of Article 2 narrow it further. An answer that applies § 2-601 without checking those provisions can approve a rejection the Code does not allow.
Four limits do most of the narrowing. In an installment contract, the buyer may reject a nonconforming installment only if the nonconformity substantially impairs that installment’s value.2 The contract’s own terms, read with course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance, define what counts as conforming, and the parties may agree in advance that the buyer will accept goods despite a nonconformity.3 The obligation of good faith governs how the buyer exercises the right to reject, and no party may disclaim it.4 And § 2-508 lets the seller cure a defective tender “if the time for performance has not yet expired” and, in some situations, even after it has.5 Each limit removes a different group of rejections, and the four subsections below take them in that order.
Together with the courts’ reluctance to allow rejection for insubstantial nonconformity, these limits may make the perfect tender rule essentially an illusion, so that the rule courts apply in fact looks more like a substantial performance rule.6 That describes results and not the statutory test. The text still asks whether the tender fails in any respect to conform, and a buyer who shows that holds the options of § 2-601. The limits then decide whether rejection is actually available. A rejection problem therefore keeps one order of analysis: compare the tender with the contract under the strict standard, then ask which limit, if any, takes the nonconformity outside the buyer’s right to reject.
Installment Contracts
Delivery terms decide which standard governs, so classification comes first. If the contract requires delivery in a single lot, § 2-601 applies in full: any defect in tender or delivery lets the buyer reject the whole lot, accept it, or accept some commercial units and reject the rest, with the seller’s right to cure and the duty of good faith tempering the result.7 If the contract is an installment contract, § 2-612 governs the same defect, and the any-respect test gives way.
Section 2-612(1) defines the category. An installment contract “requires or authorizes the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though the contract contains a clause ‘each delivery is a separate contract’ or its equivalent.”8 Two features decide the question: the goods arrive in lots, and the buyer accepts or rejects each lot on its own. A separate-contract clause does not remove the arrangement from the definition. In Emanuel Law Outlines, Inc. v. Multi-State Legal Studies, Inc., a contract for 950 copies of each of two volumes of capsule summaries every year for three years required delivery in separate lots to be separately accepted, and the court treated it as an installment contract.9
Once the contract is an installment contract, § 2-612(2) replaces the any-respect test for each delivery. The buyer may reject a nonconforming installment if the “nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the installment and cannot be cured.”10 The buyer therefore needs both substantial impairment and incurability. If the nonconformity does not substantially impair the value of the entire contract, the buyer must accept the installment when the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure.11 The official comment adds that cure can usually be made by an allowance against the price or, for reasonable discrepancies in quantity, by a further delivery or a partial rejection. The buyer’s part is cooperation, including a reasonable minor outlay of time or money to sever out an overshipment, while the seller must take over any cure that involves a material burden.12
Both requirements protect a relationship that the parties expect to continue. The Code recognizes that parties to an installment contract anticipate an ongoing cooperative relationship and likely have an interest in preserving it despite some minor bumps in the road.13 A flaw that does not substantially impair a lot’s value is such a bump, and a flaw the seller can cure and promises to cure gives the buyer nothing that rejection would add. A single-lot sale ends with the delivery, so no relationship needs protecting there and the strict rule stays.
A buyer under a single-lot contract for 100 widgets who receives 90 in one shipment is in the opposite position. Perfect tender applies, and the buyer may reject without showing substantial impairment.14 The only fact that changed the answer is whether the contract called for lots to be separately accepted.
Section 2-612(3) asks a larger question about the contract as a whole. Termination of the whole installment contract, future performances included, requires a showing that the nonconformity or default in one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract.15 Comment 6 confines the inquiry to the installments that have already occurred and bars the question whether the defect suggests that later deliveries will also be defective.16 The standard is tough to meet, and it reflects a policy of keeping installment contracts on track despite the seller’s failures.17 A defect can therefore justify rejecting one installment without giving the buyer any right to end the whole arrangement.
A buyer who fears that the seller will keep failing must look to a different doctrine, because comment 6 bars the argument from past defects to likely future ones. That doctrine is repudiation. A party repudiates installments not yet due when, before the time for performance, it makes clear by words or actions that it will breach when performance falls due.18
Agreement and Trade Usage
A tender is measured against the contract, so what the parties agreed fixes what counts as a deviation. Section 2-601 tests the goods and the tender against “the contract,”20 and agreement can move that target in two ways: the parties may write a tolerance into the contract, or the commercial setting may supply one.
Section 2-601 requires perfect tender only when the parties have not contracted for a different result. If a contract for a sign expressly allows small deviations in its size, the manufacturer need not deliver the exact dimension to be paid.21 The parties may also agree in advance that the buyer will accept goods despite a nonconformity of a described kind.22 A buyer who gives up the rule’s protection within a stated range has chosen the range, and a tender inside it delivers what the buyer asked for.
A contract also contains more than its written terms. Courts find terms by implication from the express language and the surrounding circumstances,23 and the Code emphasizes trade custom, course of dealing, and course of performance in determining what contracts mean.24 Usage of trade is the practice regularly followed in the trade, course of dealing is the history of the parties’ earlier transactions, and course of performance is the way they have handled deliveries under this very contract. If sign manufacturers and their customers observe a custom that allows certain deviations in the size of signs, a sign within the custom conforms to the contract as the parties understood it.25
Two limits keep usage from swallowing the written terms. Usage may explain or supplement a contract but may not contradict an express term, and the existence and scope of a usage must be proved as facts.26 The first limit follows from what each source tells a court. An express term is the parties’ most deliberate statement of what they chose, while usage speaks to what they left unsaid, so usage can fill silence but cannot overrule a choice. The second limit follows because a custom is a claim about how a trade behaves, and a court cannot accept that claim on one party’s say-so.
Where usage supplements the contract without contradicting it, usage can define a tolerance, and a tender inside the tolerance is perfect.27 Suppose a buyer orders 100 carloads of grade A grain in a trade whose custom allows up to 10 percent lower-grade grain in a shipment if the price is adjusted. Four carloads arrive as grade B on an invoice that reflects the lower price. The buyer cannot call the tender imperfect, because the custom is part of the agreement. Deliver the same four carloads where no agreement or custom permits the substitution, and charge the full grade A price, and the tender is nonconforming, so the buyer may reject without showing that the lower grade mattered. The grain is the same in both shipments, and the custom and the adjusted price carry the result.
A tender inside an agreed or customary tolerance matches the contract in every respect, so the Code has no deviation to forgive and no occasion to relax the rule. Course of dealing, usage of trade, course of performance, and good faith can therefore require a buyer to accept goods that look nonconforming on their face.28 The common error is to compare the tender with the bare description in the order and treat every difference as a nonconformity. The comparison starts with everything the contract includes.
Good Faith in Rejection
Section 2-601 makes the extent of a nonconformity irrelevant to rejection,30 and it asks how the tender differs from the contract without asking why the buyer is rejecting it. Good faith supplies the second question. Every contract within the Code imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance, and no party may disclaim it.31 In Printing Center of Texas, Inc. v. Supermind Publishing Co., Inc., the Texas court drew the consequence: rejection of goods is a matter of performance, so a buyer who finds a nonconformity may reject only if it rejects in good faith.32 The Wyoming Supreme Court put the point directly in Larson v. Burton Construction, Inc.: the obligation of good faith “limits a buyer’s seemingly unhindered right to reject under the perfect tender rule.”33 The limit works on the buyer’s reason and leaves unchanged what counts as a nonconformity.
Good faith has two parts: the subjective element of honesty in fact and the objective element of observing reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.34 The Texas court applied the same pair to a merchant buyer.35 Honesty in fact asks what the buyer was really after, and fair dealing asks whether using the right to reject in this way matches what commercial parties regard as acceptable.
The reason for the limit lies in what a fixed price does. The price protects the buyer against a later rise in the market and the seller against a later fall. Suppose a buyer agreed to pay $20 a unit and the market has since dropped to $5. A rule that allows rejection for any deviation hands that buyer an exit: find a deviation, however slight, return the goods, and buy again at $5. The seller must then resell at the lower price, so the market loss that the contract assigned to the buyer lands on the seller. The easier rejection becomes, the easier it is for a buyer to avoid a transaction because it is dissatisfied with the deal and not with the goods.36 Good faith closes that exit by tying the power to reject to its purpose. The right to reject for less than perfect tender must be exercised in good faith and not merely to escape an unwise bargain, and a court may refuse to enforce a plainly pretextual rejection that rests on a minor nonconformity.37
The Texas court turned that purpose into a test of motive, and the seller carries the burden of proving that the buyer rejected in bad faith.38 Evidence that the buyer rejected to escape the bargain, and not to avoid a tender that impairs the bargain’s value to it, supports a finding of bad faith, and rejection over a minor defect in a falling market would in some instances be enough.39 In Printing Center the seller, a printing firm, failed to carry that burden. The court said that proof of an escape motive would have established bad faith, but the record held no evidence that the buyer’s primary motivation in rejecting the books was to escape a bad bargain.40 A genuine nonconformity combined with no proof of an escape motive leaves the rejection intact.
The Wyoming case shows a rejection with an honest reason. The contract required the seller to deliver a Wyoming title and bill of sale at closing, and the seller instead tendered an MCO that the buyer could submit to the county treasurer for a title after closing. The court held that this was not perfect tender, because the contract said the title was due at closing and not “promptly effectuated” afterward.41 The buyer testified that accepting an MCO meant paying about $1,800 more in sales tax that was never agreed upon, and the court found his rejection “neither pretextual nor commercially unreasonable” because the MCO added $1,806 to his contractual obligation.42
D.P. Technology Corp. v. Sherwood Tool, Inc. sits at the other pole. The court refused to dismiss a seller’s action for the price of a computer system, even though the buyer alleged a late and therefore nonconforming tender, because rejecting specially manufactured goods over an insubstantial delay that caused the buyer no damage might not be good faith.43 Goods made to a buyer’s order are hard to resell, so rejection leaves the seller with the whole loss, and a delay that harmed no one gives the buyer little honest reason to send them back.
What separates the two decisions is the relationship between the defect and the buyer’s reason. In D.P. Technology the delay cost the buyer nothing, so the stated defect could not explain the rejection and the true explanation might lie elsewhere. In Larson the nonconformity itself cost the buyer money the contract had never assigned to it, so the rejection defended the value of the bargain the buyer had made. A small or technical deviation therefore does not condemn a rejection by itself. The question is whether the deviation genuinely explains the buyer’s decision.
Courts can police the limit in two ways. A pretext screen asks why this buyer rejected, while a rule that bars rejection for insubstantial defects asks how large the defect was. The courts’ reluctance to allow rejection for insubstantial nonconformity pushes practice toward the second, even though § 2-601 says “in any respect.”44 A buyer with an honest reason to care about a small defect fares better under the first approach.
The seller’s right to cure relieves much of the pressure on this dispute. When the Code gives sellers a second bite at performance, buyers have less room to act strategically, and courts have less need to sort substantial nonconformities from insubstantial ones.45 That right is the last limit on perfect tender, and it works with good faith to keep the strict rule from becoming an escape hatch.
Seller's Right to Cure
Section 2-508 mitigates the apparent harshness of the perfect tender rule significantly,47 and it answers the problem raised by good faith, how to keep a buyer from using a trivial defect to escape a bargain it regrets, without deciding how large the defect was. The statute covers two situations. Where a tender is rejected as nonconforming and the time for performance has not yet expired, subdivision (1) lets the seller seasonably notify the buyer of its intention to cure and then make a conforming delivery within the contract time.48 Subdivision (2) reaches past the contract date. If the buyer rejects a nonconforming tender that the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable, with or without a money allowance, a seller who seasonably notifies the buyer has a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender.49 Under the Code, the decision to attempt a cure is the seller’s.50
In T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., the court described the right to cure under both subdivisions as a meaningful limitation on the absolutism of the old perfect tender rule, under which, as Learned Hand put it, there was “no room . . . for the doctrine of substantial performance” of commercial obligations.51
The reason for the right lies in the choice every rejection rule makes. The harder it is to reject, the easier it is for the seller to chisel by delivering goods that are just a bit nonconforming, and the easier it is to reject, the easier it is for the buyer to avoid a deal it dislikes.52 A cure right narrows that choice, because the Code reduces the risk of strategic rejection by granting sellers a second bite at performance.53 Suppose a buyer agreed to pay $20 a unit and the market has fallen to $5. A technical defect no longer offers an exit if the seller can replace the goods inside the contract time, because the buyer must then take conforming goods at $20. The Code keeps the right from becoming a blanket second chance by attaching conditions: seasonable notice in every case and, after the contract date, reasonable grounds for the seller’s belief that its tender would be accepted.
The seller’s position is strongest while the contract time is still running. Suppose Acme contracts to deliver 500 anvils by May 7 and delivers them on May 1, and the buyer rejects them as nonconforming. Acme may notify the buyer that it will cure and then deliver conforming anvils by May 7.54 The buyer rejected while the contract still left time to perform, so a cure inside that window gives the buyer what the contract promised on the day it promised it.
After the contract date the buyer has a stronger claim. The perfect tender rule lets a buyer reject a late delivery even where time of delivery is not a material term, and § 2-508 takes this into account by imposing more stringent limits on cure after the contractual delivery date.55 Subdivision (2) accordingly asks for three things: the buyer rejected a nonconforming tender, the seller had reasonable grounds to believe the tender would be acceptable, and the seller seasonably notified the buyer of its intention to substitute a conforming tender.56 The reasonable-grounds condition keeps the extra time from rewarding a seller that never looked at what it shipped. The seller in T.W. Oil satisfied it. The contract’s .5% specification and the refinery certificate’s .52% were trade equivalents, the seller knew that Con Ed burned fuel with a content of up to 1%, and the buyer stood ready to take the oil at a reduced market price, so the seller’s belief that the oil would be acceptable was reasonable even though it tested at .92%.57
The hearing-aid sale in Bartus v. Riccardi shows subdivision (2) at work. The buyer ordered a Model A-660 and received the A-665, a newer and improved version. The seller wrote to him that it would either replace the unit or obtain the A-660, but he decided he wanted no hearing aid from the seller and refused both.58 The court held that the seller could cure. The buyer was entitled to the model he ordered, even if it was the older one, but the seller had reasonable grounds to believe he would accept the newer model, acted within a reasonable time to notify him of a conforming tender, and faced a buyer who had not bought another hearing aid elsewhere and whose position the original tender had not altered.59
A seller without such grounds stands where the dealer stood in Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith. The new car stalled at a traffic light less than a mile from the showroom, stalled again within fifteen feet, and kept stalling at each stop until the buyer’s wife could drive it only in low gear at five to ten miles an hour.60 The court found that the dealer had no reasonable grounds to believe the buyer would accept a new car that could not be driven a few miles to his home. A dealer with expert mechanics and a seventy-item inspection schedule that included a road test knows or should know of a new car’s serious defects.61 The two cases turn on the fact that drives the reasonable-grounds inquiry. The Bartus seller delivered a product that was itself an improvement and could sincerely expect it to be welcomed, while the Zabriskie dealer delivered a defect that its own inspection should have caught.
A cure must also remove the nonconformity. In a cattle sale, the seller delivered the wrong color mix and offered to take back enough black steers to restore the contract’s proportion of 80 percent red to 20 percent black. The court saw the flaw at once: even with the proportions corrected, the seller would have breached its obligation to deliver 150 steers.62
Notice is the other requirement a seller can miss. Both subdivisions condition cure on the seller’s seasonable notice to the buyer.63 The notice lets the buyer decide whether to wait for a replacement or turn elsewhere. A seller that stays silent after its first tender is rejected leaves the buyer to guess, and it cannot use the statute to force the buyer to take a replacement later.
One question remains contested. Section 2-508 speaks of a tender that the buyer has rejected,64 and a buyer who has accepted no longer has a right of rejection, whether it accepted by signifying that it would take or keep the goods despite their nonconformity or by failing to reject in time.65 A buyer in that position can only revoke acceptance, a subject taken up later in this chapter. Does the seller’s cure right follow the buyer there? A majority of courts have held that the seller has no right to cure.66 The argument for a cure right rests on § 2-608(3), which gives a revoking buyer the same rights and duties regarding the goods as if the buyer had rejected them.67 The question has also arisen outside the usual commercial-goods setting, as in David Tunick, Inc. v. Kornfeld, where a buyer revoked acceptance of a print, so the answer on cure after revocation depends on the jurisdiction.68 Timing is the other question on that route. Revocation must be communicated within a reasonable time, a standard that turns on the facts of each case, and in National Fleet Supply, Inc. v. Fairchild the court could not say that nearly four years was unreasonable as a matter of law.69