Concept
Rejection Versus Revocation
UCC sale of goods: perfect tender and revocation of acceptance
Rejection Versus Revocation
Acceptance splits the buyer's remedies into two regimes, and § 2-607(2) marks the border. Acceptance precludes rejection of the goods accepted. If the buyer accepted knowing of a nonconformity, it cannot revoke because of that nonconformity unless it accepted on the reasonable assumption that the seller would seasonably cure it. Acceptance does not, however, impair any other remedy the Article gives for the nonconformity.1 On the far side of the border the buyer holds a narrower power under § 2-608(1): it may revoke its acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to the buyer, if it accepted for one of two stated reasons.2 Which power the buyer holds therefore decides the standard of nonconformity, the excuse it owes, the clock it runs against, and the burden of proof it carries.
Four differences carry most of the analysis.
- Rejection requires only that the goods or the tender fail in any respect to conform to the contract; revocation requires a nonconformity that substantially impairs the value of the lot or commercial unit to the buyer.3
- A rejecting buyer need not excuse an earlier acceptance, because it made none; a revoking buyer must show either that it accepted on the reasonable assumption that a cure would come and none did, or that it accepted without discovering the defect because the difficulty of discovery or the seller's assurances reasonably induced it.4
- Rejection must come within a reasonable time after delivery or tender; revocation must come within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in the goods not caused by their own defects, and it takes effect only when the buyer notifies the seller.5
- After a rejection the seller must prove that the tender conformed to the contract; after an acceptance, § 2-607(4) puts on the buyer the burden of proving every requirement for revocation.6
Courts treat the two rights as distinct and unequal. In a Vermont decision, the court observed that the measure of nonconformity differs for revocation and rejection, that the time for sending notice of each may differ significantly, and that proof of a proper revocation, unlike proof of a rejection, requires evidence that the conditions of § 2-608(1)(a) or (b) have been met.7 A Colorado court put the contrast most plainly: revocation requires a greater showing than rejection. A buyer may reject if the tender fails in any respect to conform, but to revoke it must show, among other things, that the nonconformity substantially impairs the goods' value to it. The court defended the difference on the ground that it makes good sense to require more from a buyer who has accepted the goods than from one who has rejected them.8
Khiterer v. Bell shows what the line costs a buyer who waits. A dentist fitted a patient with crowns made of porcelain instead of the contracted gold and porcelain. The court held that the dental services predominated over the sale, so substantial performance governed. It added that even in a predominantly goods contract perfect tender would not have helped the patient, because she had accepted the crowns by leaving them in place for two years. She could then revoke only if the nonconformity substantially impaired their value, and it did not.9 Acceptance had moved her from the any-respect standard to the substantial-impairment standard, and a defect of that kind could not clear the higher bar.
The stricter terms for revocation follow from what acceptance does to the seller and to the goods. Acceptance makes the seller's chance to cure the nonconformity or resell the goods much harder, and one court read the gap between the relaxed rejection standard and the demanding revocation standard as a measure of that prejudice.10 Time adds three further costs. The longer the buyer keeps the goods, the likelier it is that the defect was caused or aggravated by the buyer's own handling or poor maintenance, the more benefit the buyer has drawn from using them, and the greater their depreciation and the loss to society. Those factors support a rule that makes it harder for a buyer who has accepted to cast the goods, and the loss from depreciation and market factors, back on the seller.11
The choice of standard also allocates a risk. A buyer may regret a deal because the market price has fallen, and the standard for rejection determines how freely it can act on that regret. The harder it is to reject, the easier it is for a seller to chisel on its performance by delivering goods that are just a bit nonconforming. The easier it is to reject, the easier it is for a buyer to escape a deal it dislikes rather than goods it dislikes.12 The Code leaves rejection easy and asks more of the buyer once it has accepted. The substantial-impairment requirement also has roots in earlier law. The Uniform Sales Act placed no similar restriction on rescission, yet courts applying it did not allow rescission for a trivial breach, so the Code's requirement does not differ radically from those decisions.13
A revocation that clears those hurdles puts the buyer where a rejecting buyer stands: a buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods as if it had rejected them.14 The Colorado court drew the consequence for a seller's action for the price. The seller may recover the price only of “goods accepted,” a term that excludes goods whose acceptance was justifiably revoked. A procedurally effective rejection or revocation bars acceptance, and revocation, like rejection, lets the buyer avoid the obligation to pay the price.15 A buyer that cannot clear the hurdles keeps the goods and is confined to damages for the loss in value the nonconformity caused.16
Two traps follow from the Code's terminology. The first is the label. “Revocation of acceptance” was a new term when the Code arrived, and early courts sometimes treated what the drafters would call revocation as rescission or rejection without looking at § 2-608. In recent years that trend has reversed.17 An answer that gives an accepting buyer the any-respect right of rejection repeats the early mistake. The second trap is the late rejection. A court applying Michigan's version of the Code would not let a buyer's rejection stand when the buyer could not have revoked. The buyer had stamped the steel into parts, a substantial change in the goods not caused by their own defects, and the court held that it would misapply the Code to give effect to a rejection that a revocation could not have supported.18
Some commentators doubt how much the gap matters in practice. Courts' reluctance to let a buyer reject for an insubstantial nonconformity, together with the other limits on perfect tender, may mean that the rule courts actually apply is closer to substantial performance.19 The statutory text and the cases above still keep the two standards apart, and an answer should do the same.
The first step matters most, because every later step changes once the buyer has accepted. The five conditions of revocation in steps three and four are taken up one at a time in the next section.