Concept
Effect of Revocation
UCC sale of goods: perfect tender and revocation of acceptance
Effect of Revocation
A buyer who justifiably revokes acceptance ends up, as to the goods, where a buyer who rejected them on delivery would stand. Section 2-608(3) says so in a single sentence: a buyer who “so revokes” has “the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.”1
The words “so revokes” carry the weight, because they send you back to the elements: a nonconformity that substantially impairs the goods’ value, an excuse for having accepted, revocation within a reasonable time, no substantial change in the goods, and notice to the seller. A buyer who falls short on any one has not revoked in the statutory sense, so none of the consequences below attach; it remains an accepting buyer with, at most, a claim for damages. A Vermont case about a cow shows what clearing the elements looks like. The cow’s condition did not match the seller’s representation about its health, which established the nonconformity. The buyer revoked within a reasonable time after discovering the defect, notified the seller promptly, and had skipped inspecting the cow’s mouth only because he relied on the seller’s representation.2 No one claimed a substantial change in the cow’s condition, and the findings showed no substantial impairment of its value caused by the buyer.3
The Code borrows the rejection scheme because revocation was built to replace a murkier doctrine. Revocation of acceptance was instituted to resolve the ambiguities of common-law rescission, and apart from timing (rejection comes before acceptance, revocation after) the two have the same legal effect, as the Colorado court in Cissell Mfg. Co. v. Park explained.4 The timing matters because acceptance changes the buyer’s position. A buyer who signifies that the goods conform, or that it will take or retain them despite the nonconformity, or who fails to reject, loses the right of rejection.5 Revocation lets a buyer who has accepted reach, after the fact, the position that rejection would have given it.
The two rights share their consequences but not their entrance requirements. A buyer may reject for relatively minor defects, yet it may revoke only if the nonconformity “substantially impairs” the goods’ value. The gap reflects the prejudice to the seller, because a buyer’s acceptance “will most likely make the seller’s ability to cure the nonconformity or resell the goods much more difficult.”6 Choosing the threshold also chooses whose regret the law will indulge. A buyer may regret a deal because the market price has fallen, and the basis for rejection can favor the ability of one party or the other to act on that regret.7 The harder it is to reject, the easier it is for a seller to chisel by delivering goods that are just a bit nonconforming.8
The cross-reference yields two kinds of consequence. The first is the buyer’s rights against the seller, taken up next: what a justified revocation gives the buyer, including its effect on the price, and what it takes from the seller. The second is what the buyer may do with the goods while the dispute lasts. Rejection has always paired rights with obligations about holding and using the goods, and a revoking buyer inherits both. The two belong together because a buyer that wins the right to revoke can lose it by treating the goods as its own.
Remedies After Revocation
Section 2-608(3) is the whole remedial framework for a successful revocation, because it routes the buyer into the remedies Article 2 gives a rejecting buyer.9 Article 2 sorts buyer remedies by the buyer’s status. Section 2-711 collects the remedies of a buyer who has not accepted the goods or who has justifiably revoked, and § 2-714 governs a buyer who has finally accepted.10 Because acceptance ends the right of rejection, revocation is the route back to the first track.11 The New Mexico court in Gawlick v. American Builders Supply, Inc. worked from the other side of the line. Section 2-714(2) sets a measure of damages for breach of warranty “based on an acceptance,” and the unchallenged finding there was that the acceptance had been revoked,12 so a measure built on acceptance was the wrong place to start. The conditions for revocation matter because the easier it is to reject, the easier it is for a buyer to avoid a transaction because it is dissatisfied with the deal rather than with the goods.13
The first two remedies unwind the sale. A revoking buyer may cancel and may recover as much of the price as it has already paid, and it may do both while also recovering money damages.14 The Code thus rejects the pre-UCC election of remedies. Under prior law a buyer who rescinded and gave the goods back recovered the price it had paid but no more, while a buyer who sued for damages had to affirm the contract and keep the goods.15 That history is why calling the remedy “rescission” undersells it: the revoking buyer collects the refund and the damages.
Damages follow the rejection scheme, and only the outline belongs here. A buyer that covers by making a reasonable, good-faith purchase of substitute goods without unreasonable delay may recover the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price, plus incidental and consequential damages, less the expenses it saved. If the cover was made in good faith, it does not matter that the price was not the lowest available.16 Other measures exist for the buyer that does not cover; they belong with the study of remedies.
A buyer may also recover incidental and consequential damages under § 2-715. The Code dropped the older requirement that the seller “tacitly agreed” to bear the particular loss, but it kept the common-law requirement that the loss arise from facts the seller had reason to know when the contract was made.17 McGinnis v. Wentworth Chevrolet Co. shows the point in practice: the revoking buyer’s claim reached beyond a refund to expenses such as storage, insurance, and a substitute car.
Revocation restores each side, so a buyer that enjoyed the goods or damaged them before giving them back may owe the seller a credit. In Jorgensen v. Pressnall, discussed below, the seller received an offset for the rental value of the mobile home during the buyers’ occupancy.18 But a seller who claims a credit must prove its amount. In Gawlick the court found no factual basis for an offset against the buyer: the evidence showed that the buyer had used the vehicle but supplied neither evidence nor inference of the reasonable value of that use.19 The same gap sank the claim for a dent in the vehicle, since the record showed neither the monetary decrease in value nor the cost of repair.20
Every remedy here presupposes that the seller learned of the revocation, and notice does real work. Notifying the seller of the buyer’s complaint “opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation.”21 It also lets the seller inspect the goods and investigate while the facts are fresh, so the seller can minimize its damages and better defend itself if litigation follows.22 The facts of Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller show the shape such a message takes. The buyer’s wife noticed shortly after he took delivery that the wagon had no spare tire; the next morning he told the dealer he insisted on the tire he had ordered and, told that none was available, said he would stop payment on his two checks.23 Delay carries its own risk. In an on-approval sale of furniture, a buyer who failed to notify the seller seasonably, meaning within a reasonable time, bore the risk of loss and owed the contract price.24
A buyer that holds goods after revoking also has a security interest in them, for the payments it has made on the price and for the expenses it reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care, and custody.25 The interest exists only where the buyer has possession or control; if the seller fails to deliver or repudiates, the buyer has no goods to secure its right to recover what it paid.26 The reason is practical. The buyer has paid for goods it no longer wants, and without a security interest it would have to surrender them and chase the seller for a refund with nothing in hand.
The seller loses correspondingly. The Code’s list of seller remedies, which includes withholding delivery, stopping delivery in a carrier’s hands, identifying goods to the contract, reselling and suing for damages, and suing for the difference between market and contract price, is a list for a buyer’s breach.27 A buyer who justifiably revokes has not breached, and revocation, like rejection, allows it to avoid the obligation to pay the price.28 Title revests in the seller by operation of law, and the revesting is not a sale.29
All of this depends on the revocation being effective. The oven buyer in Barry & Sewall Industrial Supply Co. v. Metal-Prep of Houston, Inc. announced a revocation but kept running the oven; the court held that the continuing use defeated the theory, treated the revocation as ineffective, and turned to the breach-of-warranty remedy under § 2-714.30 A Tennessee court reached a parallel result for a homeowner who revoked as to a phone system and a music system while the rest of his equipment stayed in his home through trial: he had not revoked as to that equipment, so he owed the contract price for it.31 An accepting buyer is not without recourse. In a steel dispute, the buyer owed the price less the scrap value it had already turned over, and because it had notified the seller of the breach within a reasonable time, it could withhold on account of the breach.32 The measure for such a buyer differs from the revoking buyer’s. Section 2-714(2) compares the value of the goods accepted with the value they would have had as warranted, at the time and place of acceptance, and it does not consider the contract price.33 The buyer who revokes effectively and the buyer who does not both hold nonconforming goods, so the defect does not separate them. What separates them is whether the revocation survived the buyer’s own conduct.
Holding and Using the Goods
A revoking buyer takes on the duties that travel with a rejecting buyer’s rights, because § 2-608(3) gives it “the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.”35 Two of those duties organize this subsection. The first is a prohibition: the buyer may not act as owner, because acceptance means the buyer takes the goods as its own, while rejection means the seller must take them back.36 The second is an affirmative obligation: a buyer that has taken physical possession must hold the goods with reasonable care for a time sufficient to permit the seller to remove them.37 The buyer’s side of that second duty is to make the goods available. The Colonial Dodge buyer, for instance, told the dealer that the vehicle could be picked up from in front of his home.38
Each duty answers a danger. Timely return lets the seller either make the goods conforming and tender them again or sell them to someone else, which mitigates damages and curtails commercial loss.39 A steel buyer that held goods for three months and stamped out all of the steel lost its right to reject: the court called three months an over-long period and found that the stamping made rejection untimely and ineffective.40 Rejection, the court added, is generally not effective after goods have been manufactured into parts.41 The same logic reaches a revoking buyer, who inherits a rejecting buyer’s duties. Delay and use compound the harm. The longer a buyer keeps goods, the likelier it is that the buyer caused or aggravated the defect, the more benefit the buyer draws from using them, and the greater their depreciation.42 A buyer who watched the market price fall may also regret the bargain,43 and a revoking buyer free to use or dispose of the goods as it pleased could turn that regret into an exit.
Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co. shows what happens when a buyer cannot hold the goods. The court listed among the requirements of an effective revocation that a buyer who has taken physical possession held the goods with reasonable care long enough to permit the seller to remove them.44 It then found that Eaton did not and could not hold the controllers so that Magnavox could remove them, noting that § 2-608(3) gives a revoking buyer a rejecting buyer’s duties and that § 2-602(2)(b) requires a buyer in physical possession to hold the goods a reasonable time for the seller’s removal.45 A buyer that has parted with the goods cannot hold them for the seller, which was a further defect in Eaton’s attempt.
The seller’s silence does not license the buyer to discard what it holds. In United States for Use & Benefit of Whitaker’s Inc. v. C.B.C. Enterprises, Inc. the buyer removed and discarded cabinets after the seller failed to retrieve them, and the court said that even a rightful rejection would not have given the buyer that power.
The security interest explains why a revoking buyer may lawfully stay in possession. A buyer that justifiably revokes keeps a security interest in the goods, and that interest entitles it to continue in possession to preserve its collateral.46 Jorgensen v. Pressnall applies the point. The buyers of a new mobile home tendered it back, subject to their security interest, and demanded return of the down payment and consequential damages.47 On their lawyer’s advice they kept living in it until about three weeks before trial, and the home was repossessed afterward and resold at a loss.48 The seller argued that the occupancy was an act inconsistent with its ownership, which would amount to acceptance under § 2-606(1)(c). The court rejected the argument. The security interest entitled the buyers to stay in possession to preserve their collateral, occupancy was the most feasible way to protect the home from water damage, covered storage would have been expensive, and the seller lost nothing because the trial court had awarded it an offset for the home’s rental value.49
The offset is what makes this arrangement tolerable to the seller, and Gawlick shows its limit: a credit unsupported by evidence of its amount is no credit at all.50
A buyer that goes on to use the goods in earnest invites the argument that it has reaccepted them, and courts answer by asking whether the use was reasonable. Only when the buyer’s actions with respect to the goods are unreasonable will a court invalidate the revocation and treat the later conduct as reacceptance under § 2-606(1)(c).51 That standard sits between two worries: the harder it is to reject, the easier it is for the seller to chisel, and the easier it is to reject, the easier it is for a buyer to escape a deal it is dissatisfied with.52 In McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. the buyer kept driving her car extensively after telling the dealer she was rescinding, and the Ohio Supreme Court held that she had not forfeited the right to revoke, because whether continued use after notice vitiates a revocation depends solely on whether the use was reasonable, a question for the trier of fact. The test grows out of the buyer’s predicament: a buyer is often constrained by circumstances, many within the seller’s control, to keep using the goods until a suitable replacement can be found. Courts have found continued use of a mobile home reasonable when the revoking buyer has no substitute accommodations, and such use can mitigate the incidental damages the seller will owe if the revocation is upheld.53 In Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Machine & Foundry Co. the buyer’s seller was the only domestic maker of the machines, so the buyer faced a choice between continuing to use some of them and going out of business, and its continued use did not bar its claim.
The first two questions look to the buyer’s side of the problem and the last three to the seller’s. A seller’s assurances carry weight at both ends of a revocation. An assurance, even one implicit in a repair warranty, may extend the time within which a buyer can revoke: a truck buyer who returned the truck ten times for repair before attempting to revoke had relied on the warranty that defects would be repaired.54 A buyer with a real need and a seller who stayed silent, kept promising repairs, or suffered no extra loss presents the strongest case for reasonable use.
Two decisions mark the poles. Jorgensen upheld a revocation despite long occupancy because the use protected the collateral, avoided costly storage, and left the seller whole through the offset. In Barry & Sewall a buyer announced revocation of an oven and kept using it, and the court, applying Minnesota’s version of the Code, held that the continuing use defeated the revocation theory, which left the buyer with its remedy for breach of warranty.55 The court added that the buyer had not actively pursued revocation at trial, that neither district judge had addressed the matter, and that it would not speculate about their reasoning.56 The usual mistake is to answer that any use after revocation ends it, or that a revoking buyer may use the goods freely. The right answer asks what explained the use and what it cost the seller.
The contrast tracks the McCullough questions. The second bakery’s eight months of baking gave it the benefit of the oven while the oven kept depreciating, and the seller, left without instructions or a substitute, absorbed the loss.57
Courts disagree about how much a revoking buyer must do with the goods it holds. One Texas decision read the purpose of § 2-711 as requiring the buyer to proceed expeditiously to sell the property and recover its investment, but courts in other jurisdictions have not imposed that requirement.58 The disagreement appears within a single case, Cardwell v. International Housing, Inc. Judge Spaeth, dissenting, agreed with Judge Price that the buyers timely and properly revoked, but he did not agree that they reaccepted the home.59
A finding of reacceptance changes the buyer’s position completely. If a revocation was effective but the buyer later reaccepted the goods by continuing to use them, damages are awarded under a breach-of-warranty theory, the same measure that governs a buyer that accepted and never revoked.60