Concept
The Aggrieved Party's Options
Anticipatory repudiation
The Aggrieved Party's Options
When one party repudiates before performance is due, the other party need not respond in any single prescribed way. For sales of goods, UCC § 2-610 lists the choices. It applies when either party repudiates a performance not yet due, the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the contract to the other.1 Once that threshold is met, the aggrieved party may await performance for a commercially reasonable time, may resort to any remedy for breach, and may, in either case, suspend its own performance.2 Each right gets its own subsection below, starting with the option to wait.
The threshold decides which repudiations count, so it deserves attention first. The UCC's phrase “substantially impairs” borrows from material breach: one court explained that whether a nonconformity rises to substantial impairment may be judged by reference to the concept of material breach under traditional contract law. The more useful test asks whether material inconvenience or injustice will result if the aggrieved party is forced to wait and receive an ultimate tender minus the part or aspect repudiated.3
The common law reaches parallel responses by a different route. Under Restatement (Second) § 253, a repudiation made before any breach by nonperformance, and before the repudiator has received all of the agreed exchange, gives rise by itself to a claim for damages for total breach. It also discharges the other party's remaining duties to render performance.4 The injured party may instead wait a reasonable time and urge the repudiator to perform without giving up its remedies.5 Whether the repudiator may then take the refusal back is a separate question, treated in the next section on retraction. The first option, awaiting performance, comes now.
Awaiting Performance
The first response in UCC § 2-610 is the quietest: the aggrieved party may “for a commercially reasonable time await performance by the repudiating party.”6 The option arises only when the repudiation concerns a performance not yet due whose loss will substantially impair the contract's value.7 It lets the aggrieved party hold the contract open without suing or cancelling. It also leaves the repudiator room to reconsider, because a repudiating party may retract until its next performance is due, unless the aggrieved party has since cancelled, materially changed its position, or otherwise indicated that it considers the repudiation final.8
Waiting costs the aggrieved party none of its other rights. Section 2-610(b) lets it resort to any remedy for breach even after telling the repudiating party that it would await performance and urging retraction.9 That is a departure from the older election theory, under which a promisee who insisted on performance was held to have kept the contract alive. The weight of authority, the Restatements, and the UCC now reject that theory.10 Waiting does carry its own risk, however: if the contract is frustrated while the aggrieved party waits, the right to damages may be lost.11
The wait is also bounded. Comment 1 to § 2-610 says that an aggrieved party who awaits performance beyond a commercially reasonable time cannot recover resulting damages that he should have avoided. The rule apparently was meant to overcome cases that let the aggrieved party ignore a repudiation until a breach by nonperformance, and it matches the general common-law rule that the injured party must act promptly after learning of the repudiation.12 The Code does not say exactly what a late buyer forfeits. The likeliest answer is that a buyer who does not cover within a reasonable time after the repudiation loses the right to measure damages by cover, along with consequential damages that cover could reasonably have avoided.13
The reason for the limit appears once you ask what an unlimited wait would allow. A buyer holding a repudiated contract at a fixed price could wait for the performance date and watch the market. If prices fell, it could simply cover at the lower price. If prices rose, it could fix its damages as of the performance date and recover the difference under § 2-713(1). The buyer would be speculating with the repudiator's money.14
Oloffson v. Coomer shows a court enforcing that limit. A grain dealer who had contracted to buy corn from a farmer did not cover when the farmer repudiated. He waited until the later delivery date, by which time the market price of corn had gone up sharply. The Illinois court held for the farmer. It found that the dealer's failure to cover when he learned of the repudiation was contrary to the usage of trade in the grain business and therefore lacked good faith. Had he followed that usage, he would have let the farmer cancel and buy his way out by paying the difference between contract and market price on the day of cancellation, 4 cents a bushel or $1,600.15 In effect, the court treated the commercially reasonable time as expiring when the dealer first heard of the unequivocal repudiation, and it may have been influenced by the fact that the dealer was awaiting performance in a rising market and so gambling with the seller's money.16 The parties' positions also mattered. Coomer was a farmer, while Oloffson was an active and sophisticated dealer with wide knowledge of alternative supply sources, and so was best placed to arrange a substitute and avoid delay and added cost.17
Critics doubt the result. The statute gives the buyer an express right to wait a commercially reasonable time, and a rule that measures damages from the moment the buyer learned of the repudiation leaves little of that right.18 One critic adds that the court itself pointed to a “well organized and easily accessible market for purchases of grain to be delivered in the future,” so the real question is how readily each side could have used it.19 Another court put the general point plainly: the circumstances of the particular market determine how long a commercially reasonable time lasts, and the time cannot be treated as expired without a showing that cover was easily and immediately available in an organized and accessible market.20
The limit rests on mitigation, so it reaches beyond the sale of goods. The victim of a repudiation may decline to accept it and give the repudiator a chance to recant, but the mitigation principle requires that choice to be made reasonably.21 A lease can be repudiated before performance is due just as a sale can.22 A tenant who receives a clear repudiation of a warehouse lease while industrial rents climb daily, and who waits three weeks for a retraction before renting substitute space, may find its damages confined to the added rent it would have paid had it acted within a reasonable time.23
The length of the permitted wait also bears on a question the UCC leaves open: when is a buyer's market price fixed after a repudiation? Section 2-713 ties the measure to the time the buyer learned of the breach, and courts have read that three ways. They have fixed damages when the buyer learns of the repudiation, a commercially reasonable time afterward, or when performance is due.24 Each reading has a cost. Suppose a buyer of skis learns on August 2 that the seller has repudiated, when the market stands at $225 a pair. If damages are fixed at that moment, the buyer cannot use the right § 2-610(a) seems to give it, to await performance for a commercially reasonable time, without risking loss from later market shifts.25 If damages are fixed at the time for performance, the buyer can speculate as described above.26 The court in the Cosden dispute chose the middle course and measured damages at a commercially reasonable point after the buyer was told that its three orders were cancelled.27 An exam answer should note the split without treating any one reading as settled.
Step three does the real work. It is the only step that depends on facts the statute does not supply.
Resorting to Remedies
The second response in § 2-610 is the one that makes the first safe. Section 2-610(b) lets the aggrieved party “resort to any remedy for breach,” drawing on the seller's remedies in § 2-703 or the buyer's in § 2-711, even though it has notified the repudiating party that it would await performance and has urged retraction.29 As with the other options, the right belongs only to a party whose counterpart has repudiated a performance not yet due whose loss will substantially impair the contract's value.30 Asking the repudiator to reconsider therefore carries no legal cost. A party may press for performance in the morning and cover or sue in the afternoon.
Courts once held otherwise. Under the election theory, an aggrieved party could treat a repudiation as a breach or as inoperative, and one who chose the second course kept the contract alive, in Lord Cockburn's words in Frost v. Knight, “for the benefit of the other party as well as his own.”31 Bernstein v. Meech applied the theory. In August the plaintiff wrote that he would not honor an engagement at the defendant's theater unless the promised pay was increased. The defendant replied that the plaintiff must comply with the contract, heard nothing more, and booked other entertainers. When the plaintiff appeared in December and tendered his services, the defendant refused them because a substitute had been hired. The court held the defendant liable on the ground that by insisting on performance he had elected to keep the contract alive.32
The decision exposes the theory's defect. The defendant did what a sensible party does, which was to urge the other side to honor the deal, and the law turned that request into liability. The case and the theory have been strongly criticized, and the weight of authority, the Restatements, and the UCC take the contrary position; § 2-610(b) says so in terms.33 The modern rule removes the gamble, so a party may press for performance without committing itself to keep the contract alive.
Consider how the clause works on a simple case. Sergeant, a snorkel seller, tells Bailey on March 10 that his business is in serious financial trouble and he cannot and will not deliver on April 1. Losing the entire delivery substantially impairs the contract's value to Bailey, so § 2-610 applies.34 Bailey may await performance for a commercially reasonable time, and if he tells Sergeant that he will wait and urges retraction, he may still resort to any remedy for breach.35 When Sergeant stays silent, Bailey remains free to buy snorkels elsewhere or to sue.
For goods, the remedies themselves come from the Article 2 provisions that § 2-610(b) cross-references, and the details belong to the remedies material.36 Three points matter here. A buyer that covers may measure its damages by cover, and a buyer that does not may recover the difference between market and contract price under § 2-713(1).37 A buyer that has paid some or all of the price of identified goods may be able to recover those goods under § 2-502.38 And specific performance carries a timing wrinkle: pre-Code law let the repudiatee bring an immediate action for a decree but postponed the decree's effectiveness until the contract date for performance, and § 2-610(b) can be read the same way.39 A repudiating buyer exposes the seller to the parallel measure under § 2-708(1): the difference between the market price at the time and place for tender and the contract price, plus incidental damages, minus expenses saved.40
Outside sales of goods, the common law reaches the same freedom by another route. A repudiation gives rise by itself to a claim for total breach and discharges the injured party's remaining duties, so the injured party may stop performing and sue at once.41 The courier in Hochster v. De La Tour did exactly that: his employer wrote on May 11 that he no longer wanted the courier's services, and the courier sued on May 22, before the trip was to start on June 1.42 The repudiation may be treated as an immediate material breach with all the related rights, even though the duty to perform has not yet fallen due.43 The injured party's choices then resemble those that follow any uncured material breach: cease its own performance and seek full contract damages, or rescind and sue in restitution.44 At common law, as under the UCC, urging the repudiator to perform first forfeits none of these choices.45
The freedom to choose a remedy does not include freedom to keep running up costs. In Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., the county terminated a bridge project and told the contractor to stop work, but the contractor disregarded the instruction and built the bridge. The court allowed the contractor its anticipated profit and the losses incurred up to the breach, and denied it any compensation for expenditures made afterward. It also dismissed Lord Cockburn's view as out of harmony with American decisions.46 The modern cases, which carry the overwhelming weight of authority, hold that the duty to mitigate overrides the concept of election.47 Remedies for repudiation protect the value of the lost bargain. They do not finance a performance the other side has refused.
Every option in § 2-610 depends on the substantial-impairment threshold, and the threshold is where an overeager buyer goes wrong.
A buyer that cancels on an announcement of that kind risks becoming the breaching party, because if no qualifying repudiation occurred, the buyer was not justified in terminating the contract.48 At common law the same screen operates through total breach, since a statement repudiates only if the breach it announces would itself give a claim for damages for total breach.49 A party whose worry falls short of that standard may have a right to request adequate assurance of performance, which was taught earlier.50
Resorting to a remedy has one more consequence, and it leads into the next section. A repudiating party may retract until its next performance is due, unless the aggrieved party has since cancelled, materially changed its position, or otherwise indicated that it considers the repudiation final.51 Urging retraction leaves that window open. Cancelling the contract closes it, and covering with a substitute supplier may count as a material change of position. The aggrieved party can press for performance without losing anything, but when it takes a remedy it also ends the repudiator's chance to undo the damage.
Suspending Performance
UCC § 2-610(c) gives the aggrieved party a right that travels with the other two. “In either case,” whether it awaits performance or resorts to a remedy, it may suspend its own performance, or proceed under the seller's right to identify goods to the contract notwithstanding breach or to salvage unfinished goods under § 2-704.53 Suspension is therefore not a third choice competing with the first two. Bailey, the snorkel buyer whose seller said he could not and would not deliver, may hold back his own performance whether he waits for Sergeant to reconsider or resorts to a remedy.54 Like the other options, the right arises only when the repudiation concerns a performance not yet due whose loss will substantially impair the contract's value.55
The right follows from how repudiation operates in a bilateral contract. An anticipatory repudiation excuses the conditions that may have shielded the repudiating party's duty to perform, and it may also excuse the other party's performance. The practical effect is that the non-repudiating party may properly suspend performance or preparations and has a defense to going forward.56 The Restatement reaches the same place by discharge: one party's repudiation of a duty to render performance in an exchange of promises discharges the other party's remaining duties.57 Suspension spares the aggrieved party from spending money and effort on a deal the other side has declared off. It is also a pause and not a forfeiture. If the repudiation is properly retracted, the other party is given additional time to perform, and retraction reinstates the repudiating party's rights with due excuse and allowance to the aggrieved party for any delay the repudiation caused.58
Article 2A applies the same rule to leases of goods. When a lessee repudiates, the lessor may suspend its own performance, and it may also wait a commercially reasonable time for retraction, demand adequate assurance of performance, or resort to any remedy for default.59
Suspension is a right to stop spending, and it is not a right to keep going. Under the older election theory, a number of early American cases held that a promisee could elect to perform after a repudiation. The modern cases, representing the overwhelming weight of authority, hold that the duty to mitigate overrides election, so a promisee may not continue to perform if the effect would be to enlarge damages.60 Rockingham County shows the result: the contractor who kept building after the county repudiated recovered its anticipated profit and losses to the date of breach, but nothing for the expenditures it made afterward.61 The duty runs both ways. If a contractor repudiates, the owner must mitigate, for example by securing another contractor.62
The reference to § 2-704 applies the same loss-avoidance logic from the seller's side. A seller whose buyer repudiates while goods are in production may identify goods to the contract notwithstanding breach or salvage unfinished goods.63 Consistent with mitigation, the sensible choice between finishing and stopping is the course that reduces the seller's loss. In the bridge case continued work enlarged the loss, while in the seller's case it may shrink it. The detailed seller's remedies belong to the remedies material.
The right to suspend rests on a genuine repudiation. A party that holds back performance because the other side has voiced difficulty or doubt may discover that no repudiation occurred, and it is then the party that failed to perform. In cases of real uncertainty, the safer course is a demand for adequate assurance of performance, which was taught earlier.64
Step three decides most contested cases, because the same decision to keep working can be a sensible loss-avoiding step for one party and a pointless addition to the damages claim for another.