Concept
Meaning of Good Faith
Obligation of good faith and fair dealing
Meaning of Good Faith
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing on every contract, in both performance and enforcement, but the section does not itself say what the phrase means.1 The comment explains why: “good faith” is used in many contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with each. For performance and enforcement, the comment stresses faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the other party’s justified expectations, and it excludes conduct that violates community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness.2 The previous section named the interest the duty protects, the fruits of the contract. This section asks what a party must do, or refrain from doing, to honor the duty, and the answer comes mainly from the UCC’s definition and from cases about motive and reasonableness.
The UCC definition has two halves of different character. Revised UCC § 1-201(b)(20) defines good faith as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”3 Honesty in fact is subjective, because it asks what the party actually believed and intended. Observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing is objective, because it measures the conduct against a yardstick outside the party’s own head. The old law shows the split plainly. Before the revision, the general Code definition required only “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned,” a minimal standard that demanded subjective honesty and set no objective test of reasonableness. Only a merchant in a transaction in goods carried the higher Article 2 standard, which added “the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”4 Revised Article 1 puts both halves into one definition for everyone. A clear majority of states have adopted it, but a number have kept honesty in fact as the only statutory test, at least for parties who are not Article 2 merchants.5
Common-law courts use a similar two-part vocabulary. Carma Developers, Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc. described the implied covenant as having a subjective aspect and an objective aspect, so that a party breaches it by acting without a genuine belief in the validity of its conduct or by acting in a way that is objectively unreasonable. Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition covers the same ground: it combines honesty in belief or purpose with observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade, and it adds faithfulness to one’s duty and the absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage.6
Beyond that shared structure, the phrase has no single content, because it takes its meaning from the particular bad faith a court is ruling out. A judge who says a public authority must act in good faith in letting bids usually means only that the authority may not call for bids as a pretense while planning to award the contract to a favored bidder.7 Later in this unit the excluded conduct is a false claim of dissatisfaction, an extorted modification, or a price set to drive a dealer out of business, and “good faith” answers each one differently. States also disagree about what the doctrine is for. The Supreme Court noted in Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg that some states use the covenant to carry out the parties’ intentions and protect their reasonable expectations, while others use it to keep a party from violating community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness.8
This chapter therefore sorts the doctrine into three strands. Honesty in fact is the subjective strand. Observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing is the objective strand. Improper motive asks whether the party acted for a purpose the duty forbids. Disputes rarely fall into one strand, and one set of facts often implicates two or all three, so the labels exist to help you learn each strand cleanly and then combine them.
Honesty in Fact
Honesty in fact is the one element that every version of good faith contains. Even the narrowest statutory test, kept in some states for parties who are not Article 2 merchants, requires it.9 The test looks into the actor’s mind and asks whether the party actually believes what it asserts and whether the reason it announced is the reason it acted on. The pre-revision Code definition, which stopped at honesty, required only subjective honesty and set no objective standard of reasonableness.10 A sincere but mistaken belief is therefore not dishonest, and this strand does not ask whether the decision was wise.
Sincerity works as the floor for a practical reason. An announced reason invites a response: the other side can cure the defect it is told about, contest the facts, pay under protest, or look for another supplier. A reason that is false, or that surfaces only after the fight begins, sends that response to the wrong target and hides the real purpose, which is usually to escape the bargain or to extract more from it. The test is also easy to administer, because a court asks what the party believed and never has to decide whether the choice was a good one.
Demands to modify a contract show the test at work. In Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., the court treated a seller’s threat to stop performing unless the buyer agreed to a higher price as supporting an inference of bad faith, and it held that the inference had not been rebutted. The seller offered no legal justification for nonperformance when it sought the modification. The justification appeared only as an afterthought in the litigation, and the court held that this was not the “honesty in fact” the UCC good-faith obligation requires.11
Timing matters because it is the best evidence of what the party believed when it acted. A reason that did not exist until the lawsuit cannot have been the reason for the threat. The test also reaches intentions a party never announces. In Crane Co. v. Progressive Enterprises, Inc., the buyer agreed to a higher price while secretly intending never to pay it, and the court held that this secret intention was not in keeping with the requirement of “honesty in fact.” Some courts have held that a party who agrees to an assertedly coerced modification has a good-faith duty to make plain that it acts under protest, so that the other side is not deceived about its intention to resist enforcement or seek redress. Another court declined to bar a buyer’s later objection merely because the buyer never formally protested, and it distinguished Crane.12
Honesty in fact also sets the minimum when a contract makes one party’s satisfaction the measure of the other’s performance. Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd. gives the cleanest picture of the dishonest version. A sitter hires a painter to produce a portrait to the sitter’s satisfaction. The painter delivers, and the sitter is in fact satisfied but says otherwise, hoping to push the agreed price down because the portrait may be unsaleable to anyone else. The Seventh Circuit called that bad faith, “not because any provision of the contract was unreasonable and had to be reformed but because a provision had been invoked dishonestly to achieve a purpose contrary to that for which the contract had been made.” The duty, the court explained, is not to “be reasonable” but to avoid exploiting the gaps and vulnerabilities that sequential performance creates. Once the portrait exists, the painter has performed and has little leverage, and a false claim of dissatisfaction preys on that weakness.13
The mirror image is the sitter who truly dislikes the likeness. That sitter may decline to pay even if everyone else admires the portrait, because the clause makes the sitter’s own satisfaction the measure and honest dissatisfaction is all the clause requires. The same logic applies when a contract leaves a question to an expert’s honest judgment. Where the contract left the question of “defects of a substantial nature” to the honest judgment of the defendant’s building inspector, the court looked to that judgment rather than to its own view, even though the trial court had concluded the defects, though expensive to remedy, were not substantial.14
Locke v. Warner Bros. applies the same minimum to creative judgments. The appellate court found triable issues on two theories: whether Warner breached its development deal with Locke by categorically refusing to work with her, and whether Warner entered the agreement fraudulently, with no intention of working with her.15 A studio’s subjective creative decision is not reviewable for reasonableness, and the trial court was wrong to treat creative decisions as beyond judicial review altogether. The studio’s dissatisfaction still had to be genuine, and a studio that refuses in advance to consider anything has not exercised its judgment at all.
The same pattern governs the rejection of goods. UCC § 2-601 lets a buyer “reject the whole” of a tender, but the right is exercised subject to the UCC’s obligation of good faith in performance and enforcement.16
Commercial Reasonableness
The second half of the UCC definition measures conduct against an outside yardstick, so a party can be completely sincere and still fall short of it. A buyer that truthfully announces why it is acting satisfies honesty in fact and has said nothing yet about commercial reasonableness. Under revised Article 1 the combined definition covers every party, and the older merchant formulation’s reference to standards “in the trade” no longer appears in the text.18 In states that kept honesty in fact as the only statutory test for nonmerchants, such a party answers only to the subjective strand.19
The yardstick comes from commercial practice rather than from an abstract ideal of reasonableness. What counts as reasonable depends on the nature of the parties’ undertaking and the standards of the business or industry in which they deal.20 Merchants write contracts against a background of trade practice they rarely spell out, so tying the standard to that practice lets the duty fill gaps as the parties would have expected. It also gives a court a reference point outside the defendant’s conscience, such as comparable prices or usual notice periods.
Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co. shows a trade norm becoming the measure. The Ninth Circuit reinstated a jury verdict against Shell, finding substantial evidence that Shell breached its contract with Nanakuli in 1974.21 Shell had the contractual right to set the price, and a posted price will normally satisfy good faith. The dispute concerned how an increase was put into effect: Shell raised its asphalt price effective January 1 in a letter written December 31 and received January 4, in a trade where advance notice of increases was the norm. The jury could find that the abrupt manner failed commercially reasonable standards of fair dealing, even if the new price itself was fair.
The objective strand also has a limit that students often miss. The Code asks for fair dealing, which is not the same as carefulness. A party that errs on the side of generosity or gullibility has not acted in bad faith merely because a more cautious business would have behaved differently.22 If every careless decision breached the covenant, it would become a negligence rule for commercial life, and courts would be reviewing the wisdom of choices the contract left to the parties. An argument that a careful merchant would have acted otherwise is an argument about negligence and does not by itself show unfair dealing.
Requirements contracts show the objective standard at work. A buyer agrees to buy all it needs of a good from one seller, and UCC § 2-306 measures the quantity by the requirements that occur in good faith.23 The parties chose an elastic quantity term, so both contemplated that the buyer’s needs might change a great deal, and a seller cannot complain merely that the buyer now needs less. The question is whether the decision that changed the quantity was made in good faith, judged against all the circumstances in which the contract was made and the requirements were determined.24
Courts sort reductions by their source. A reduction that results directly from reasons beyond the buyer’s control will probably be in good faith: in R.A. Weaver & Associates v. Asphalt Construction, the buyer was not liable after the construction project was altered to eliminate the limestone the plaintiff had contracted to supply.25 Wiseco, Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc. is similar. The buyer’s orders for headrest components dropped sharply when Jeep changed the headrest design and made the contracted parts unsuitable, and the court found a legitimate business reason that the seller, who bore the burden of proving bad faith, failed to overcome.26 In Chemical Distributors, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., by contrast, the evidence showed that the buyer bypassed its seller, bought directly and more cheaply from the manufacturer, and acted in part to eliminate the seller as a competitor in a related market, so a jury finding of bad faith was justified.27 Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co. states the line in general terms. A buyer does not act in good faith when it reduces orders by buying from another seller, or merely because it has second thoughts about a contract that is less advantageous than hoped. It may act in good faith when it reduces its requirements for legitimate and compelling business reasons, such as technological advances that change its fundamental needs or a dramatic drop in demand for its own products.28
The two groups of cases differ in what happened to the buyer’s need. In Weaver and Wiseco, something outside the buyer’s choice changed what it required. In Chemical Distributors, the buyer still wanted the goods and took them from someone else, so the reduction recaptured an opportunity the requirements contract had been understood to foreclose. An output seller is judged the same way: in Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc., bankruptcy or a threat to the company’s existence would have justified stopping production of bread crumbs, but earning less profit would not.29
The objective measure also reaches contractual discretion outside requirements contracts. In Dick Broadcasting Co. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., a Tennessee decision, the covenant required a party holding a right to approve an assignment under an asset purchase contract to exercise that right in a commercially reasonable manner, and it gave that party no arbitrary or unfettered discretion unless the contract expressly said so. Satisfaction and approval clauses in other settings show both edges of an objective test. In Forman v. Benson, a seller’s rejection of the buyer’s credit report was held pretextual, an attempt to renegotiate price and interest rate. An objective standard does not guarantee the plaintiff a win, however: in Kennedy Associates, Inc. v. Fischer, a mortgage lender could reasonably disapprove the property after conducting the agreed inspection.30 The chapter returns to contractual discretion in Applying the Duty.
Improper Motive
The duty of good faith attaches to every contract, but not every decision that leaves the other side worse off breaches it. In Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, the court held that breach of the implied covenant requires bad faith or ill motive, so conduct that is merely arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable does not breach it. It found the requisite ill motive in the intentional exercise of discretion to deprive the other party of the reasonable expectations the contract created.32 The first two strands ask what a party believed and whether its conduct met outside commercial standards. This third strand asks why the party acted, and it decides cases the other two cannot.
The New Jersey Supreme Court gave the standard its usual form in Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., a dispute over a gasoline seller’s discretion in setting prices. A party with contractual discretion breaches the duty if it exercises that discretion “arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously, with the objective of preventing the other party from receiving its reasonably expected fruits under the contract.”33 Both halves do work: the conduct must depart from ordinary business judgment, and it must be aimed at the other side’s expected fruits. Wilson added that a bad-faith claim should not be advanced in the abstract and without improper motive, because discretionary decisions that happen to leave the other party economically worse off carry no legal significance when no bad motive or intention lies behind them. The Seidenberg court applied that reasoning to allegations that the buyer of the plaintiffs’ brokerage firms had performed poorly, or failed to perform, in areas the contract left to its discretion.34
A motive requirement exists because a duty that attached to every harmful decision would swallow the bargain it protects. Nearly any exercise of a contractual right leaves the counterparty worse off than some alternative would have, so equating disadvantage with breach would turn the covenant into a general demand for fairness and invite judges to rewrite agreements that capable parties made for themselves. The Seidenberg court warned that an unduly expansive idea of bad faith could become an all-embracing statement of the parties’ obligations, imposing duties no one intended and destroying the mutual benefits of binding agreements.35 Requiring a purpose aimed at the other side’s fruits separates a party pursuing the self-interest the contract allows from a party using its position to take back what it gave up when it signed.
Deom v. Walgreen Co. shows the failing side of the line. A seller whose bonus depended on the buyer’s promotion of pharmacy business sales claimed the buyer had promoted poorly. The court dismissed the claim, because the governing law required an improper motive to keep the seller from the fruits of the bargain, and negligent, arbitrary, or unreasonable behavior was not enough.36
Conduct that looks entirely ordinary can still breach the duty when the purpose behind it is improper. In Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 54 franchisees alleged that Exxon set the prices it charged them for gasoline to drive them out of business and replace them with stores Exxon owned. The contract expressly let Exxon set those prices, the commentary to UCC § 2-305 suggests that a merchant’s posted price will normally meet the requirements of good faith, and Exxon’s prices were comparable to its competitors’. The Fifth Circuit nonetheless upheld the jury’s verdict for the franchisees, because substantial evidence showed that Exxon set the prices to make the franchises unprofitable.37 Mathis shows that the strands can diverge. Prices at market level meet the objective strand, yet the improper purpose still breaches the duty. A price is only a number, and the same number can be a competitive offer or a weapon. The franchisees’ expected fruit was the chance to run their stations at a reasonable profit, and a supplier that sets its price to erase that profit uses a power the contract gave it for pricing to recapture an opportunity it gave up at signing.
The courts are split on this point. The First Circuit, in Marcoux v. Shell Oil Products Co., agreed with Mathis and treated a merchant’s raising prices to drive its customer out of business as hardly the normal case the posted-price comment contemplates.38 The Texas Supreme Court, in Shell Oil Co. v. HRN, Inc., took the contrary view that a refiner’s subjective bad faith in trying to force dealers out is irrelevant so long as it charges commercially reasonable prices and does not discriminate among its purchasers.39 The minority rule rests on a worry about second-guessing. A refiner whose prices are at market and uniform can plan around an objective rule, while a motive rule makes liability depend on internal documents and testimony about intentions. The majority answers that purpose is what separates a competitor’s hard pricing from a squeeze on a dependent party, and honest hard bargaining stays protected because the plaintiff must produce evidence of the improper aim.
Improper motive takes the same shape when a party uses an ongoing deal to renegotiate it. Under UCC § 2-209(1), a modification needs no consideration to be binding, but the official comment says that modifications must still meet the test of good faith. It adds that extorting a modification without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith, and that a mere technical consideration cannot support a modification made in bad faith.40 The inquiry looks at the state of mind of the party who seeks to enforce the modification, in light of the overall commercial circumstances and the business justifications or other factors behind the change.41 The paradigm wrongdoer is the extortionist who threatens to stop work unless the buyer pays more, and the wrong is greater when the demand is for concessions the party sought in the original negotiations and failed to win.42 In Crane, by contrast, the seller’s letters supported a finding that its costs had increased, which justified asking for a higher price. The buyer, who had the contractual right to refuse and to demand performance on the original terms, instead gave objective assent to the higher price.43 Roth Steel supplies a two-part test. The modification must be consistent with commercially reasonable standards, an objective component, and it must be motivated by a legitimate reason for altering the original contract in light of supervening exigencies, a subjective one.44 The seller in Roth failed the second part, because it offered a legal justification only in the course of litigation.45
A second improper-motive pattern is the dishonest compromiser, who conjures up a dispute over the meaning of the original contract without believing in the position taken, hoping to extract a favorable compromise settlement.46
Industrial Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp. describes improper motive as opportunism, which covers two situations. In the first, a party exploits the other side’s sunk costs by demanding more for its own performance after the first performer has already invested. In the second, a party takes advantage of the other in a way that could not have been contemplated at drafting and so was never resolved in the contract. Contract law does not require parties to be fair, kind, or reasonable, or to share gains and losses equitably, but it does require them to avoid exploiting the opportunities that sequential performance creates where the contract is silent.47 Market Street Associates v. Frey illustrates the second situation. The Seventh Circuit held that the state of mind of Market Street’s representative, Orenstein, was the essential issue and could not be resolved without a trial. On remand, the district court found that Orenstein knew the other party, a pension trust, was not operating under the lease provision he had assumed it would review, yet kept writing ambiguous letters until he wanted to use his purchase option and buy the property at a discount, which breached his duty of good faith.48
The parties’ relative bargaining power and sophistication bear on the analysis, but they are not required elements of the claim. In Seidenberg the plaintiffs had built two successful brokerage firms and both sides negotiated with able counsel, and the court held that equal bargaining power and competent counsel at formation do not determine the claim.49 The trier of fact may weigh these circumstances, and they are not the only factors.50 Sophistication matters because the covenant gives no undue protection to parties who could protect themselves, so a party that bargained with counsel may find it harder to show that its expectation was reasonable.51 Even so, the covenant is implied by law in every contract, and a party does not lose protection against deliberate opportunism merely because it negotiated from strength.
How motive is proved varies with the jurisdiction and the industry. The Seidenberg court observed that the level of bad faith required may vary with the nature of the alleged breach and the type of business, and it entrusted the line between bad faith and sharp commercial practice to trial judges and juries. At the pleading stage, the complaint alleged that the defendant’s actions were wanton and willful and without privilege or right, and the court held those allegations of bad faith and ill motive sufficient to survive dismissal. Whether the proofs would meet the Wilson standard, or even survive summary judgment, was left for further investigation and discovery.52 On an exam, state the improper purpose the facts suggest, point to the evidence that shows it, and note that the pleading stage asks only for allegations of bad faith and ill motive.