Concept
Express Terms Prevail
Obligation of good faith and fair dealing
Express Terms Prevail
Good faith has a ceiling, and the written agreement sets it. Every contract imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement,1 but that duty governs how a party performs and how it uses the rights it holds; it does not take those rights away. Where the contract expressly authorizes the very conduct the other side attacks, the covenant cannot forbid it. This section states that rule, shows why the Code treats good faith as a way of reading agreements instead of a separate duty of fairness, and marks the settings where courts disagree about how far an express right must yield.
Conduct the Contract Authorizes
The rule sits where two propositions meet. First, the parties cannot contract the covenant away: a clause that would remove it is void, because good faith involves more than carrying out the parties’ intentions. It requires each party to exercise its rights and perform its duties in a way that meets basic societal standards. Second, implied terms should never be read to vary express terms, and no covenant of good faith should be implied that forbids acts and conduct the express provisions authorize.2 The parties may not waive good faith wholesale, then, but they may bargain for specific rights, and a party who uses a right it bargained for does not breach the covenant by using it.
The reason begins with what the covenant protects. Neither party may do anything that destroys or injures the other’s right to receive the fruits of the contract,3 and the contract defines those fruits. A court that implied a ban on conduct the contract expressly permits would take a right from the party who bargained for it and give the other side a protection it never negotiated. A judge or jury should first make an honest effort to determine what the parties intended before it substitutes its own notion of appropriate performance.4 The duty also creates no free-standing obligation of charity or kindness, and it may not trump a carefully negotiated express term.5 Outside the insurance context, it does not require a party holding a clear right to exercise that right to its own detriment for the other party’s benefit.6
The hard cases ask how closely the express grant matches the conduct complained of. In Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, the agreement expressly allowed Warner to refrain from marketing a singer’s recordings, so a decision not to market left no discretion for the covenant to police. Locke v. Warner Bros., Inc. turned on a different agreement. The court found triable issues whether Warner breached its development deal with Locke by categorically refusing to work with her, and whether Warner fraudulently entered the deal without intending to work with her, and it reversed the judgment on those two causes of action.7 The difference lay in what each agreement authorized. The first wrote the refusal into the contract; the second left a categorical refusal to work with Locke open to proof. A clause that uses the word discretion does not shut the covenant out, because the duty applies to discretion unless express terms carefully negate it.8
Termination provisions draw the same line. A termination under UCC § 2-309 faces two checks: the unconscionability requirements of subsection (3) and the good-faith obligation of § 1-304.9 In Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., the contract allowed termination at any time and for any reason, and the Fifth Circuit overturned a finding of bad faith, holding that the Code’s good-faith duty could not override the express terms so long as the termination provision was not unconscionable. Baker v. Ratzlaff fell on the other side of the line. A popcorn grower and seller held an express right to terminate if the buyer failed to pay on delivery. The seller exercised that right without ever requesting payment and immediately sold the popcorn that would otherwise have gone to the buyer to another buyer for nearly double the contract price. The court upheld a finding that the seller violated the Code’s good-faith requirement, and it noted that the agreement did not expressly allow termination at will.10 The clause in Corenswet authorized termination for any reason at all. The clause in Baker authorized termination for nonpayment, and the seller used it to capture a better price without first asking whether payment would come.
General words of discretion reach only as far as their language carries them. In Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, the court read an employer’s “sole discretion” over sales quotas to mean discretion to decide whether factors existed that would reasonably justify changing the quota: an unanticipated volume of business from a particular customer, unconnected with the extra sales efforts of the employee assigned to the account, or a poor overall sales year. The language did not confer discretion to raise the quota for any reason whatever, including a simple desire to deprive an employee of the fairly agreed benefit of his labors.11 Where a contract does commit a judgment to one party, the commitment holds. In one decision, the contract made a party’s obligation depend on its building inspector’s finding that the plaintiff’s building was free from “defects of a substantial nature.” The inspector found defects. The trial court thought the defects, though expensive to remedy, were not substantial, but the contract left that question to the honest judgment of the defendant’s expert, so the trial court’s contrary view did not control.12 Even then the judgment must be honest. A court that agrees only the subjective test of honest dissatisfaction applies has not necessarily decided for the defendant, because a plaintiff who proves the defendant was not honestly dissatisfied can still prevail, though that burden may be difficult.13
Courts also decline to use the covenant to add obligations the writing omits. Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc. involved a landlord who leased ground to an anchor tenant for up to 65 years at a low rent that never rose. The tenant built its own store, operated it for 21 years, and then closed it and moved to another location nearby, leaving the other 25 stores in the center without the anchor’s business. The lease imposed no operating obligation, and the court refused to imply a covenant of operation from the nominal rent or the potential 65-year duration. It focused on the absence of a percentage rent term and on the fact that the tenant had built its own store.14 Indenture disputes follow the same logic. Absent special circumstances, corporate directors owe no fiduciary duties to debt holders; the holders’ rights are contractual and set out in the indenture, and interpreting that language is a matter of basic contract law.15
Good Faith as a Reading Tool
The Code’s good-faith provision, § 1-304 (cited in older cases as § 1-203), states the same limit from another direction: it supports no independent cause of action for failure to perform or enforce in good faith.17 A failure to perform or enforce a specific duty or obligation in good faith is a breach of that contract, or it makes a remedial right or power unavailable in the circumstances. The doctrine directs a court to interpret the contract within the commercial context in which the parties created, performed, and enforced it, and it creates no separate duty of fairness and reasonableness that a party can breach on its own.18
Good faith has no content apart from the agreement. A party cannot simply act in good faith; it acts in good faith relative to the parties’ agreement, so the real question is what the agreement is. Good faith directs attention to the parties’ reasonable expectations and is not an independent source of rights and duties, and the Code’s own language extends the obligation only to rights and duties that result from the contract.19 A plaintiff who pleads only that the other side acted unfairly therefore has nothing to hold on to. A plaintiff who points to a specific duty or remedial right and shows that the defendant used it contrary to the parties’ reasonable expectations has a claim under the contract.
Reading good faith through the agreement limits the covenant in one direction and keeps it alive in another. It is wrong to conclude that, so long as the agreement allows a party to do something, the party may do it on any terms; that conclusion overlooks the difference between merely exercising a right and exercising it consistently with the parties’ reasonable expectations in light of the commercial conditions.20 This does not contradict the express-terms rule. A right is a right as written, and the covenant checks whether the party stayed within the grant and, where the grant leaves discretion, whether that discretion was exercised properly. The covenant bars a party from taking affirmative steps to frustrate the other side’s right to the contract’s benefits, and when the contract gives one party discretion, it requires the discretion to be exercised consistently with the other party’s reasonable expectations at formation unless express terms carefully negate that requirement.21 How much room the covenant has therefore depends on the words. A clause that dispenses with any reason for terminating leaves little for the covenant to protect, which helps explain Corenswet, while a right tied to a stated ground or a power to choose among options leaves the covenant a job to do.
Where Courts Divide
Courts do not agree on how much work the covenant does beside the express terms. Professor Van Alstine reported that, beginning in the 1990s, courts moved toward a new textualist approach that gives near-absolute priority to express terms and renders the implied duty irrelevant in many situations. Nearly all courts still recognize the duty in principle, but not all give it a broad application.23 At the other end, a very limited number of jurisdictions use good faith to create obligations beyond those found in the contract. Critics say that approach confuses contract law with tort law and lets a jury decide what the terms of a contract should be, substituting those terms for the agreement the parties actually made.24 Because jurisdictions sit at different points on this spectrum, an answer should identify the governing state’s approach before applying the rule.
Consent-to-sublet clauses show the division in a form that recurs in leases. Without a lease restriction, a tenant may assign or sublet freely, and restrictions are strictly construed, so a provision against assignments does not affect subleases and a provision against subleases does not affect assignments.25 Leases often prohibit assignments or subleases without the landlord’s consent. Traditionally the landlord could withhold consent arbitrarily, but in recent years most courts have read such a clause to mean that the landlord cannot withhold consent arbitrarily.26 The Restatement says the landlord cannot unreasonably withhold consent “unless a freely negotiated provision in the lease gives the landlord an absolute right to withhold consent.” That formula leaves questions open: what makes a refusal unreasonable, when a provision is freely negotiated, and whether a lease that says only “tenant shall not assign this lease” should be treated differently from one that adds “without the prior written consent of the landlord.”27
Suppose a landlord refuses consent because it would rather re-let the space at a higher rent. In the Epstein lease dispute, the court held that, even assuming the landlord had that hidden agenda, it could withhold consent for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all, because the lease carried no implied covenant requiring it to act reasonably on a proposed sublet.28 Newman v. Hinky Dinky Omaha-Lincoln, Inc. reflects the modern approach, which subjects the landlord’s refusal to good faith and reasonableness.29 Even the Restatement’s formula honors express terms, since a freely negotiated provision giving an absolute right controls. The open question is whether a clause that simply requires consent, and says nothing about reasons, grants such an absolute right or leaves a discretion the covenant polices.