Concept
Protecting the Expectation of Performance
Adequate assurance of performance
Adequate Assurance of Performance
Protecting the Expectation of Performance
A contract for the sale of goods imposes an obligation on each party: neither may impair the other's expectation of receiving due performance.1 Section 2-609 builds its remedy on that obligation. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise about either party's performance, the other may demand adequate assurance in writing and, if commercially reasonable, suspend any performance for which it has not yet received the agreed return, until the assurance arrives.2 Because the section speaks of either party, a buyer who doubts a seller stands where a seller who doubts a buyer stands.
Parties bargain for the other side's performance, not merely for its promise, and that is why the expectation deserves protection before any breach occurs.3 The right to an unimpaired expectation of proper performance raises two problems: anticipatory repudiation and the right to adequate assurance.4 This chapter is about the second, but the first defines where the second begins.
Ordinarily the law waits for breach. When one party commits a total breach at the time its performance is due, the other may treat her own performance obligations as discharged. Suppose, however, that before the performance date something happens that gives the second party serious doubts about the other's willingness or ability to perform.5 No breach has occurred, yet the doubting party must still decide whether to keep performing, and each choice carries a cost.
Anticipatory repudiation answers the extreme case. If a party repudiates before the date for performance, the injured party may await performance or sue at once, and the rule applies when the repudiation substantially impairs the value of the contract to the other.6 The repudiation must be "an overt communication of intention or an action which renders performance impossible or demonstrates a clear determination not to continue with performance."7 The effects are substantial. The non-repudiating party may suspend performance or preparations, and its immediate claim for breach lets it mitigate by seeking the return performance elsewhere.8
Commercial parties rarely give a signal that clear. They do not readily admit that they cannot perform; they may believe that new financing will arrive, that the weather will change, or that their ship will reach port in time to save the contract.9 Conduct that reasonably indicates an end to a party's continuing obligation can amount to repudiation,10 but because the bar is high, a party may hold substantial doubt that never clears it, and that doubt is hardest to bear when timely performance matters.11 Stopping one's own performance on a guess is risky: if a court later finds no repudiation, the "aggrieved" party turns out to be the breacher.12 Section 2-609 lets the insecure party ask instead of guess.
Sherman Company has agreed to sell ten machines to Peabody, Inc., for delivery on August 15. Peabody has already promised the machines to a customer, so a late delivery will cost it. On July 15, Sherman tells Peabody that it is having production problems and may be unable to deliver as agreed. Sherman has not said that it will not deliver, so its message gives Peabody grounds for insecurity rather than a repudiation.13 Peabody's proper move is to demand adequate assurance under § 2-609. If Peabody instead treats the message as a repudiation and stops performing, and a court disagrees, Peabody is the party in breach.14
Had Sherman written that it will not deliver on August 15, the message would show the clear determination that § 2-610 requires, and Peabody could await performance or sue at once.15 Remedies of that weight fit only a clear refusal. Doubt that falls short of one gets a lighter tool: the right to demand assurance and, if reasonable, to suspend one's own performance until it arrives.16
The obligation binds both sides, so the device serves sellers and buyers alike. McCloskey v. Minweld typifies the case that gave rise to § 2-609: a seller committed to supply goods for payment after delivery and received signals, before delivering, that the buyer was in financial distress. Insolvency alone is not an anticipatory repudiation, so the anxious seller needs a remedy that does not depend on one.17 Comment 3 to § 2-609 adds that a buyer who falls behind in its account impairs the seller's expectation of payment. In one case, a buyer resold the goods but paid only a small share of its revenues toward the seller's outstanding invoices and avoided the seller's calls. The court held that the seller had reasonable grounds for insecurity and could demand assurances and suspend further performance until it received payment or acceptable assurances.18 Peabody's position in the hypothetical is the mirror image.
No party must use the procedure. One who fears nonperformance may instead conclude that the other side has repudiated, which can make sense when the party is so certain that performance will fail that it wants to cancel early, minimize damages, and make alternative arrangements. That choice stays risky for the reason already given: a court that finds no repudiation will treat the cancelling party as the breacher.19 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 generalizes the device. It has no counterpart in the first Restatement and derives from § 2-609, itself a legislative innovation, and it allows an obligee who reasonably believes that the obligor will commit a breach amounting to total breach to demand assurance of performance.20
The section's steps form a chain, and each later part of this chapter takes one link:
The order matters. The right to suspend rests on both grounds and a demand, and silence becomes repudiation only after a justified demand goes unanswered. We begin with the reasonable grounds that open the door.