Concept
Responding to a Demand
Adequate assurance of performance
Responding to a Demand
A justified demand puts a question to its recipient, and the recipient’s answer decides whether the contract goes forward. Under § 2-609(1), the insecure party may demand “adequate assurance of due performance” in writing, and it may suspend its own performance only “until he receives such assurance.”1 An adequate answer ends the suspension. A missing, late, or thin answer lets the demanding party treat the contract as repudiated, as subsection (4) provides.2
The procedure exists because doubt usually arrives before anything has gone wrong. Under the rules of constructive conditions, a party whose counterpart commits a total breach when performance is due may treat its own obligations as discharged. Suppose, though, that something happens before the date specified for performance and causes serious doubts about the other side’s willingness or ability to perform. No total breach has yet occurred, so the doubting party cannot rely on discharge.3 Section 2-609 supplies the missing step. It rests on the premise that a contract for sale obliges each party not to impair the other’s expectation of receiving due performance, and it lets the doubting party try to restore that expectation by demanding assurance.4
Two questions organize the rest of this part: what makes an answer adequate, and what follows when none arrives. Both assume that the demand was justified, meaning that reasonable grounds for insecurity existed and the demand was properly made. Between merchants, commercial standards govern both the reasonableness of the grounds and the adequacy of any assurance offered.5
What Counts as Adequate
The Code does not list the answers that qualify. Subsection (4) asks only for “such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case.”6 The working definition is functional: adequate assurance is a circumstance, or an act of the obligor, that gives the obligee reason to be confident that the contract will be duly performed.7 Adequacy therefore depends on the facts, and the facts that matter most are the ones that made the demanding party insecure.
Because adequacy depends on the facts, courts commonly send it to the jury. A number of courts have recognized that the reasonableness of a party’s insecurity, the propriety of a demand, and the adequacy of the assurance tendered all present questions of fact.8 The two inquiries are conceptually distinct, but courts often apply the same underlying facts to both.9 Occasionally the facts are so one-sided that no jury is needed. In By-Lo Oil Co. v. ParTech, Inc., the court acknowledged that both questions are generally for the jury, yet held that no reasonable jury could find ParTech’s assurance inadequate or find that By-Lo had reasonable grounds for insecurity to ask for it.10
Official Comment 4 shows the test at work on a small scale. Where the buyer can make use of a defective delivery, a mere promise by a seller of good repute that he is giving the matter his attention and that the defect will not be repeated is normally sufficient. A similar statement from a known corner-cutter might well be insufficient without the posting of a guaranty or, if the buyer demands it, a speedy replacement of the delivery.11 The words are identical, and the answers differ because the listeners have different reasons to believe them. Reputation sets how much a bare promise is worth, and the weaker the promisor’s record, the more it must add that the other side can hold.
When the doubt concerns payment and the record is poor, the assurance a court will accept can be correspondingly firm. In Rocheux International of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Financial Group, the buyers continued to leave invoices unpaid for 2006 deliveries and for goods held in the seller’s warehouse. The court could not say as a matter of law that the seller’s demand for a letter of credit covering those goods was unreasonable. It also noted that the buyers never provided one, even after the seller said that a letter of credit “need be [their] only reply.”12 The court cited a decision finding that an insecure party’s requests for “an extension of contractual guarantee and the posting of a letter of credit were not unreasonable,”13 and it observed that some courts have recognized that an insecure party may request cash on delivery.14
Set side by side, By-Lo and Rocheux mark the ends of a scale. In By-Lo the demanding party lacked reasonable grounds, and the court resolved the case as a matter of law. In Rocheux the buyers’ continued failure to pay kept the seller’s demand for a letter of credit from being unreasonable as a matter of law. The facts that create the doubt also set the size of the answer.
Waldorf Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Consolidated Systems, Inc. shows one device passing in one setting and failing in the next. Consolidated worried about payment under two contracts. On the first, Waldorf offered a joint check under which Consolidated would be paid at the same time Waldorf was paid. Consolidated knew and trusted the drawer, so the court found no reasonable grounds for insecurity. It could as easily have found that grounds existed and that the joint-check offer answered them.15 On the second contract Waldorf had ignored explicit payment terms on two past projects, so the grounds were real, and its response failed twice. It came after the thirty-day limit, and it promised another joint check from a drawer with whom Consolidated had no prior experience and whose creditworthiness was unknown.16 The doubt on both contracts was whether Consolidated would be paid. A check from a trusted payer answered it, while the same arrangement through a stranger moved the doubt onto the stranger.
A general answer to a specific doubt is the weakest kind. A promisor that is uncertain about its own performance but hopes matters will work out tends to answer as ambiguously as it can, for example, “We have every expectation of fulfilling our contractual obligations.” Such expressions of hope do little to comfort the insecure party, and their status as adequate assurance is itself uncertain.17 A response that speaks to the concern can do better. In Remuda Jet Five LLC v. EMBRAER, concerns about the quality of an airplane’s components, reported in industry magazines, prompted a demand for assurances. The manufacturer answered that it would perform as its contract required, knew of no reason the planes would not meet contractual or FAA requirements, and was working on improvements that would hopefully address acknowledged performance issues. The court concluded that a response of that kind could be sufficient.18
The demand itself also helps set the target. In one illustration, Bill’s license was revoked, and Sandy was entitled to feel insecure and to demand assurance. Her demand, however, asked for little more than assurance that a newspaper report was false and hinted only vaguely at timely performance. Bill’s reply was evasive and offered nothing concrete beyond a vague statement that he would perform as promised. Sandy was right to feel unreassured, but she may be trapped by her inept demand, which called for little more than Bill gave her.19
The first step does most of the work, because every later step asks how well the response fits the doubt. By-Lo turned on the first step, since the demanding party lacked reasonable grounds. Rocheux turned on the first and third, since unpaid invoices supported a firm demand for a letter of credit. The second response in Waldorf failed the third and fifth.
Failure as Repudiation
Adequacy tells the recipient what to deliver, and subsection (4) tells it what silence costs. After receipt of a justified demand, failure to provide, within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days, such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of the contract.21 A breach, strictly speaking, can occur only when the promised performance falls due, but a party can repudiate earlier by making clear, through words or actions, that it will breach when performance falls due.22 Subsection (4) classes the failure to assure as a repudiation of that advance kind, even though the recipient never announces that it will not perform.
The rule closes a gap. Constructive conditions free a party from its own obligations when the other side commits a total breach at the time performance is due, but the doubt in these cases arises earlier.23 A recipient that could ignore a demand at no cost would leave the demanding party stuck between continued suspension and an uncertain due date. Silence that counts as repudiation gives the demanding party a clear next step and gives the recipient a strong reason to answer.
The sequence matters, because a statement of reservations is not itself a repudiation. Suppose a seller tells its buyer that it is experiencing production problems and may be unable to deliver as agreed. The seller has not said it will not deliver, and it has given the buyer grounds for insecurity. The buyer’s proper move is to demand adequate assurance, and a buyer that stops performing because it treats the statement as anticipatory repudiation is the party in breach.24 The recipient’s failure to answer a justified demand is what turns doubt into repudiation.
The statute fixes thirty days as the outer limit and otherwise asks only for a reasonable time. Circumstances may therefore make a much shorter period reasonable, particularly when the performance date is near.25 The reasonable-time standard gives the recipient a fair chance to gather an assurance, and the thirty-day cap keeps the demanding party from holding its own performance in limbo indefinitely.
Two preconditions sit inside that sentence of the statute: the demand must have been justified, and the recipient’s time must have run without an adequate answer. The first precondition keeps a party from manufacturing a repudiation by sending a letter and waiting. A demand that merely repackages a change of mind is not justified. In one decision, a seller sought additional security even though the buyer’s credit status was no different and no weaker than at the contract date. The court surmised that the seller had simply changed its mind about extending credit and treated the demand as lacking good faith, a backdoor attempt to rewrite the original agreement.26
A suspension also needs more than an offhand remark. In Scott v. Crown, the seller made only an oral statement to the buyer’s driver before suspending performance, and the court held that this was insufficient to make the suspension justified under § 4-2-609.27 Section 2-609(1) contemplates a written demand,28 and subsection (4) operates only after receipt of a justified one.29 A buyer’s silence in the face of such a remark is therefore not a repudiation, and the seller that suspended without justification risks being the party in breach.
At the other end, Hornell Brewing Co. v. Spry involved a recipient that ignored a justified demand. The supplier asked the distributor to document his credit line, and the distributor never produced the financing agreement on which he relied. The court held that the failure to respond was a repudiation of the distributorship agreement, which entitled the supplier to suspend performance and terminate it.30
Waldorf shows the third route, an answer that comes but fails. Waldorf’s response on the second project was not only late but also inadequate, because it rested on a joint check from a drawer of unknown creditworthiness.31 Each defect independently falls short of a statute that asks for adequate assurance within the time allowed.
Once a repudiation exists, the demanding party has several options. It may wait for the repudiating party to change its mind, but only for a commercially reasonable time, and waiting longer forecloses damages that earlier action could have avoided. It may resort immediately to any remedy for breach, even after saying it would await performance. It may also suspend its own performance and identify or salvage goods identified to the contract.32 This page stops at that threshold, and the remedies belong to the law of repudiation. A recipient that has missed the deadline still has one path left. If a party retracts a repudiation or overcomes its inability to perform before the time for performance and tries to reinstate the contract, the contract is reinstated unless the other side has changed position in reasonable reliance in the interim.33