Concept
Accepting Improper Delivery or Payment
Adequate assurance of performance
Accepting Improper Delivery or Payment
A party that accepts a late payment, a short payment, or a nonconforming shipment keeps its right to ask for assurance about what comes next. Section 2-609(3) says so directly: acceptance of any improper delivery or payment "does not prejudice the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of future performance."1 The aggrieved party is the one who received the improper tender. Subsection (1) lets that party demand assurance in writing and, if commercially reasonable, suspend performance for which it has not yet received the agreed return, once reasonable grounds for insecurity arise.2 Subsection (3) answers a prior question: whether taking what the other side tendered costs the right to ask. It does not. Two points complete the picture. Acceptance is not waiver, and the right still needs grounds and still has limits.
Acceptance Is Not Waiver
A party that takes a late payment or a flawed shipment without protest invites an argument from the other side: having accepted, it showed it was satisfied and cannot now claim to be insecure. Subsection (3) rejects that argument for the right to demand assurance.3 The rule fits the problem the section addresses. Adequate assurance covers the gap before performance is due, when something gives one party serious doubts about the other's willingness or ability to perform.4 Parties that take imperfect performance are often trying to keep a working relationship alive, and that says little about how they see the future. If acceptance forfeited the right, the cautious course would be to refuse the first imperfect tender. Subsection (3) lets a party be patient now and still ask for protection later.
Earlier lapses also keep their evidentiary value. One late payment may have an innocent explanation, but a series says something about the payer's willingness or ability to pay, and Comment 4 to § 2-609 directs that repeated delinquencies be viewed as cumulative.5 Courts reasoning about installments make the same point. They look at the totality of the circumstances, mindful that defects in prior installments are cumulative in effect, so that acceptance does not wash out the defect "waived."6 That reasoning comes from a different context than the demand for assurance. Subsection (3) itself says nothing about remedies for goods already accepted, and it has only one job: protecting the right to ask about the future.
Rocheux International of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Financial Group shows the cumulative effect at work. The seller's August email recognized that the buyer had recently sent a check on an invoice, yet it still put forward a proposal to resolve the buyer's problem with past-due invoices.7 When the seller later demanded a letter of credit covering the 2006 deliveries and warehouse goods, the court pointed to the buyer's continued failure to pay outstanding invoices and could not say as a matter of law that the demand was unreasonable.8 A recent check did not erase the unpaid invoices behind it.
What the bakery's patience cost it in other respects is a separate question that subsection (3) does not answer. The subsection preserves one right, the right to protect itself against what comes next.
Limits on the Right
Subsection (3) removes one objection and supplies no grounds. The demand still requires reasonable grounds for insecurity with respect to the other party's performance,10 and between merchants the reasonableness of those grounds is judged by commercial standards.11 An accepted late delivery or payment counts as one fact among others. It matters to the extent that, together with the rest, it would make a reasonable merchant doubt what comes next. The right also looks forward, since its object is future performance, so it cannot be used to reopen what was already accepted.
A pattern of partial payment combined with silence is enough, as RAD Concepts, Inc. v. Wilks Precision Instrument Co., Inc. shows. The buyer sold multiple units yet paid only a small percentage of its revenues toward the seller's outstanding invoices, and the seller could not reach it to learn when the balance would be paid. The court quoted Comment 3 for the point that a buyer who falls behind in its account impairs the seller's expectation of payment. It held that the buyer's payment history and its avoidance of telephone calls gave the seller reasonable grounds for insecurity, so the seller could demand assurances and suspend further performance until it received payment or acceptable assurances.12
The second limit is repetition. A demand for assurance answers a particular doubt, and once the other party supplies the specific assurance demanded, that doubt has been addressed. Absent a further change in circumstances, the party that demanded and received it is bound to proceed. A party allowed to demand again on unchanged facts could keep the other side under a standing cloud and extract more security with every letter.
Hornell Brewing Co. v. Spry turned on this point. The distributor argued that what the brewer had already received answered its demand, so the brewer had to proceed unless circumstances had further changed. The court accepted that repeated demands fall within § 2-609, and it found that circumstances had changed. New facts gave the brewer fresh reasonable grounds for insecurity and a new basis for seeking adequate assurance.13