Concept
Puffery and Seller Opinion
Express warranties
Puffery and Seller Opinion
A seller who praises the goods has not necessarily warranted them. Section 2-313(2) draws the line: an affirmation merely of the value of the goods, or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods, does not create a warranty.1 The same subsection excuses the seller from using formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee” and from having a specific intention to warrant, which is a substantial change from the common law approach to warranties.2 The two halves work together. A flat factual claim binds the seller without magic words, and praise does not bind the seller however emphatically it is delivered.
The official comment explains why the carve-out exists. Even for affirmations of value, opinion, and commendation, the basic question stays the same: what statements of the seller have, in the circumstances and in objective judgment, become part of the basis of the bargain? The comment answers that all of them do “unless good reason is shown to the contrary,” and it includes subsection (2) because “common experience discloses that some statements or predictions cannot fairly be viewed as entering into the bargain.”3
The default therefore favors the buyer. Official comment 3 adds that no particular reliance need be shown to weave a seller's affirmations of fact into the agreement, and that any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof.4 Keith v. Buchanan, a sailboat case, states the same default in terms of description: affirmations of fact the seller makes about the goods during the bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods, because the whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what the seller has in essence agreed to sell.5
Praise falls outside that agreement, and the work lies in deciding which statements are praise. The next subsection states the test courts apply, and the one after it collects the factors that matter when a statement lands near the line. Two boundaries frame the inquiry. The exclusion operates at the first step of a warranty claim, where the claimant must prove that the defendant made a warranty under § 2-313, § 2-314, or § 2-315,6 and it governs only express warranties, because implied warranties “do not arise from any particular conduct of the seller, but are imposed by operation of law unless they have been excluded.”7 Whether the buyer must also prove reliance is a separate question for the next section. Some states require it, though that sits uneasily with the drafters' intent as expressed in the official comment.8
Fact Versus Opinion
The Code gives no formula for sorting value talk and opinion from affirmations of fact, so courts sort them by asking who knows what. The decisive test is whether the seller asserts a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment on a matter of which the seller has no special knowledge and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion and to exercise judgment.9 A statement on the first side of that line can create a warranty. A statement on the second cannot.
The test works because it asks the question that justifies warranty liability in the first place. Express warranties are affirmative assertions that a product has certain characteristics of quality, construction, performance capability, durability, or safety, and a claim for breach rests on the falsity of the asserted information.10 A buyer who hears such an assertion about something the buyer cannot check may reasonably stop investigating, so the seller must answer for it. A commendation invites no such reliance. It is a puff meant to enhance the product's attractiveness rather than to assert a fact on which buyers may justifiably rely.11 In Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., Judge Learned Hand observed that neither party usually believes what the seller says about his own opinions, and each knows it; such statements, “like the claims of campaign managers before election, are rather designed to allay the suspicion which would attend their absence than to be understood as having any relation to objective truth.”12
Generic commendations are the clearest exclusions, because they describe no trait that the goods could fail to have. General statements that goods are “the best,” are “of good quality,” or will “last a lifetime” are regarded as expressions of the seller's opinion or the puffing of his wares, and they create no express warranty.13 Statements that a Suzuki Samurai “never lets you down,” has “fun written all over it,” and is “nifty” are loose and general sales talk that counts as puffing, not as an assertion that the vehicle resisted rolling over. Courts have held the same of a truck called “rock-solid,” a manufacturer's belief that “Quality is job one,” and a used car described as in good shape.14
A brochure line in Bayliner Marine Corp. v. Crow shows how little a commendation commits the seller. The buyer of a boat that could not reach 30 miles per hour argued that a line promising that the model “delivers the kind of performance you need to get to the prime offshore fishing grounds” warranted that speed. The court held that the line commended the boat's performance without describing any specific characteristic or feature.
Affirmations of value have their own words in the statute because worth is the standard matter on which buyers and sellers form their own judgments. A seller's commendation of a product's worth ordinarily is a mere puff.15 In Hall v. T.L. Kemp Jewelry, Inc., a jeweler's statement of a bracelet's value, later shown to be well above what other appraisers found, was held to be no express warranty, because nothing in the circumstances suggested anything other than ordinary sales talk.
A value statement does not shelter a description that accompanies it. In Daughtrey v. Ashe, a jeweler gave the buyer an appraisal form that described diamonds as “H color and v.v.s. quality” beside a stated appraised value, and the form recited that it was “for insurance purposes only.” The court held that the recital limited only the statement of appraised value, so the jeweler's description of the grade was to be treated like any other statement he made about the stones.16 The jeweler had not qualified the grade as his opinion, and a seller with superior knowledge who makes a statement about the goods without qualifying it as opinion makes a statement of fact.17 That is the knowledge gap at the center of the test: the jeweler can say what grade a stone is, and a buyer ordinarily cannot.
The statute's own wording keeps the exclusion narrow. Subsection (2) removes a statement only when it is merely an affirmation of value or purports to be merely opinion or commendation.18 The comment's objective standard points the same way, because the question is what statements have, “in objective judgment,” become part of the basis of the bargain, so a seller cannot turn a factual claim into puffery by phrasing it as a hunch.19 Hauter v. Zogarts described the expansion of sellers' liability as necessary to counteract the shrewd technique of sellers who, instead of making broad factual assertions about their products, seek to couch their representations in opinion form.20
The second step does most of the work, since it connects the exclusion to the reason for warranty liability. A buyer who cannot check the claim and has been invited to stop checking is the buyer the Code protects, and a buyer facing only enthusiasm has been given nothing to rely on.
Factors Courts Weigh
No single feature of a statement settles whether it is a warranty or a commendation, so courts weigh the circumstances of the sale and ask what a reasonable buyer would have understood the seller to be committing to. That inquiry is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact.22 The previous subsection gave the organizing idea: a seller who asserts a fact the buyer cannot check has warranted it, and a seller who voices a judgment the buyer can form alone has not. The factors show which side a given statement falls on. Courts look at how specific the statement is, whether it can be verified, whether the seller hedged or committed, whether it was written or spoken, how experimental the goods were, and what each party knew.23 Each factor is evidence of how the statement would have sounded to a buyer in that bargain, and none controls alone.
Specificity comes first because a general remark gives the buyer nothing to hold the seller to. Federal Signal Corp. v. Safety Factors, Inc. states the factor directly: the more specific a statement, the more likely it is an affirmation of fact or a promise, and such affirmations and promises generally relate to the quality of a good, while a general remark such as “You meet the nicest people on a Honda” is the seller's opinion or commendation.24 Describing a helmet as “one of the best,” “great,” and “top rated” creates no express warranty, but saying that the helmet “could protect us completely” could.25
Two boat brochures show the factor at work. The line in Bayliner Marine Corp. v. Crow named no speed or other figure against which the boat could be measured, and it failed. The brochures in Keith v. Buchanan called a sailboat “a picture of sure-footed seaworthiness,” and the court held those statements to be specific and unequivocal assertions of seaworthiness.26 Both statements appeared in sales brochures about boats, so the medium and the subject match, and the content moved the result. Seaworthiness is a condition the vessel either has or lacks, while the Bayliner line named no condition or figure at all.
A statement can also fail because of its reach. In Morgan v. Cabela's Inc., the court observed that the retailer's statements were “general rather than specific, in that they relate to all of Cabela's goods and not specifically to the tree stand,” and that express warranties are most often found when a seller makes a specific statement about a specific product.27 That observation did not end the inquiry. Because other factors weighed in the buyer's favor, the court could not say that the evidence was so one-sided that Cabela's must prevail as a matter of law.28
Verifiability is the companion of specificity. A reasonable person would take the assurance “this car gets 32 miles per gallon on the open road” as more than sales jabber, because it relates to a particular fact that can be checked.29 The Utah Supreme Court drew the same line through a pair of boat claims in Boud v. SDNCO, Inc.: an affirmation must be objective and capable of being proved true or false, so “best in class” is puffery, while “fastest in class” can be verified. A stopwatch and a rival boat settle “fastest,” and no instrument settles “best.”
Hedging and commitment point the same way. A reasonable person would hardly think a seller means to make a commitment when he says, “I think you'll love this car.”30 In Hupp Corp. v. Metered Washer Service, the buyer found defects in clothes dryers, the seller then sold the buyer parts and remarked that they might solve the problem, and the court held that language too uncertain to be an express warranty that the parts would correct the defects.31 A buyer who hears a word of doubt cannot also treat the claim as a reason to stop checking.
The nature of the goods can do the hedging for the seller. Bishop Logging Co. v. John Deere Industrial Equipment Co. arose on a fraud claim, which requires a false statement of present or pre-existing fact, while a warranty can rest on a promise.32 It still shows how untried goods change what a buyer may take from a seller's confidence. The fully mechanized swamp logging system was an unprecedented and untried concept, and the buyer knew from the seller's representative that such a package had never been attempted, so the representative's statements about how it would perform were opinion or promises of future performance and not false statements of existing fact.33 The court concluded that a representation that was only an opinion about future performance could not support a finding of fraud.34 Federal Signal lists the experimental nature of the good among the factors for the same reason.35
A writing carries more weight than speech. Writings command more attention, so a reasonable person may take more stock in a writing than in an oral remark.36 Advertising copy can still carry a warranty: Federal Signal recalled Touchet Valley Grain Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Seibold General Construction, Inc., where a court found a seller's statements to be express representations promising “a building of certain quality” rather than puffing in advertising.37
Writing raises the odds that a statement is a warranty without settling the question. The Bayliner line was printed in a brochure and remained commendation, because it named nothing the boat could be measured against.
Relative knowledge explains cases in which the words match and the results differ. In Wat Henry Pontiac Co. v. Bradley, a used-car salesperson told the buyer the car was in “A-1 shape” and “mechanically perfect,” and the court held the statements to be warranties. In Frederickson v. Hackney, a seller said a bull calf would “put the buyer on the map” and that its father was “the greatest living dairy bull,” and the court held the statements to be trade talk even though the bull proved sterile.38 The car buyer was an uninformed consumer who could not judge the car's mechanical condition, while the calf buyer was an experienced farmer who could weigh breeding claims for himself.
A pair of horse sales gives the sharpest version. In Sessa v. Riegle, the seller told the buyer of a three-year-old standardbred race horse, in a telephone call, that the horse was sound, and the court held the statement opinion or commendation and not a warranty.39 Several circumstances carried the result. Horses are fragile animals prone to many maladies, and traders did not ordinarily guarantee one without an understanding with the buyer. The buyer was experienced with standardbreds and had sent an even more knowledgeable agent to inspect the horse. The conversation was largely collateral to the sale, and the remark about soundness sat among bland statements that the horse was a good one and that the buyer would like him, so it took on their character.40
The older decision in Flood v. Yeager, which the Sessa court discussed, came out the other way. The buyer there told the seller that he knew nothing at all about horses and did not want the seller to make a mean deal, and the seller answered that the horse was solid and sound and that he would guarantee it.41 The seller's words were of the same tenor in both sales. In Flood the buyer announced that he was relying on a seller who knew horses, and the seller accepted that role by guaranteeing, while the Sessa buyer could judge the horse for himself. The Sessa court acknowledged that the older decisions rested partly on a requirement of specific intent to warrant that the Code has since displaced, but it treated them as showing that statements of the same tenor receive varying treatment depending on the surrounding circumstances.42
When the seller's expertise is the reason for the purchase, the same factor favors the buyer. A dealer's representation of authenticity might ordinarily be treated as mere opinion, yet in Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc. the court held that a dealer's representation that a particular work was a genuine Dali created an express warranty, because the buyer was unsophisticated and justifiably relied on it.43 The court reasoned that the defendants allegedly made very strong claims about the artwork and repeated them so that the plaintiffs would rely, and that, given the prices, the plaintiffs could reasonably treat the defendants' representations as their primary, if not sole, source of information about authenticity, since the price effectively kept them from undertaking an extensive investigation.44 Sessa and Balog therefore mark two ends of one scale, with an expert buyer who could discount the seller's words at one end and an unsophisticated buyer who had to take them at the other.
These indicators do not collapse into a formula, because in real disputes they point in different directions: a statement can be written but general, specific but hedged, or specific and unhedged but spoken to an expert buyer. Calling a statement a puff states a conclusion, and the analysis that earns it comes from the factors. A lawyer who labels a seller's statement before examining the buyer's actual or imputed knowledge and the nature of the defect, both of which Federal Signal counts among the factors, has skipped that work.45 Used together, the factors let a court leave the ordinary exuberance of a sales pitch alone and still reach a seller who has recast a factual claim as an opinion.
The fifth step is where cases with matching words come apart, as Sessa and Flood show, and the sixth is where a bare puff label gets replaced by reasons.