Concept
Warranty Imposed by Law
Implied warranty of merchantability
Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Warranty Imposed by Law
Section 2-314(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code is the source of Bert's warranty. Unless the warranty is excluded or modified under § 2-316, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.1 In such a sale, the warranty means, among other things, that the goods will pass without objection in the trade and are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.2 The sections that follow define the merchant seller (including the rule that serving food or drink for value is a sale) and the meaning of merchantable. This section asks why the law imposes the warranty and what kind of obligation it creates.
Two features of § 2-314(1) matter most. The warranty is implied, so it enters the sale without anyone writing it, saying it, or bargaining over it. It is also a default term, a rule the law supplies when the parties are silent and that they may displace by contracting to the contrary, even though the agreement could be understood and enforced without it. That is why “gap filler” undersells the term.3 Exclusion or modification is therefore the only exit, and § 2-316 governs it in a later reading. “Imposed by law” does not mean mandatory. A valid exclusion keeps the warranty from attaching at all, and without one the warranty is present in every qualifying sale.
The law supplies this default because it once supplied the opposite. Under caveat emptor, a contract silent about quality imposed no minimum standard, and a buyer who wanted one had to contract for it.4 The implied warranty reversed that rule. In English and then American law it appeared first in cases over defective food, and in the nineteenth century it grew into a broad repudiation of caveat emptor.5 The new principle, caveat venditor, made the seller answerable for latent defects on the theory that fair dealing implies a guarantee of fair quality, so that the quality a buyer received became the quid pro quo for the price paid.6 Courts then carried the rule from contaminated food to other products. They rested it on the special responsibility for public safety undertaken by one who enters the business of supplying products that may endanger persons and property, and on the forced reliance of those who buy.7
The law puts the risk on the merchant because the merchant knows more. A seller who deals in goods of the kind is a repeat player. It meets the range of similar goods far more often than any buyer does, so it learns how often the goods break down, what damage they tend to suffer and inflict, and what repairs cost. A car dealer knows the reliability of its automobiles better than any random customer does.8 That knowledge lets the seller price the risk. Suppose a good costs $99 to produce, with a reasonable profit, and breaks down about one percent of the time. The expected loss per unit is about $1.00, and a seller liable in warranty can add roughly that amount to every price and pay the occasional claimant from the “insurance premium” collected from all buyers. Buyers with little experience of breakdown rates should be willing to pay it, because it is a fair price for insurance they could not price for themselves.9
Because the warranty rests on the law and not on the parties, courts say it arises by operation of law. Express warranties under § 2-313 arise from the seller's statements or conduct. The implied warranties of §§ 2-314 and 2-315 do not depend on anything the seller says or does, which makes them resemble unjust enrichment in one respect: they are not consensual.10 No particular language or act has to evidence them. They arise automatically in certain common factual situations unless unmistakably negated.11 One court explained the premise this way: “Into every mercantile contract of sale the law inserts a warranty that the goods sold are merchantable, the assumption being that the parties themselves, had they thought of it, would specifically have so agreed.” Liability therefore does not depend on any specific conduct or promise by the defendants. It turns on whether the product is merchantable under the code.12 The imagined agreement explains the rule without becoming a requirement of it, for the warranty “does not depend upon the affirmative intention of the parties. It is a child of the law; it annexes itself to the contract because of the very nature of the transaction.”13 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. states the same point for the ordinary sale of goods by description: an implied warranty of merchantability is an integral part of the transaction.14
With the warranty tied to the goods and not to the seller's conduct, the seller's fault drops out. Liability for breach generally rests on a product's deficient condition without regard to the seller's fault, which makes the warranty a form of strict liability. Proof of the seller's negligence is therefore not only unnecessary but irrelevant.15 A merchant that proves it took every reasonable care has answered a question the warranty never asks. The claim arises in everyday retail sales. In Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., a buyer of one-day-old chickens charged Montgomery Ward with breach of implied warranties.16
The warranty sits in a sales statute and wears a contract label, yet it is the central and most important warranty in UCC Article 2, and a claim for its breach is often a central claim in products liability cases.17 Proof that a product is defective under strict tort liability generally establishes that it is unmerchantable, and the reverse also holds. In that fundamental way, these two bases of liability, one in contract and one in tort, are essentially the same.18 A later section of this chapter returns to the overlap.