Concept
Merchant Seller Requirement
Implied warranty of merchantability
Merchant Seller Requirement
Section 2-314(1) ties the warranty to who is selling and what the transaction is. It implies a warranty that the goods are merchantable “if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind,” and a second sentence declares that serving food or drink for value is a sale.1 Three questions follow from those words. Is the seller a merchant in goods of the kind sold? Is the transaction a sale of goods, or a lease under Article 2A? And when a restaurant serves a meal, does the serving count as a sale? Until those questions come out in the buyer’s favor, the quality standard never comes into play.
The merchant limit rests on a reason. A merchant who deals in goods of the kind is a repeat player and meets the range of similar goods far more often than any one buyer does. That experience yields information the buyer cannot readily get: how often the goods break down, what damage they suffer and cause, and what repair costs, all of which bear on the right price.2 The warranty reaches sellers who hold that information by trade.
The requirement also separates the merchantability warranty from its neighbors. Claims under §§ 2-313 and 2-315 need no merchant seller; a claim under § 2-314 requires a seller who is a merchant of the product in the ordinary course of trade.3 The fitness warranty asks instead whether the seller had reason to know the buyer’s particular purpose and whether the buyer relied on the seller’s expertise in supplying the right product.4 Express warranties become part of the basis of the bargain, while implied warranties are read into the agreement by the Code unless the agreement or the circumstances exclude them.5 A buyer who fails the merchant gate therefore loses the implied warranty of merchantability but may still hold an express warranty or a fitness claim.
Merchant of Goods of That Kind
Section 2-314 asks one question about the seller: does the seller deal in goods of the kind sold? The answer borrows from the definition of merchant in § 2-104, which offers alternative routes to the status. A person qualifies by dealing in goods, which means selling inventory to consumers and other buyers, or by having knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods, as craftspeople such as electricians, plumbers, carpenters, and boat builders do.6 For § 2-314, the word refers to the first clause of that definition: a person who deals in goods of the kind.7
The official comment describes what that choice does. For purposes of § 2-314, “merchant” applies to “a much smaller group than everyone who is engaged in business” and “requires a professional status as to particular kinds of goods.”8 The status turns on regular dealing, not on expertise. Because the definition’s criteria are alternatives, it catches everyone who regularly sells inventory, even a seller with no expertise in the particular product: distributors, wholesalers, and retail dealers. A dealer who sells prepackaged goods with a defect it cannot control may be surprised to learn that it gave an implied warranty of merchantability, “but such is the law.”9
The usual error is to see a business on the seller’s side and call it a merchant. Status is tested sale by sale and goods by goods. A used-car lot owner is a merchant with regard to cars, so the lot’s sale of a used car carries the warranty. If the same owner sells an old computer used in the business, the warranty does not apply to that sale, because the owner is not a merchant with respect to computers.10 The computer sale arose in the course of business, but the goods lie outside the owner’s line of trade.
Decided cases track the line of trade. In Siemen v. Alden, a sawmill operator replaced its power saw with a new one and sold the old saw to the plaintiff, and the court held that the operator was not a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.11 The saw was equipment the mill used, not goods it sold. McHugh v. Carlton lies on the other side of the line: a service station that sold tires was treated as a merchant when it supplied a recapped tire that it ordered only at the customer’s request.
Statutes aimed at art sales draw a comparable line between sellers in the trade and private owners. They apply only between a merchant seller and a nonmerchant purchaser, and Michigan’s statute defines an art merchant to include an auctioneer who sells at public auction and the auctioneer’s consignor or principal. It does not appear to reach collectors who do not sell through an auctioneer.12
The word does not carry one meaning through all of Article 2. Section 2-314 reads it narrowly, so a seller can count as a merchant under a provision with a broader purpose and still fall outside § 2-314 for the goods in a given sale.13
Isolated and Occasional Sales
An isolated sale is the mirror image of the merchant requirement. A person who makes a one-time or infrequent sale of goods is not a merchant for that sale, so no warranty of merchantability enters the contract.15 Comment 3 to § 2-314 says so directly: “A person making an isolated sale of goods is not a ‘merchant’ within the meaning of the full scope of this section.”16
The same product can carry a warranty when a dealer sells it and carry none when a private owner does, and the reason lies in the basis of the warranty. A dealer meets goods of the kind again and again and learns how they fail and what the failures cost; an owner who sells a single car has seen one.17 A buyer from a private seller keeps other protection, such as an express warranty drawn from what the seller says about the goods.18
Private sales of vehicles supply the standard examples. A person who advertises a 2018 Honda Accord in the local paper and sells it to a neighbor is not a merchant, so the neighbor has no implied-warranty claim.19 Ballou v. Trahan reached the same result for a private person’s sale of a used Porsche, which the court called an isolated sale.20 Courts have likewise treated as isolated the sale of a fishing boat, a used airplane, and a used car, and they have held that a volunteer parent organization providing food at school functions is not a merchant.21 The danger of the goods plays no part in these decisions. The rule asks who is selling, and an owner who sells one airplane deals in aircraft no more than the owner of the Accord deals in cars.
Colton v. Decker adds that merchant status is a question of fact. Decker ran a one-man trucking business and sold a truck, and the South Dakota court found no breach of the warranty of merchantability.22 A trucking business earns its living by hauling freight. The truck is a tool, and selling it at the end of its service does not put the owner in the business of selling trucks. Because status is a fact question, a court looks to the seller’s regular course of business, meaning what the seller sells in the ordinary course of trade.23
The logic reaches institutions as well as individuals. A bank that repossesses a fishing boat and sells it once makes an isolated sale. An isolated sale of a product does not make a person a merchant, and a single boat sale does not show that the bank deals in boats.24
Because the inquiry runs sale by sale, one seller can fall on both sides of the line. The dealer who is a merchant when selling cars makes an isolated sale when selling its office computer.
Food and Drink Served for Value
The second sentence of § 2-314(1) settles a threshold dispute that restaurant cases would otherwise raise: is a meal a sale? The statute answers that “the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.”26
A meal combines the cook’s labor, the server’s attention, a table, and the food, while the implied warranty attaches to a contract for the sale of goods. A restaurant sued over a bad dish could therefore argue that the diner bought dining service and no goods. The sentence closes that argument. Once food or drink is served for value, the transaction is a sale for purposes of the section, however much labor surrounds the plate.
The statute reaches food and drink consumed on the premises or elsewhere, so the table, the takeout counter, and the delivery bag all fall within it.
Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc. applies the rule to the container. A customer’s wine glass shattered in his hand and caused permanent injuries, and the court held that the restaurant breached the warranty of merchantability. The wine could not be consumed without a container, so the sale carried an implied warranty that the wine was adequately “contained, packaged, and labeled.”27 The container travels with the drink. A federal court in New Jersey allowed a merchantability claim to proceed over a casino’s complimentary drink in Levondosky v. Marina Associates.28
The food sentence settles only the sale question. The warranty still arises only if the server is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, so a buyer who proves that food was served for value has cleared one gate and must still clear the other. As the isolated-sale cases hold, volunteer parent organizations that provide food at school functions are not merchants.29 A parents’ bake sale is a sale of food for value, yet the buyer who falls ill has no implied warranty of merchantability, because the group does not deal in food in the ordinary course of trade. A restaurant, whose trade is serving food and drink, sits on the other side of that line.
Sale or Lease Required
The second gate asks whether the transaction is a sale of goods. Section 2-314(1) implies the warranty “in a contract for their sale,”31 and a sale is the passing of title from seller to buyer for a price. Maryland’s Code, for example, defines a seller as one who sells or contracts to sell goods and a sale as that transfer.32 The warranty therefore presupposes a seller who transfers ownership and a buyer who pays for it. Courts and the lease statute have relaxed the requirement in several places, and each relaxation keeps faith with the reason for the rule.
Article 2 governs goods, so a contract that is mostly for services raises a different question. Whether a provider of services carries a warranty analogous to merchantability is not well developed and varies from state to state.33 Courts facing a mixed contract ask which element dominates. In Bonebrake v. Cox, the sale and installation of used bowling equipment for a lump sum was treated as a sale despite the labor, because the sale was the heart of the deal.
Leases are the harder case, because a lessor hands over goods for money without passing title. Some courts hold that Article 2 warranties do not apply to a product that is merely leased, such as a rental car, or to a plaintiff who is merely a bailee of the product. Many other courts have applied the Code principles directly or by analogy to leases, and because almost every state has adopted Article 2A, applying the implied warranty of merchantability to leased goods is now routine. Article 2A’s warranty provisions closely mimic those of Article 2.34 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing is an early example, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court implied a warranty in a truck lease.
Some courts carry the reasoning past leases. In Newmark v. Gimbel’s, Inc., a product used to give the plaintiff a permanent wave was supplied in a transaction that was not technically a sale, and the court implied a warranty that the product was fit for its use. Becker v. IRM Corp. describes the law as recognizing that a contract to build is in effect one of material and labor, that implied warranties are not limited to sales transactions, and that building contracts give rise to a warranty of merchantability and suitability for ordinary use.35 Neither decision removes the sale requirement from § 2-314. Each extends a warranty to a transaction that does the same work.
The moment of sale matters, because injuries happen between the shelf and the checkout counter. Comment 1 to § 2-314 provides that “[t]he seller’s obligation applies to present sales as well as to contracts to sell,” and many courts conclude that a merchant’s placement of a product on the shelf is an offer of sale and the shopper’s removal of it is an acceptance. That exchange creates a contract sufficient for § 2-314, and the warranty covers both the bottle and its contents.36 A shopper who lifts a bottled drink from the shelf and sees it burst before reaching the register holds a warranty claim, because she took the goods on the terms the seller offered.
The warranty also runs against the right party. In Erie Insurance Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the court gave “seller” its ordinary meaning: one who offers property for sale, where a sale is the transfer of ownership and title for a price, the definition Maryland’s Code adopts.37 Measured against that meaning, an intermediary that takes the buyer’s order but never takes title is not the seller. The buyer’s impression of who sold does not change who passed title, so a buyer who deals through a website must trace the sale to the party that transferred ownership.