Concept
Boundaries of the Warranty
Implied warranty of merchantability
Boundaries of the Warranty
The warranty of merchantability promises a minimum, and its limits follow from that fact. A merchant impliedly warrants that its goods are merchantable,1 and the Code measures that promise against yardsticks drawn from outside the individual sale: the goods must pass without objection in the trade under the contract description, and they must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.2 The first yardstick asks how the trade receives goods of the kind. The second asks what such goods customarily do. Neither asks whether this unit satisfied this buyer, and that is why some disappointments fall outside the warranty.
A merchant can make the promise because it sees the whole run of goods of its kind. It learns how often they break in ordinary use and builds the expected loss into the price that every buyer pays.3 A promise of perfection would make every buyer pay for flaws that no one expects to be absent. A promise of suitability for every conceivable use would make the merchant insure against rough handling it cannot foresee and needs it has never heard of. Holding the warranty at the minimum quality and safety that buyers of the goods reasonably expect keeps the price of that protection fair.
One boundary was drawn in the earlier sections: only a seller who is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind gives the warranty. A used car lot owner is a merchant as to cars but not as to the old office computer it sells,4 and a sawmill operator that replaces its saw and sells the used one is not a merchant as to saws.5 Four further boundaries govern the goods and the buyer's use of them. The first concerns imperfection: minor flaws and natural characteristics do not make goods unmerchantable. The second concerns use: the warranty covers ordinary and reasonably foreseeable uses and stops short of unforeseeable misuse. The third concerns visibility: a warranty aimed at hidden defects has little to say about features that are open and obvious. The fourth separates the customary uses that merchantability protects from a buyer's particular purpose, which the Code leaves to a separate warranty. Each subsection below teaches both sides of its boundary, the seller's use of it and the facts that defeat that use.
Merchantable Does Not Mean Perfect
Section 2-314(2) sets standards that never demand perfection. Goods must pass without objection in the trade under the contract description and be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.6 Each standard takes its yardstick from outside the unit in dispute, so a unit with a blemish can satisfy both. Courts say so directly: “merchantable” is not synonymous with “perfect,”7 and a product that conforms to the quality of other brands in the market will normally be merchantable.8 The ordinary-purposes test asks whether goods are reasonably safe in ordinary use and reasonably capable of performing their ordinary functions.9
Perfection is the wrong target because of how sales are priced. A merchant prices goods by the ordinary run of units, and buyers pay for that run. No seller can strip out every blemish and natural variation at a cost buyers would accept, so a warranty of perfection would put the cost of curing or insuring against all of them into every sale. Holding the warranty at a minimum concentrates its coverage on failures that buyers do not expect and that a merchant can spread across its sales at a fair price. Three kinds of imperfection fall below that threshold: flaws too slight to impair ordinary use, characteristics that naturally belong to the goods, and risks the seller disclosed.
Slight flaws come first, because they leave the goods able to do what such goods ordinarily do. Slight damage to a new car that does not affect its usefulness or drivability does not breach the warranty, and neither does a defect that minor repairs will cure when the seller has offered to make them.10 In Pronti v. DML of Elmira, Inc. buyers received dining room furniture with minor defects and refused to let the seller cure them. The court denied recovery for breach of the implied warranty because the furniture was fit for the ordinary purposes of such goods and did not have to be in “perfect” condition.11
Skelton v. General Motors Corp. approaches the line from another direction. Cars whose transmissions were inferior to those listed in the express warranty supported no implied warranty claim, because the implied warranty requires only a minimum level of quality and nothing showed that the cars were unfit for driving.12 Fitness for ordinary purposes does not mean that the product will fulfill the buyer's every expectation, and the Code's perfect tender rule shows why the difference matters: a buyer may reject goods for any nonconformity, but not every nonconformity makes goods unmerchantable.13 When goods fall short of a specification, then, ask a second question before announcing a breach of merchantability: do the goods still meet the minimum for goods of that kind?
The second kind of imperfection is a characteristic that belongs to the goods. A knife is sharp and a bowl of fish chowder contains bones, and either can hurt a person. Courts ask what a consumer would reasonably expect to find in goods of the contract description. That question follows the contract description, which fixes what the buyer bought: a person who orders chowder has ordered a dish whose bones the trade expects, so the dish still passes without objection under that description.14 The bone is a real hazard, but it is a hazard that comes with the thing the buyer chose.
A diner hurt by something in a meal therefore turns the case on whether the thing belongs in the dish. A bone in fish chowder gives the diner no claim, because bones are ordinarily found in chowder; chowder with a lizard's head in it is not merchantable, because no one buys chowder expecting that.15 The lizard's head is a foreign object that lies outside the dish altogether, so the reasonable-expectations test never excuses it.
The third kind of imperfection is a risk the seller disclosed. In Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp. the manufacturer of a prescription drug had warned of possible risks, and the plaintiff who suffered side effects could not recover for breach of warranty because he failed to prove that the drug was unfit for its ordinary purpose.16 A warned-of side effect, standing alone, does not show that the goods fell below what such goods ordinarily do.
The dividing line between these imperfections and a true breach is usefulness and safety in ordinary use. A pressure gauge that did not measure pressure building up in an expansion joint was unmerchantable, a hay stacking machine that caught fire on the first day of use was unfit for stacking hay, and insulation foam that gave off noxious fumes was not merchantable.17 Each product failed at the job goods of its kind do, or did the job dangerously, so none presented a mere blemish.
Minor problems also carry a caution. In a case about Night Warrior light towers, the court found substantial evidence of breach even though the trial judge had made no findings comparing the towers to others on the market: considering all the problems together, the towers were far below the quality of other light towers, and the buyer and several of his customers testified that no other tower had given them so many problems that it was hard to use them for their ordinary purposes.18 One trivial flaw gives the buyer no claim, yet a pile of failures can add up to goods that cannot do their ordinary work.
Foreseeable Use Versus Misuse
Section 2-314(2)(c) requires that merchantable goods be “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,”20 and misuse disputes turn on how much the word “ordinary” takes in. Early warranty cases denied recovery whenever the injury arose from a use the manufacturer had not intended. More recent decisions read the standard to reach uses that are reasonably foreseeable, so a seller's implied warranties may not extend to abnormal use and plainly do not extend to unforeseeable misuse, whether by the user or by someone else.21
Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co. shows the standard at work. Applying Massachusetts law, the First Circuit relied on the state high court's holding that the ordinary purposes of goods include both the uses the manufacturer intended and those that are reasonably foreseeable.22 That court had called it “no more than a play on words” to demand fitness for ordinary purposes but not for extraordinary or unusual ones, because such labels do not tell a seller whether it has warranted the goods to be free from the propensity that caused the injury.23
The plaintiff in Venezia had thrown a thin-walled, non-returnable glass bottle against a telephone pole. The bottle shattered and glass entered his eye. He argued that the manufacturers should have anticipated rough handling by children and built a bottle that could safely withstand it.24 The First Circuit rejected the claim, because deliberately smashing a bottle against a pole is not a use the ordinary-purposes standard covers.
The foreseeability line fits the way the warranty is priced. A merchant can anticipate how buyers handle goods of its kind, design and test for those uses, and spread the expected loss across its sales. It cannot fairly price in a user's deliberate destruction of the goods, because that would make the seller the insurer of the user's own intent. The warranty therefore reaches the failures a seller can expect and stops where use becomes abuse.
What separates the boy with the bottle from a child who sprays flammable hair spray on her dress and hair because she likes the fragrance? The answer lies in the product and in what buyers fairly expect of it. A bottle exists to hold a drink, and nothing about that purpose makes hurling it at a pole an anticipated way of handling it. Hair spray, by contrast, is made to be sprayed, and a jury might find that using it for its fragrance was a use the seller could expect.25 Each use is judged against how the seller and the user might fairly expect the product to perform in that setting.26
Evidence of customary use belongs in the buyer's proof. In a case over a fire blanket used during a cutting operation, the court found it far from clear that the blanket was being used for its ordinary purposes: nothing showed the blanket inappropriate for cutting operations, but nothing showed it appropriate either.27 Auburn and Inpro had waived the point below, so the court went on to ask whether the appellants had carried their burden of producing evidence that the blanket was unfit for that purpose.28 The practical lesson is that a record silent on how goods of the type are customarily used leaves a court unable to say the use was ordinary.
Close cases go to the jury, because whether a use was ordinary depends on the fair expectations of both parties and the facts of the particular setting.29 Misuse also overlaps with causation. When a use is abnormal, the facts that put it outside the warranty usually show that the condition of the goods did not cause the injury, and a later section on proving breach takes up that second question.
Step three does the sorting. The plaintiff in Venezia lands in the last category, so the analysis ends there, while the child with the hair spray lands in the middle category and reaches step four.
Open and Obvious Characteristics
Section 2-314(2)(c) tests merchantability by asking whether the goods are “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.”31 A feature whose risk is apparent to the ordinary consumer generally does not make the product unfit for those purposes, because the implied warranty normally extends only to latent defects, flaws a buyer cannot detect by looking. It does not reach defects that are obvious, whether or not the buyer actually noticed them.32
The limit follows from what the warranty protects. The ordinary-purposes standard measures goods against what buyers of that type reasonably expect, and a risk on the face of the product creates no false expectation. Neither the price nor the look of the goods promises a safety that the buyer can see is missing, and a buyer who looks can walk away, bargain for a lower price, or choose a different product. A latent defect gives the buyer none of those chances, while the merchant knows how often goods of the kind fail and can spread that loss across its sales. The warranty therefore stays with hidden flaws, where the buyer cannot protect against the risk, and falls away from visible ones, where the buyer can.
In Toney v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries the Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi law, held that a motorcycle sold without leg protection was not unfit for its ordinary purpose, because the ordinary rider would appreciate the risk of a leg injury in a side collision with an automobile.33 The motorcycle did what motorcycles ordinarily do, and the danger was one that every rider can see on the showroom floor. The Texas Supreme Court reached a similar result for a hazard that is widely known, treating common knowledge of the health risks of cigarette smoking as a defense that bars an implied warranty claim in American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell.34
The same reasoning keeps the warranty in force when the flaw is hidden. In Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Williams-Hayward Protective Coatings, Inc. the defect lay in paint and could be found only by chemical testing, so the implied warranties were not excluded.35 What a buyer should discover on examination depends on the buyer's skill and the normal method of examining goods in the circumstances, so a professional buyer is held to a higher standard than a consumer. Even a professional is not expected to run tests the circumstances do not contemplate. The buyer bears the risk of defects that an ordinary examination would reveal, and the seller bears the risk of defects that are latent or discoverable only by such testing.36
Article 2 also gives examination a role of its own, and a student should keep the two ideas apart. Under § 2-316(3)(b), a buyer who examined the goods, or who refused to examine them, receives no implied warranty as to defects that an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed.37 That exclusion depends on what this buyer did, and for a refusal it also requires the seller to have demanded that the buyer examine the goods fully, since the mere availability of the goods for inspection is not enough.38 The obviousness limit sits inside the standard of merchantability itself and is judged from the vantage of the ordinary consumer, so it applies even if the buyer never looked. The disclaimer reading takes up the examination rule in full. The usual exam error is to call a risk obvious merely because the buyer could have inspected the product. The right question is whether the risk was apparent to the ordinary consumer or whether only testing the circumstances did not contemplate would have revealed it.
Ordinary Versus Particular Purposes
Section 2-314(2)(c) measures merchantable goods against a standard set by custom: they must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.40 A second implied warranty, found in § 2-315, turns on something different. When the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required, and reason to know that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, the Code implies a warranty that the goods shall be fit for that purpose, unless it is excluded or modified under § 2-316.41 The first warranty looks to what goods of the type are generally used to do. The second looks to what this buyer told the seller, or let the seller see, about the job the goods were bought for. The ordinary purposes stay inside the merchantability warranty, and a particular purpose belongs to the fitness warranty.
The official comment to § 2-315 draws the line with an example. A particular purpose is a specific use by the buyer that is peculiar to the nature of the buyer's business, while the ordinary purposes of goods are the uses customarily made of goods of that kind, which are the uses merchantability protects.42 Shoes are generally used for walking on ordinary ground, so a pair that falls apart on ordinary ground is unmerchantable. A seller may know, however, that a particular pair was selected for climbing mountains, and a seller who knows that, and who has reason to know the buyer is relying on the seller to furnish suitable shoes, has impliedly warranted them fit for the climb.43 Neither warranty requires particular language from the seller. Both arise automatically in the common situations the Code describes, unless they are unmistakably negated.44
Each warranty has its own reason, and the reasons explain why the elements differ. Merchantability is priced into the ordinary sale: a merchant sets its price with the usual run of uses in mind, so extending the warranty to whatever purpose any buyer might have would raise the price for everyone, including the many buyers who use the goods in the ordinary way.45 Because that baseline protects every buyer of the goods, it needs no proof of what any single buyer said or trusted. The fitness warranty rests instead on the seller's implicit representation that it knows the buyer's special need, will apply its own skill or judgment to select a product, and honors the buyer's trust in that selection.46 A seller can hardly promise suitability for a use it has no reason to know about, so the knowledge requirement gives the seller the information it needs to decline the sale or charge for the risk, and the reliance requirement shows that the seller's selection, and not the buyer's own, put these goods in the buyer's hands.
In practice the narrower warranty is often unnecessary. A buyer whose bucket leaks need not prove that the bucket was bought to haul water, that the seller knew it, or that the buyer relied on the seller to choose a bucket that holds liquid. A leaky bucket will not pass without objection in the trade and is unfit for the ordinary purposes of buckets, so the merchant that sold it has breached the warranty of merchantability.47 The fitness warranty is narrow and carries several elements, of which the particularity of the purpose, the buyer's reliance, and the seller's reason to know usually decide whether it arose at all.48 It earns its place only when the buyer had a non-ordinary purpose for which the goods as delivered are unsuitable. The usual exam error is to reach for fitness whenever a product fails, when a failure at an ordinary task belongs to § 2-314.
Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp. is the opposite pole. When Lewis installed a pump in his hydraulic system, a request for the proper oil went through Rowe to Ted Klock, a Mobil engineer, who recommended Ambrex 810. The pump failed a few weeks later, and Klock inspected the plant, had the system flushed, and switched to oils containing additives, after which no further trouble occurred.49 The court held that this evidence adequately established an implied warranty of fitness. Mobil had reason to know that the oil was bought for Lewis's own hydraulic system, and not for hydraulic systems in general, and Lewis was plainly relying on Mobil to supply the proper oil, because he had made clear that he did not know which kind the system needed.50 The case shows why the choice of warranty matters. A merchantability claim would have required proof about hydraulic oil in general, while the fitness claim required proof about what Mobil knew of this buyer's system and what he trusted Mobil to do.
A boat buyer's claim shows what happens when a buyer's own need is mistaken for the customary one. Crow argued that because his boat could not reach 30 miles per hour, it was unfit for its ordinary purpose as an offshore sport fishing boat. The seller answered that, although the boat did not meet the needs of this particular fisherman, nothing showed that the boat was generally unmerchantable as an offshore fishing boat, and the court agreed.51 Merchantability measures the goods against the customary use, so a buyer's unmet individual need does not establish a breach.
Three differences between the warranties follow from their elements, and each is a separate point of comparison on an exam:
- Merchantability binds only a seller that is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, while § 2-315 speaks of “the seller” and imposes no merchant requirement.52
- Merchantability arises from the sale alone and makes reliance irrelevant, while fitness requires the seller's reason to know the purpose and the buyer's actual reliance on the seller's skill or judgment.53
- Merchantability asks whether the goods fall below the minimum for goods of that kind, while fitness asks whether the goods suit the buyer's purpose and does not require that they be defective in any way.54
The line also cuts against buyers who try to relabel an ordinary use as a special one. Courts commonly hold that a particular purpose must be a non-ordinary purpose, so an ordinary use cannot also be a particular use. In Miles v. Ford Motor Co., a truck passenger who was injured in an accident claimed a fitness warranty for the purpose of carrying passengers, and the court found none, because carrying passengers is one of the ordinary purposes of such trucks.55
The warranties are independent, yet one set of facts can breach both. Shoes sold for mountain climbing whose soles wear through within a week of ordinary use fail the ordinary-purposes standard and the buyer's particular purpose together.56 A buyer who wants the second claim must still prove every element of fitness, including the special nature of the purpose. The converse also holds: the two warranties are defined entirely differently and are conceptually distinct, so goods that are merchantable can still be unfit for a purpose the buyer and seller made part of their deal.57
Step one does the sorting, and a buyer who skips it tends to build the harder claim on facts that support the easier one. How the seller's reason to know and the buyer's reliance are proved, and how either warranty is excluded, belong to the fitness warranty and disclaimer readings.