Concept
Elements of the Claim
Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
Elements of the Claim
Section 2-315 implies a warranty of fitness where the seller, at the time of contracting, has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.1 A plaintiff who sues on that language must prove five elements: the buyer’s purpose was particular; the buyer relied on the seller’s skill or judgment to select an appropriate product; the seller had reason to know both the purpose and the reliance; the goods were unfit; and the unfitness caused harm.2 The first three decide whether a warranty arose at all, and they often predominate in importance. Unfitness is often uncontroverted in cases of substantial personal injury, and causation and harm belong to breach.3 Because the warranty is implied, the buyer need not point to a promise in the agreement. The Code reads it in unless language or circumstances exclude it, in sales of livestock and feed as in sales of any other goods.4
The three threshold elements share one feature: each describes the dealing as it stood when the contract was made. When any one is missing, the seller never gave the implicit assurance the warranty enforces, and poor performance afterward cannot supply it. The plaintiff carries the burden of proof on each element, and the claim fails if proof of any one is insufficient.5 In Rynders v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., the court held that DuPont had no reason to suspect that Vitek, the buyer, was relying on DuPont’s skill or judgment and that Vitek did not in fact rely on it.6 Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co. shows a claim that clears all three. The buyers bought a particular riding mower on a salesman’s recommendation for their hilly property, subject to his inspection of the land. At delivery he inspected and pronounced the mower suitable if driven vertically up the steepest hills. When it tipped over backward on a steep slope and injured the husband, the court affirmed a verdict for breach of an implied warranty of fitness, in addition to breach of express warranty.7
The elements answer different questions. Purpose asks what the buyer needed. Reason to know asks what reached the seller. Reliance asks whether the buyer in fact leaned on the seller’s choice. Purpose comes first because the other two are defined by it: the seller must know of that purpose, and the buyer must be relying on the seller to choose goods that suit it.
A Particular Purpose
The statute requires a “particular purpose” but does not say what makes a purpose particular.8 Comment 2 does. A particular purpose is a specific use by the buyer that is peculiar to the nature of the buyer’s business, while the ordinary purposes of goods are the uses customarily made of them, which the warranty of merchantability covers.9 The comment’s illustration is the shoe: shoes are generally used for walking on ordinary ground, but a seller may know that a particular pair was selected for climbing mountains.10
The line follows the foundations of the two warranties. Merchantability is the warranty that a merchant who regularly sells goods of a kind gives that the goods are of good quality and fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used.11 Fitness rests on a different representation: that the seller is aware of the buyer’s trust and will apply special skill or judgment to select a product that satisfies the buyer’s particular, unusual need.12 Shoes sold for walking on ordinary ground carry only the merchantability warranty, which requires that the goods be fit for the ordinary purposes of goods of that description.13 The pair the seller knows is bound for a mountain carries the fitness warranty as well, provided the seller had reason to know the buyer relied on its selection and the buyer in fact relied.14
The statutory word “particular” is ambiguous. It could mean specific to this buyer, or it could mean atypical. A buyer who wants a computer with a lot of memory has a particular purpose in the trivial sense that every buyer has some use in mind, and whether the purpose is particular in the atypical sense depends on what programs purchasers usually run.15 If the first reading controlled, every buyer who explained a use would hold a fitness warranty, and the distinction from merchantability would vanish. Most courts accordingly read the purposes contemplated by § 2-315 as distinct from the uses such products ordinarily serve.16
The cases show what a particular purpose looks like. In O’Shea v. Hatch, the buyers told the seller they wanted a show horse for their daughter that would be safe around children. The horse proved aggressive, and the court found the fitness warranty breached because the horse was unfit for children, the use the buyers had described.17 Commercial buyers show the same pattern. Courts have found the warranty breached where a seller selected produce boxes for shipping the buyer’s tomatoes, supplied lids it knew were inappropriate for the buyer’s salad dressing bottles, recommended a low-ash oil at the buyer’s request for irrigation engines, and furnished a steam-coil heating system for a buyer interested only in the results obtained.18 In each, the buyer’s own operation set the requirement, and the seller selected goods to meet it.
The common error is to treat any stated use as a particular one. In Keffer v. Wyeth, the plaintiff took hormone replacement drugs to treat menopausal symptoms, and her fitness claim failed because treating those symptoms was the drugs’ ordinary purpose.19 In Parker v. Alexander Marine Co., the buyer expected to sail a yacht on the open ocean, and the court found no intent peculiar to him and different from the purposes for which such yachts are ordinarily used.20 Each buyer had told the seller what the goods were for, but neither wanted anything beyond what the goods were for in the first place. Even a genuinely particular purpose supports the warranty only if the seller had reason to know of it when the contract was made, a requirement taken up below.
Ordinary Use as Particular Purpose
A buyer’s disclosed use sometimes turns out to be the use that goods of that kind ordinarily serve. Section 2-315 does not say whether such a use can be a “particular purpose,”22 and courts have split. Most hold that an ordinary use is never a particular purpose, so the buyer with a customary need must sue on merchantability. A minority holds that when the buyer’s specific purpose is also the goods’ ordinary purpose, the two warranties merge and the buyer may sue on either. The menopause-drug and ocean-yacht decisions above applied the majority rule.
The majority rests on how the two warranties are defined. Comment 2 sets a use peculiar to the buyer’s business against the uses customarily made of the goods, and most courts conclude that a use cannot be both.23 Miles v. Ford Motor Co. illustrates. A passenger in a Ford Ranger pickup was badly injured in an accident allegedly because of a defectively designed shoulder harness. The court noted that the state’s earlier fitness cases had all involved peculiar or extraordinary uses, and it adopted the rule that “a particular purpose must be a particular nonordinary purpose.”24 Carrying passengers is one of a pickup’s ordinary purposes, so the sale carried no fitness warranty for it. Claims of that kind belong on the merchantability side, where defect and unmerchantability tend to overlap when personal injury occurs.25
Other decisions run the same way. In DiIenno v. Libbey Glass Div., Owens-Illinois, Inc., a buyer argued that a jar’s failure to open and close without breaking breached the fitness warranty, and the court rejected the claim because opening and closing are what a jar is ordinarily for.26 Merchantability is measured the same way, by function: in Whitson v. Safeskin Corp., a nurse who developed an allergy to latex gloves had no merchantability claim because the gloves’ ordinary purpose, preventing transmission of blood-borne illness, was one they served.27 In Doe v. Miles, a Missouri court reversed a verdict on the fitness claim because the Factor VIII concentrate sold for hemophiliacs had been bought and used for its ordinary purpose and for no other.28 And in Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., the court rejected a fitness claim over a counterfeit work because it found it hard to envision a particular use of artwork that differs from the ordinary purpose of displaying it.29 In each, the plaintiff described the very job the product was built to do, so the seller’s knowledge of that job added nothing merchantability did not already supply.
Two practical concerns reinforce the definitional point. The first is breadth. The fitness warranty is narrow and somewhat peculiar, and although the two implied warranties may sometimes overlap, they are defined entirely differently.30 If every described ordinary use also counted as particular, fitness would grow as wide as merchantability. The second is disclaimers. A seller can disclaim merchantability orally, while § 2-316(2) permits disclaimer of fitness only by a conspicuous writing, so a buyer whose merchantability claim has failed has every reason to relabel an ordinary use as particular. One commentary calls that end run around the right to disclaim merchantability the primary reason for extending the fitness warranty to such uses.31
The minority rejects that line. In Soaper v. Hope Industries, Inc., the owner of a photo business bought photo equipment that failed to work properly, and the seller answered that the equipment had been bought for its ordinary purposes, so no fitness warranty arose. The court rejected the argument. Where the purpose for which a product is bought is also its ordinary or intended purpose, the warranties “merge and are cumulative, such that a plaintiff may proceed upon either theory.”32 Which rule a jurisdiction follows can decide the case.
The minority has reasons of its own, and they begin with the text. The statute says “particular,” not “atypical,” and nothing in § 2-315 itself says which meaning is intended.33 The point matters most when the seller is not a merchant. A nonmerchant makes no merchantability warranty,34 so if the fitness warranty is closed to ordinary purposes, a buyer who disclosed the use and asked for a recommendation is left with no implied warranty at all. The minority also points to the warranty’s rationale. A seller who holds itself out as able to make a recommendation and then makes one lulls the buyer into ending the search, and the warranty induces sellers who know they are being relied on to recommend only within their area of expertise.35 A seller unwilling to bear that responsibility can disclaim the warranty in a conspicuous writing.36
The overlap between the warranties is an old complaint. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., the court repeated Cardozo’s remark that the distinction between fitness for a particular purpose and merchantability is in many instances practically meaningless. Its example was a buyer who tells an automobile dealer that the car is wanted for business and pleasure driving on the public highway.37 That is a use every car buyer has, which is why the example works as a criticism of the distinction. The majority answers that the two warranties, though they may sometimes overlap, are defined entirely differently and remain conceptually distinct.38 A buyer who wants the fitness warranty must therefore prove every element of it, including a purpose that is not the ordinary one.
An exam answer should apply the majority rule unless the problem names a jurisdiction that merges the warranties. The cue for the minority is language in the facts or the call of the question that the buyer’s specific use is also the goods’ ordinary use and that the court lets the buyer proceed on either theory. The cue matters most when the seller is a nonmerchant or has disclaimed merchantability.
Seller’s Reason to Know
Section 2-315 conditions the warranty on the seller’s knowledge in two respects. At the time of contracting, the seller must have reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it must also have reason to know that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.40 Both are required because of what the warranty is: an implicit representation by the seller that it is aware of the buyer’s trust and will apply its special skill or judgment to choose goods suited to the buyer’s need.41 Knowledge of the purpose tells the seller what the representation concerns, and knowledge of the reliance tells the seller that the buyer will treat the selection as a recommendation. A seller who lacks either has made no representation to enforce.
“Reason to know” makes the standard objective. The buyer “need not bring home to the seller actual knowledge” of the purpose or the reliance if the circumstances give the seller reason to realize that either exists, and whether the warranty arises is basically a question of fact determined by the circumstances of the contracting.42 An actual-knowledge test would reward the seller who prefers not to ask, because the buyer cannot prove what was in the seller’s mind. The objective test asks instead what the dealing would have told a reasonable seller. It protects sellers too. When nothing in the dealing reveals the use or the reliance, the seller has no reason to know either and is not held to a promise it could not have understood.
Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp. applied the objective standard in the buyer’s favor. When operations with new machinery were about to begin, Lewis asked Rowe to get him the proper hydraulic fluid. Rowe asked only what kind of system Lewis had, Lewis answered that it was a commercial-pump type, and that was all the information asked or given. Neither man knew what oil the system required, and Rowe knew that Lewis knew nothing more specific.43 When trouble developed and the oil became a suspected cause, Lewis asked Rowe several times to be sure he was furnishing the right kind.44 The court held that Mobil had reason to realize both the purpose and the reliance, because Lewis made clear when he bought that he did not know what kind of oil was necessary and so was plainly relying on Mobil to supply the right one.45 If more information was needed, it was up to Mobil to get it before it made its recommendation. That it could easily have done so was shown when its engineer later visited the plant and, after inspecting, changed the recommendation.46 Lewis’s admission of ignorance helped him, because it was the clearest evidence that he was relying on the seller.
Other settings carry the same information. The request itself often discloses both purpose and reliance. A buyer who asks for a computer compatible with a memory-hungry program has told the seller the purpose, and by asking has shown reliance on the seller to choose the machine.47 The Klein salesman, who recommended a mower for the buyers’ hilly property and inspected the slopes before pronouncing it suitable, knew the buyers were relying on his judgment.48 Commercial contracts often state their purpose in their terms. In Ingram River Equipment, Inc. v. Pott Industries, Inc., the shipbuilder agreed to build barges with steam-coil systems and knew the coils were meant to heat fluid cargo, so the contract carried an implied warranty of fitness. The design failure that left the coils unsuitable breached it and entitled the purchaser to damages.49
The record in Bayliner Marine Corp. v. Crow shows the opposite problem. The dealership’s salesman, Atherton, gave Crow manufacturer “prop matrixes” listing a 30-mile-per-hour maximum for the model when fitted with a 20 x 20 or 20 x 19 propeller, and the boat Crow bought had a 20 x 17 propeller.50 Witnesses testified that speed is critical in offshore sport fishing in that area, because a typical fishing site lies about 90 miles from the coast.51 The Supreme Court of Virginia nonetheless held the fitness claim failed. Crow had to show as a threshold matter that he made the particular purpose known to the seller, and nothing showed that he told the salesman a boat unable to reach 30 miles per hour was unacceptable. Telling the salesman the boat was for offshore fishing, and discussing speed in that context, did not establish that the salesman knew on the date of sale that the 30-mile-per-hour floor was a requirement.52
Lewis and Crow differ in whose information was missing. Lewis left the technical details to the seller by saying he did not know what the system needed, so the missing detail was one the seller had been asked to supply and could have asked about. Crow held a numerical threshold that only he knew, and keeping it to himself left the dealer nothing to realize. A buyer who describes the job and asks the seller to work out what it takes gives the seller reason to know. A buyer who holds a specific performance requirement in reserve has given the seller nothing from which to infer it.
Knowledge can also fail because the seller stands too far from the buyer to learn anything. In Ford Motor Co. v. General Accident Ins. Co., the manufacturer did not know that a truck cab chassis would end up as a tow truck, so it was not liable for breach of a fitness warranty for that use.53 The Maryland court explained that a seller can seldom learn of a buyer’s particular purpose, and a buyer can seldom rely on a seller to select the right product, without some direct dealing between them.54 A manufacturer that reaches buyers only through intermediaries often has no such dealing, a limit that returns in the section on remote manufacturers.
The two objects of knowledge are separate, and reason to know one does not supply reason to know the other. A buyer’s private reliance on the seller’s skill does not satisfy the statute if the seller could not have perceived it. In Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Zallea Brothers, Inc., a buyer purchased expansion joints for steam pipes but never told the seller that strong corrosion resistance was a particular purpose. The circumstances gave the seller no basis to infer that the buyer was relying on it to choose joints with that property, so the joints were not sold with an implied warranty of fitness.55
On an exam, the facts will show what the seller saw and heard before the contract. Ask what the buyer disclosed about the use, whether the request or the buyer’s admission of ignorance showed reliance on the seller, and whether the dealing was direct enough for either fact to reach the seller before the contract was made.
Buyer’s Actual Reliance
The same clause of § 2-315 that requires the seller’s reason to know also requires that the buyer “is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.”57 The preceding subsection covered the seller’s side, which asks what the circumstances would have told a reasonable seller. The buyer’s side is a separate element: the buyer must actually have relied on the seller’s skill or judgment.58 If the buyer put no trust in the seller’s choice, the seller’s awareness of the buyer’s need adds nothing, and the warranty never attaches.
Reliance gives the seller’s implicit assurance its force. The fitness warranty is premised on a kind of representation by the seller, that the product is suitable for the special purposes of the buyer made known to it.59 A seller with no reason to know it was being relied upon cannot fairly be said to have tacitly represented that the goods were suitable, and if the buyer did not in fact rely, the principal justification for imposing a fitness warranty disappears.60 Reliance also ties the assurance to the loss. A buyer who bought on the seller’s recommendation was hurt by the goods’ failure to match it, while a buyer who decided alone would have suffered the same loss whatever the seller said. The mechanism explains the warranty’s purpose as well. A seller who holds itself out as able to recommend and then does so lulls the buyer into ending the search, and the warranty makes the seller answer for the confidence it invited.61
A buyer shows reliance most easily by asking for help. The buyer in Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Evans, who had never farmed, relied on a salesman’s explanation and his assistance in selecting farm equipment. The equipment failed to operate and was never sufficiently repaired. Because the seller knew the buyer was relying on its skill and expertise, and the salesman had asserted the equipment would be “field ready,” the court held that the seller breached its implied warranty of fitness.62 A buyer’s candid admission of ignorance strengthens the showing. When he bought, Lewis made clear that he did not know what kind of oil his system required, and the court found it plain that he was relying on Mobil to supply the proper product.63
Reliance can just as clearly be absent. Suppose a homeowner picks a riding mower of a particular model only because a neighbor owns one, and seeks advice from no one. That buyer has nothing on which to rest a fitness claim, because reliance on the seller is an element and there was none.64 The machine, the slope, and the tip-over could be the same as in Klein. What differs is whose judgment picked the machine.
Business buyers supply the same contrast. The buyer in O’Keefe Elevator Co. v. Second Ave. Properties, Ltd. bought a wheelchair lift that a person in a wheelchair could not operate because of an improper landing the buyer itself had supplied. The court found no reliance on the seller’s expertise, because the buyer had obtained its own state approval for the installation and received exactly the goods it ordered. A plaintiff who did not buy from the seller could not have relied on its skill or knowledge at all, and § 2-315 did not apply.65 Rynders, discussed above, failed on both halves of the requirement. DuPont had no reason to suspect that Vitek relied on it, and Vitek did not in fact rely.66
Whether the buyer relied is a question of fact, and appellate courts defer to supported findings. One court upheld a trial finding that a buyer did not rely on the seller’s skill or judgment in selecting a vessel, because substantial evidence supported it.67 The same decision reversed the trial court’s ruling that no express warranty existed and remanded on the seaworthiness claim, so losing on reliance did not end the buyer’s warranty case.68
Reliance is also where fitness departs most sharply from merchantability. It is an element of the fitness warranty and no part of the merchantability warranty, which is implied in any sale of goods by a merchant seller that sells goods of that kind.69
The pattern in the decided cases is consistent. A buyer who describes a need and leaves the choice to the seller has relied, and a buyer who chose the goods, specified them, or verified them independently usually has not. The next section takes up the recurring situations that point toward missing reliance: goods built to the buyer’s specifications, a buyer who insists on a brand, a buyer who knows more than the seller, and a buyer who personally picks the item.