Concept
Proving and Remedying Breach
Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
Proving and Remedying Breach
Establishing that a fitness warranty arose is only the first step toward recovery. The buyer must next prove that the goods did not comply with the warranty, then that the unfitness caused the injury “proximately and in fact,” and then the damages. After that, the buyer must fight off affirmative defenses such as disclaimers, limitations periods, privity, lack of notice, and assumption of the risk.1 For a fitness claim, the causation element has a precise content: the product’s unfitness for the buyer’s particular purpose caused the plaintiff harm.2
Fault plays no part in that sequence. A seller may be entirely blameless, may have spoken nothing but the truth, and may have done everything humanly possible to live up to the warranty, yet still be liable, because recovery on a warranty, as with an insurer, does not rest on fault.3 The statute’s own conditions point the same way. They ask what the seller had reason to know about the buyer’s purpose and reliance at the time of contracting, and they say nothing about how carefully the seller chose the goods.4
Two subsections follow. The first explains what “unfit” means and why a buyer can prove breach without proving a defect. The second takes up causation, where the buyer’s own conduct and the peculiarities of the buyer’s operation come into play, and then the damages that follow once causation is shown. The general remedies for breach of a sale-of-goods contract belong to their own reading, so damages get only the treatment the fitness warranty requires.
Unfitness Without Defect
The statute fixes the yardstick for breach in its closing words: the goods “shall be fit for such purpose,” meaning the particular purpose the seller had reason to know of at the time of contracting.5 A court therefore compares the goods with the buyer’s job, not with goods of the same description in general. For that reason, breach does not require any showing that the goods were defective in any way; it requires only that they were not fit for the buyer’s particular purpose.6 In Neilson Business Equipment Center, Inc. v. Monteleone, the computer equipment did not meet the needs of a buyer who relied on the seller to select the goods and customize the software, and that mismatch was the breach.7
The yardstick follows from what the seller implicitly promises. When a buyer describes an unusual need and trusts the seller to choose, the seller is aware of that trust and, in effect, promises to respect it by applying special skill or judgment to select a product that will satisfy the need. The merchantability warranty promises something narrower: that the product will safely and effectively perform the normal functions for which that type of product is ordinarily bought and sold.8 The fitness warranty typically arises in one-on-one dealing that creates quite explicit expectations that the product the seller selects will accomplish the buyer’s particular task.9 At the breach stage, a single question remains: whether that promise came true.
A bicycle shop shows the point. You tell the salesperson that you are about to ride across the country for six weeks and ask him to recommend a bike. The salesperson, who has never ridden a bike in his life, picks out a heavy mountain bike with only three gears, which is not very practical for long-distance road riding.10 The bike may well be merchantable, because goods can be fit for their ordinary purpose and still unfit for a particular one.11 Sold to a rider who says she wants to take it onto rough trails, the same bike would do the job the seller knew about, and nothing would be breached. Whether you could reasonably rely on a salesperson who had never ridden goes to whether the warranty arose, the subject of the earlier sections, and this section assumes that it did.12
The yardstick reaches only purposes the seller had reason to know of. In one decided case, a buyer purchased expansion joints to absorb the contraction and expansion in steam pipes. The buyer never told the seller that strong resistance to corrosion was a particular purpose for which the joints were required, and the seller could not be expected to infer that the buyer was relying on it to select such joints, so the court held that the joints carried no implied warranty of fitness for that purpose.13 A need the seller never heard about cannot be added to the yardstick after the goods fail.
The buyer must also show that the purpose was particular, meaning different from the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. Some courts let a fitness warranty arise alongside the merchantability warranty when the buyer tells the seller the anticipated use. Most disagree and hold that the purposes § 2–315 contemplates form a class distinct from the uses such products ordinarily serve.14 A complaint that goods failed at their ordinary work therefore points toward merchantability, not fitness.
What the seller said about the goods is not the yardstick either. A seller’s statements of opinion, affirmations of value, and puffing do not create an express warranty,15 but the buyer needs no such promise to hold the seller to this warranty, which rests on the seller’s reason to know the purpose and the buyer’s reliance on the seller’s skill or judgment.16
How carefully the seller chose the goods drops out of the analysis for the same reason. In Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., the buyer bought one-day-old chickens from Montgomery Ward and sued for breach of implied warranties.17 The chicks carried avian leukosis, a disease the seller could neither detect nor cure, and the seller argued that it therefore could not be liable. The court disagreed. The Code requires no showing that the seller should or could have found the defect, only that the goods on delivery were not of merchantable quality or not fit for their particular purpose, and once the buyer makes that showing the seller’s only exculpatory route is to prove that the warranties were excluded or modified under § 2–316.18 The seller’s inability to detect the disease could matter only to a negligence charge, which was no longer part of the suit.19
The rule allocates risk to the party whose skill or judgment the buyer relied on. A seller unwilling to carry that risk can exclude or modify the warranty, a subject taken up at the end of this chapter. Shifting the cost of the mismatch to the buyer, who trusted the seller’s selection, would strip the warranty of its purpose.
A buyer who wins on unfitness has not yet won the case. Causation and damages remain, and the seller may still raise defenses.
Causation and Damages
A buyer who proves unfitness has proved a breach, not yet a recovery. Two showings remain: that the unfitness, and not some other event, caused the loss, and the amount of loss that the Code allows.21 Causation is a separate burden because the warranty promises only that the goods will suit the purpose the seller knew of, and if something else caused the harm, that promise did not. The Code’s official commentary states the point for warranty actions generally: it is necessary to show not only the existence of the warranty but also that it was broken and that the breach was the proximate cause of the loss, and an affirmative showing by the seller that the loss resulted from some action or event following its own delivery can operate as a defense.22
The buyer’s own conduct after delivery is the most common place where causation breaks down. Comment 8 to § 2–316 explains that if the buyer discovers the defect and uses the goods anyway, or unreasonably fails to examine the goods before use, the resulting injuries may be found to result from the buyer’s own action rather than proximately from a breach of warranty, and Comment 5 to § 2–715 develops the point more fully.23 Suppose a buyer gags on a foreign substance halfway through a bottle of soft drink, spits it out, and finishes the bottle, only to be injured by ground glass in the last of it. The seller can argue that the injury came from the buyer’s choice to keep drinking after the warning, and that argument goes to proximate cause. It does not revive a fault defense. The seller’s care is still no defense, as the last subsection showed, but the buyer must still prove that the unfitness did the damage.
The features of the buyer’s own system raise the same question. In Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., Mobil had recommended an oil for a sawmill owner’s hydraulic system. Mobil then argued that, even if an implied warranty of fitness existed, it did not cover the case because the system had abnormal features, namely an inadequate filtration system and a capacity to entrain excessive air.24 The court gave several answers. The argument goes to causation, to whether the oil or some other cause produced the damage, and not to whether a warranty of fitness existed. Even if the system had peculiarities, the point of the warranty is that a seller should not supply a product unsuited to the buyer’s specific purpose. And nothing in the record showed the system to be unusual, since it had run satisfactorily under its prior owner and ran satisfactorily again after it was cleaned and an additive oil was used. That last fact doubles as proof of causation, because a system that works with a different oil and fails with the recommended one points to the oil. The seller remains free to prove that a peculiarity of the system, and not the oil, caused the failure, but the peculiarity does not erase a warranty that the seller’s own recommendation created.
Once causation is shown, § 2–714(2) supplies the baseline measure: the difference, at the time and place of acceptance, between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.25 In a warranty case that baseline often falls short, because the buyer may have spent additional sums coping with the problems the breach caused.26 Incidental damages fill part of the gap, and § 2–715(1) reaches “any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.”27 In Lewis, the incidental damages were the excessive oil the system used and the cost of repairing and replacing mechanical parts damaged by the oil’s failing to function properly, and the parties did not dispute that those damages were recoverable.28
Consequential damages bring the warranty’s own logic back into the remedy. Under § 2–715(2)(a), they include any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.29 The reason-to-know test uses the same words, and looks to the same moment, as the threshold element of the warranty, so the facts that showed the seller knew the buyer’s purpose usually show which needs the seller can be charged with. The test still applies loss by loss, and a buyer who proved the seller’s knowledge of one need cannot recover for another need the seller never heard about.
The sawmill owner’s own claim marks the outer edge of recovery. The parties disputed two points: for what period damages were recoverable, and whether he could recover lost profits for the time he could not operate at full capacity.30 Cover under § 2–712 does not fit goods the buyer has accepted, so the court asked whether the damage could otherwise have been reasonably prevented, and it applied the doctrine that damages avoidable with reasonable effort and without undue risk, expense, or humiliation are not charged to the defendant.31 On lost profits, the court refused recovery for the later period, when the mill ran at only about half capacity after the unsuitable oil was replaced. The earlier losses had left the owner short of capital, so the shortfall traced to his capital resources and not to the breach, and an oil company is not in the business of extending credit to manufacturers.32 The chain from breach to loss ran through the buyer’s finances, and the seller’s reason to know of the mill’s lubrication needs gave it no reason to know of its capitalization. For the fitness warranty, three points matter here: the buyer’s burden to prove causation, the reason-to-know limit on consequential loss, and the refusal to make the seller answer for losses that trace to something else.