Concept
Disclaiming Express Warranties
Exclusion or modification of warranties
Disclaiming Express Warranties
A seller who makes an express warranty has affirmatively promised something, and §2-316(1) makes that promise hard to take back. The subsection supplies no form of words for the seller to recite. It instructs courts how to read the seller’s own language: words or conduct creating an express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty are construed as consistent with each other wherever that is reasonable, and, subject to the Article’s parol evidence provision in §2-202, the negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such a construction is unreasonable.1 A court first tries to harmonize the promise with the disclaimer. Where the two cannot honestly be reconciled, the disclaimer yields.
Implied warranties are disclaimed by other means. To exclude the implied warranty of merchantability, the language must mention merchantability and, if written, be conspicuous, and a seller who follows those steps gets a predictable result.2 The examination rule of subsection (3)(b) also reaches only implied warranties: when the buyer has examined the goods as fully as he desired, or has refused to examine them, “there is no implied warranty” as to defects an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed.3 Express warranties get no comparable route, and the reason lies in what they are. An implied warranty is a default the law supplies, while an express warranty is a promise the seller made, often as part of what the buyer paid for. Why should a seller avoid responsibility for a promise for which the buyer paid, on which the buyer relied, and which formed part of the basis of the bargain? One state, South Carolina, answers by prohibiting disclaimers of express warranties outright.4 The uniform text takes a middle course: a seller may limit the scope of its promise, but it may not contradict it.
The statute poses two questions, and where the promise sits determines which comes first. If the promise and the disclaimer both appear in the signed writing, the only question is whether they can be read together. If the promise was made orally or before signing, the buyer must first get past §2-202, which decides whether the promise may be proved at all. This unit takes the reading rule first, because it shows what the seller is up against once the promise is in the case, and then turns to the evidence rule.
Reading Warranty and Disclaimer Together
The first clause of §2-316(1) presumes that a seller who made a promise and also wrote limiting language meant both to count. Two features of the text control the outcome. The reasonableness qualifier demands an honest effort at harmony, not a strained one. And because the disclaimer is inoperative only “to the extent” that harmony is unreasonable, it loses force only where it collides with the promise, so a clause that fails against one warranty can still operate against others.5
The presumption of harmony exists because every express warranty has borders. A tire maker may warrant a new tire against blowouts, but only for three years or 36,000 miles, only for normal non-commercial passenger-car driving on roads and highways, and with no coverage for tires run flat or damaged by off-road driving, fire, collision, vandalism, misalignment, mechanical defects in the vehicle, or deliberate misuse. Each of those terms tells the buyer where the promise stops, so each is read together with the promise and each is effective.6
The override does the subtler work. A disclaimer that cannot reasonably be construed as consistent with an express warranty is void, and the cases involve contradictions of an essential aspect of the warranty: a product’s safety, its express description as new, or the descriptions and pictures in advertisements and brochures.7 A seller who could promise one thing in the sales pitch and cancel it in the boilerplate would take back with one hand what it gave with the other, so the Code puts the risk of an irreconcilable contradiction on the seller. The earliest draft of §2-316 said so bluntly: “If the agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative.” Hauter v. Zogarts traced that history and observed that, although the section has since been reworded, “the spirit of the provision remains the same.”8
The familiar mileage illustration shows the override at work. A contract states that a used car will get 36 miles per gallon and also disclaims all warranties. One term promises a specific result and the other promises nothing, so §2-316(1) directs the court to construe the ambiguity created by the contradiction against the seller, and the mileage warranty survives.9 The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Software Contracts reaches a similar place for software by barring enforcement of an express warranty disclaimer that the user reasonably would not expect.10
In Art Hill, Inc. v. Heckler, the buyer of a camper asked the seller three times before the sale whether the camper was compatible with the buyer’s pickup truck, and each time the seller said it was. The court held that those answers created an express warranty and that the purchase agreement’s disclaimer of all warranties had not eliminated it. The same clause did succeed against the implied warranties, because it was in writing, conspicuous, and mentioned merchantability.11 The disclaimer was cut down to its proper reach: effective against what the law supplied, inoperative against what the seller said.
One court, citing §2-316(1), held an attempted disclaimer of express warranties inoperative because “to give effect to the disclaimer would be unreasonable in view of the writing on the face” of the agreement.12 The conflict there sat inside a single writing, and the disclaimer fell for the same reason as in the mileage example: it could not reasonably be read together with the promise.
Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp. reached a harmonizing reading on commercial facts. The seller’s terms warranted the machine free from defects in material and workmanship, and its promotional literature described what the machine could do. The court read the two together: the sales material and technical specifications on the order established the standard of performance, and the warranty promised that the machine would meet that standard when free of defects. The exclusionary language therefore did not make the seller’s express representations in the literature inoperative.13 The difference between Fargo and Art Hill is whether the limiting words and the promise fit together as parts of one commitment. In Fargo they did. In Art Hill a blanket disclaimer would have left nothing of the seller’s repeated assurance.
The more a promise looks like the negotiated heart of the sale, the harder it is to read a disclaimer alongside it. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. shows context at work: it distinguished two Texas decisions that had refused to enforce disclaimers because those cases involved consumer goods and disclaimers that were not dickered terms, meaning terms the parties had individually negotiated. The reasoning of those decisions was that express warranties resting on the dickered aspects of the individual bargain go so clearly to its essence that words of disclaimer in the purchase agreement are repugnant to the basic dickered terms.14
Because the risk of an irreconcilable contradiction falls on the seller, the sure way to avoid being bound by an affirmation or description is not to make it. The next best course is to state its limits inside the promise, as the tire maker does, so that the disclaimer and the warranty are one commitment instead of two.
Express Warranties and Parol Evidence
Section 2-316(1) qualifies its own consistency rule: the negation or limitation is inoperative only “subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202).”16 That clause decides which promises the consistency rule can ever reach. Setting a promise beside a disclaimer presumes that the promise is properly before the court, and §2-202 can keep an earlier or outside statement out of the case before any comparison begins.
Two fact patterns look alike and must be kept apart. In the first, one signed contract contains both an express warranty and a disclaimer of all express warranties; the construction rule decides, and the disclaimer gives way to the extent the two cannot be read together. In the second, the seller makes an express warranty, and the parties then sign a contract that disclaims all express warranties; the statement is the kind of evidence the parol evidence rule polices, so the first question is whether the buyer may prove it at all.17
Under §2-202, a writing the parties intended as the final expression of their agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement.18 Sellers have good reason to want that protection. After the fact, claims of oral warranties raise obvious problems of proof, because they depend on the veracity of both sides and on memories that fade and drift toward each side’s version of the negotiation.19 Sales representatives, who are often credited for the sales they close, may overstate the goods to close them, and a seller may prefer a disclaimer to minimize these “agency costs.”20 The Code’s provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence protect the seller against false allegations of oral warranties, and the customary lack-of-authority clauses protect it against unauthorized representations.21
The effect shows in the mileage example. A buyer alleges that the seller’s representative said a used car would get 36 miles per gallon, but the signed contract contradicts the statement. If §2-202 applies, the evidence is barred, and the buyer cannot even prove that the seller made the statement; with no express warranty in the case, the consistency rule has nothing to harmonize.22 Hoover Universal, Inc. v. Brockway Imco, Inc. reached the same result on commercial facts: evidence of the seller’s earlier representations about a machine’s capacity was inadmissible because the later written contract was intended by the parties as their final expression.23 A promise printed in the writing itself is different. It is already part of the document, so the parol evidence rule has nothing to exclude, and the construction rule governs.
The seller’s strongest drafting tool against oral warranties is a merger clause, which states that oral representations made during negotiations have no effect and are merged into a written contract that is the complete, exclusive, and final expression of the parties’ agreement. If the clause is properly drafted, conspicuously presented, and acknowledged by the buyer’s signature, it can effectively disclaim oral express warranties, possibly even when the buyer claims personal injuries.24 The clause turns a contest between two witnesses into a question about what a signed page says. BHC Development, L.C. v. Bally Gaming, Inc. excluded evidence of express warranties of software quality on that basis, because of a final signed agreement with a merger clause.25 A seller cannot create a warranty with one hand and disclaim it with the other, but it can effectively disclaim any express warranties it made before the contract was entered into if the contract is completely integrated, or at least integrated with respect to express warranties.26
Buyers have answers, and courts that disfavor disclaimers have found them in the rule’s own vocabulary. Some courts have simply said that the parol evidence rule has no effect where a prior oral express warranty is contradicted by a written disclaimer. Others admit the testimony while deciding whether the writing was intended as the parties’ final expression, or find that the writing was not final because it lacks a merger clause or because the seller made post-contract statements.27 Because those answers arise in a fixed order, a problem of this kind is best run as a sequence.
Step three is where many contested cases are decided, because a writing can be the final word on the terms it contains without being the whole deal. The buyer argues that the writing is final but not complete and exclusive and that the statement only supplements it, while the seller answers that the statement contradicts the writing’s disclaimer.28 A statement that explains or supplements the writing without contradicting it can come in, and one that contradicts it cannot.29
A conspicuous merger clause signed by the buyer, together with a disclaimer of warranties not stated in the writing, would give the dealer its best argument that the writing is complete and exclusive, and the same statement would then face exclusion. A statement that the car gets 36 miles per gallon, made to a buyer who signs a contract specifically warranting lower mileage, has a second problem: it contradicts the writing and is excluded at step three however complete the writing is.
When the writing is final and the statement is excluded, the buyer’s remaining route is fraud. A buyer told that a used car gets 36 miles per gallon, who then signs a contract disclaiming express warranties not in the writing, can argue that the statement fraudulently induced the signature. Most jurisdictions treat the parol evidence rule as inapplicable to fraudulent inducement even when the contract is fully integrated, as the South Dakota decision in Poeppel v. Lester noted.30 The route is narrower than it looks, because fraud requires an element a warranty claim lacks: knowledge that the statement was false. Without that scienter, fraud closely resembles breach of an express warranty, the very claim the parol evidence rule has already excluded.31 A salesperson who honestly but wrongly believed the mileage figure leaves the buyer with nothing under an integrated writing; one who knew the figure was false gives the buyer a claim.
Some courts go further and refuse to let a disclaimer reach the description of what was sold. In La Trace v. Webster, statements at auction that items were Tiffany lamps went to the “core description” of the goods and could not be disclaimed by several “as is” clauses in the auction terms and the sales receipt; the court also noted that the description was given during the auction, after the buyer had received the terms and conditions.32 The earlier representations in Hoover Universal concerned a machine’s capacity and preceded a writing the parties meant as final, while the statement in La Trace identified the very thing being sold and came after the buyer had the terms. Read together, the cases suggest that a merger clause and a disclaimer protect a seller most against pre-signing performance assurances and least against statements that define the goods.
Because the seller is usually the party best placed to control what its own representatives say, courts tend to read efforts to shift the risk of agent statements onto buyers narrowly, and even a carefully drafted merger clause remains exposed to a court’s willingness to look for a way around it.33 The mechanics of the parol evidence rule belong to the course’s fuller treatment of that rule; here it matters as a gate that comes ahead of the consistency rule.