Concept
Disclaiming Implied Warranties
Exclusion or modification of warranties
Disclaiming Implied Warranties
Implied warranties are terms the law supplies when the seller has said nothing about them: the UCC reads them into a sales agreement unless specific language or the circumstances exclude them.1 Subsection (2) of §2-316 tells a seller how to exclude them. To exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability, or any part of it, the language must mention merchantability and, if it is in a writing, must be conspicuous. To exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness, the exclusion must be by a writing and must be conspicuous.2
Two warranties are at stake, and they protect different interests. Merchantability concerns the ordinary purposes for which goods are used. Fitness for a particular purpose concerns a specific use peculiar to the buyer, as when a seller knows that a pair of shoes, ordinarily bought for walking, was chosen for climbing mountains.3 A seller who wants to sell with no implied assurance at all must dispose of both.4
The Code prescribes form because the clauses it targets are the common ones that seek to exclude “all warranties, express or implied.” Section 2-316 protects the buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances that protect the buyer from surprise.5 Surprise is a real danger. Consumers of new products typically know little about a product’s dangers, have minimal power to bargain for more safety, and have few skills in valuing warranties or their exclusion, so a seller gains the most from a disclaimer that the buyer neither sees nor understands.6
A seller who complies wins completely. Most states adopted the uniform §2-316, which lets a seller disclaim both implied warranties entirely, and a compliant disclaimer defeats a consumer’s warranty claim even when a dangerous defect kills or seriously injures the consumer.7 In one case a steering defect sent a 14-month-old car off a bridge. The 12-month express warranty had expired, the tort claims were barred by a one-year statute of limitations, and a disclaimer drafted under subsection (2) barred the claim for breach of the warranty of merchantability.8
Express warranties call for other tools. The Code’s provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence protect the seller against false claims of oral warranties, and the seller’s most effective defense is usually a merger clause stating that oral representations have no effect and are merged into the written contract.9 Implied warranties rest on no statement of the seller, so subsection (2) asks only for the right words in the right form. The warranty of title lies outside this machinery altogether: subsection (3)’s methods do not apply to it, and §2-312(2) allows it to be excluded only by specific language or by circumstances giving the buyer reason to know that the seller does not claim title or sells only such right as he or a third person may have.10
The formal route is not the only one. Subsection (2) opens with the words “Subject to subsection (3),” and the methods in that subsection are the subject of later sections.11 The rest of this section takes subsection (2) in order: merchantability first, then fitness, then the conspicuousness on which both depend.
Merchantability Disclaimers
A disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability must satisfy two requirements: the language must mention merchantability, and a written disclaimer must also be conspicuous.12 The requirements do different work. The word requirement governs content, because it forces the seller to name the protection being surrendered. The conspicuousness requirement governs presentation, because a clause that names the warranty protects no one if the buyer cannot be expected to see it. A clause can pass one test and fail the other, so a court checks each separately.
General language fails the word requirement however prominently it is printed. A clause excluding “all warranties, including implied warranties” is ineffective, and a clause that says only “no guarantee” is unlikely to do better.13 In Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., the exclusion failed both tests: it did not use the word “merchantability,” and it was not conspicuous.14
Another opinion isolates the second test. In Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., the seller’s last warranty paragraph stated, in part, “There are no warranties of merchantability or fitness.” The paragraph mentioned merchantability and, as to fitness, was in writing. But it appeared in standard print, without indented margins, contrast print, or any other conspicuous feature, and the court identified that as a potential defect.15 Gindy and Fargo fail in different ways. A clause that omits the word needs new language; a clause that has the word but looks like its neighbors needs new typography.
Conspicuousness attaches only to a writing, so a merchantability disclaimer may be spoken, while a fitness disclaimer may not.16 A spoken disclaimer must still mention merchantability.17 Speech also costs the seller something at trial: if the parties dispute what was said, the actual words must be proved as a fact before they can be interpreted, and memories differ.18 A writing avoids that problem. When the parties intend it as their final expression, the parol evidence rule may also keep out an earlier or contemporaneous oral statement, such as “These goods are guaranteed for one year,” that would contradict it.19
The same sentence of subsection (2) lets a seller exclude or modify the warranty “or any part of it,” so a seller may narrow the warranty without eliminating it.20 The same two formalities govern a modification as govern a full exclusion.
The last step matters because subsection (3) offers routes that do not depend on the seller’s wording. One turns on the buyer’s examination: when the buyer, before contracting, has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as desired, or has refused to examine them, there is no implied warranty as to defects that an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed.21 The 2003 amendments would have required that such a refusal come “after a demand by the seller.”22
Fitness Disclaimers
The fitness clause of subsection (2) asks for less in wording and more in form. The exclusion must be by a writing and must be conspicuous, but the clause requires no particular word. Its own model is a general statement: language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that “There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof.”24 Similar general language, such as “no warranties of any kind accompany the sale of this product,” also suffices for fitness.25
The two halves of subsection (2) therefore differ in two respects:
- Merchantability: the language must mention merchantability, a writing must be conspicuous, and the disclaimer may be spoken if it uses the word.26
- Fitness: no particular word is required, but the exclusion must be a conspicuous writing, and a spoken disclaimer never suffices.27
Litigants notice the difference. One court observed that buyers are drawn to the fitness warranty as an end run around a merchantability disclaimer, because merchantability can be disclaimed orally while fitness can be disclaimed only by a conspicuous writing.28 The warranty rests on the seller’s awareness of the buyer’s reliance. In Evans, a buyer who had never farmed relied on a salesman’s explanation and help in selecting farm equipment. Because the seller knew of that reliance and the salesman asserted that the equipment would be “field ready,” the court held that the seller breached the implied warranty of fitness.29
A conspicuous writing that names merchantability can dispose of both warranties at once. An Indiana court held that because the seller’s disclaimer was in writing, conspicuous, and mentioned merchantability, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose had been effectively disclaimed.30
The reverse does not hold. The Code’s model sentence reaches all implied warranties of fitness but never mentions merchantability, so a seller who relies on it alone has removed one warranty and left the other in place.31 A drafter who wants both gone names merchantability and adds the fitness language, all in conspicuous type. The next section explains what that standard demands.
What Makes a Term Conspicuous
Conspicuousness is the one requirement common to both formal disclaimers: a written merchantability exclusion must be conspicuous, and a fitness exclusion must be both written and conspicuous.33 Opinions in this area quote a definition: a term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it, and whether it is conspicuous is for the court to decide.34 The test is objective. The official comment puts the question as whether attention can reasonably be expected to be called to the term, so a court can decide by examining the form, without a contest over what this buyer happened to read.35
The quoted definition also names examples: a printed heading in capitals is conspicuous, and language in the body of a form is conspicuous if it appears in larger or other contrasting type or color.36 Courts weigh several features of a clause, and no single feature is required:
- Contrasting type: a larger font, a different typeface, or a different color from the surrounding text.37
- A heading that announces the clause, such as DISCLAIMER OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES.38
- A prominent location, such as immediately above the buyer’s principal signature line, or beside a separate signature or initial line on which the buyer acknowledges the loss of rights.39
The definition is not exhaustive, and ordinary print is not inconspicuous in every circumstance.40 The features are evidence on the single question the comment asks. A disclaimer that fails the test does not exclude the warranty, because the Code permits exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances that protect the buyer from surprise.41
The plain-print clause is the common failure, and the Fargo paragraph discussed above is its model: it sat in standard print with nothing to set it apart from the clauses around it. A heading can make matters worse. In Gindy, the exclusionary provision contained no larger or different type, and the only large type was a printed heading reading “WARRANTIES.” The court held that the heading did not make the exclusion conspicuous and added that, if anything, it would suggest to a buyer who does not read the fine print that warranties are included, not excluded.42 A capitalized heading draws the eye, so what it says matters.
Burial is a separate failure. In South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., the written agreement ran twenty-two typewritten pages, mostly single-spaced. The disclaimer was the last sentence of a two-paragraph item on page 17, indistinct in color and type, and the court held that it was not conspicuous as a matter of law.43 Placement on the back or an interior page of a standard-form sales contract is particularly suspect. Yet a disclaimer so located is effective if the buyer’s attention is effectively directed to the clause and the clause is otherwise prominently displayed.44
A clause can be visible and still fall short. In Dorman v. International Harvester Co., a tractor form placed the exclusion near the signature line in type slightly larger than the paragraph before it, and partly italicized. The court held it inconspicuous because it was not set out in large, bold print positioned to compel notice and carried no prominent disclaimer heading.
One question has no settled answer: whether a buyer who actually knew of an inconspicuous disclaimer is bound by it. Courts are split on whether such a disclaimer is valid if the buyer admits reading it or otherwise knowing about it at the time of contracting.45 Each side has an argument. The definition is objective, so what the buyer knew seems beside the point; the purpose is to prevent surprise, and a buyer who read the clause was not surprised.46 An exam answer should apply the objective test to the form first and, if the facts show that the buyer knew of the clause, flag the split.