Concept
What Counts as Goods
Identification of goods
What Counts as Goods
Article 2 governs transactions in goods, so every sales problem starts with the definition in UCC § 2-105(1). Goods are all things, including specially manufactured goods, that are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale, other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities under Article 8, and things in action.1 The definition also reaches the unborn young of animals, growing crops, and other identified things attached to realty as described in § 2-107.2
The definition works in three stages. A general rule admits movable things. Three carve-outs remove the money that pays the price, investment securities, and things in action. A closing sentence then pulls back in a few things still attached to land, because buyers treat them as articles of commerce. A crate of machine parts needs no analysis; the hard cases sit at the edges, and the subsections below take the three stages in turn.
Movable at Identification
The core of the definition is one clause: goods are things that are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.3 Each phrase does its own work. Things means tangible things, because the essence of goods is that they are tangible and movable.4 Movable asks whether the object can be carried from place to place, which separates a printing press from the lot it stands on. The phrase at the time of identification says when to ask, and students tend to skip it. Identification is the point at which particular items become the ones the contract concerns; a later section develops its mechanics, and here only its timing matters. The statute measures movability at that point, neither at signing nor after delivery.
Courts apply the clause with common sense. One court described the things sold as items of tangible property, normally in the flow of commerce, portable at the time of the contract, and added that they are no less goods because service may play a role in their ultimate use, since the Code contains no such exception.5
Timing starts to matter when the goods do not yet exist. Take a made-to-order desk. A buyer picks a design from a catalog, the seller must still build the desk, and delivery is six weeks away. On the signing date no desk exists, so a movability test applied that day would put the contract outside Article 2. The statute asks about movability at identification instead. Future goods, which are neither existing nor identified, remain a subset of goods, and Article 2 governs them if they are or will be movable when identified to the contract.6 The better reading extends the definition even to things that would have been movable at identification had they come into existence, so the desk is a good even if the buyer repudiates before the seller builds it.7 A repudiated contract to build a house stands differently: it involves no movable thing, so it is not a transaction in goods.8 The reason for measuring at identification is practical. Buyers often order goods before the goods exist, and a test applied at signing would confine Article 2 to items already on the shelf.
The parenthetical for specially manufactured goods answers a related doubt. If Acme contracts with Omega to build a machine to Acme's specifications, the machine is a good.9 Every manufactured product embodies labor, and the presence of some service in production does not take the contract out of Article 2.10 What matters is what the buyer bargains for. A sale involves a transfer of title, so ask whether the end product on which the labor is spent is the object of that transfer; if it is, the transaction is a sale of goods, even if the labor is worth far more than the materials.11 A sculptor, Chip, who buys the marble, carves it to Mark's design, and delivers the finished piece for a price sells goods. If Mark supplies the block and pays Chip only to carve it, Chip transfers title to no end product, and the contract is for labor on Mark's property.
Movability at identification also protects a completed sale from later events. A homeowner who buys boards, nails, and brackets at a home-improvement store to build a deck has contracted for materials alone, and the materials are movable things when identified to the contract.12 Once the owner nails them to something fixed to the foundation, they are no longer movable and cease to be goods.13 That later event does not reach back to change the character of the sale that delivered them. If installation could reverse the classification, the law governing a delivery would depend on what the buyer later did with the lumber, and a seller handing it over could not know which law applied until the buyer picked up a hammer.
A contract with a builder runs the other way. A homeowner who hires a builder to construct a house buys work that produces an immovable structure, and a contract for house construction involves no movable thing, so it is not a transaction in goods.14 More generally, Article 2 does not govern transactions in real estate or in fixtures that have become part of it.15 The homeowner at the store and the homeowner with a builder can therefore end up with the same boards nailed in place under different bodies of law: one bought movable things, the other bought work.
Step three decides most cases. A thing treated as real property because it was bolted down after delivery, or as outside Article 2 because it did not exist at signing, has been tested at the wrong moment, and in both situations the correct answer is that the thing was movable when identified.
Money, Securities, and Intangibles
Section 2-105(1) subtracts three items from the category of movable things: the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities governed by Article 8, and things in action.17 People own and transfer all three for value, but none fits a sales statute built around tangible commodities, and each is removed for a different reason. The money exclusion depends on the role currency plays in the deal. The securities exclusion hands a whole category to another article. The things-in-action exclusion removes rights that have no physical existence.
Money is excluded only when it is the price. A sale is the passing of title from seller to buyer for a price, and the price may be payable in money or otherwise.18 The statute therefore needs a goods side and a price side, and the exclusion keeps the two from merging. If the cash that pays for a shipment were also goods, every cash sale would be two sales, each party selling to the other, and the delivery and warranty rules would run against the cash as well as the merchandise.
When Acme pays Omega in cash for 1,000 widgets, the widgets are goods and the cash is not. When Acme instead buys a coin collection from a dealer, the collection is a good, because money as a commodity falls within Article 2 while money as a medium of payment falls outside it.19 The test is functional, so the same coins can be goods in one contract and excluded in another. Ask which side of the exchange the money occupies: currency on the price side is excluded, and currency on the thing-bought side is an ordinary movable good.
Investment securities are excluded because Article 8 governs them and contains numerous provisions written for them.20 The exclusion sits in the definition of goods itself, so it operates at the threshold, before any Article 2 rule is reached.
The third exclusion, things in action, removes rights that can be enforced only by bringing a claim, such as a right to be paid under a contract. The exclusion follows from the essence of goods, which are tangible and movable.21 A claim has no physical existence that a seller can hand over or a buyer can inspect.
The sharpest test of this line is an asset that trades like a commodity yet fails to be a good. Warranty claims are a fertile area for disputes over whether a transaction is in goods, and Lansing Trade Group, LLC v. OceanConnect, LLC shows why: the dispute concerned separated renewable-fuel credits known as RINs. The court noted that wheat, oil, and gold are clearly goods under Article 2. Separated RINs, unlike those commodities, are essentially informational rather than tangible and have no intrinsic value. They have value only because they confer a right to claim a fuel credit under EPA regulations, which makes them a regulatory credit, a form of intangible right. Even if that right can be considered personal property and traded, the court concluded, it is not goods within the UCC, so the availability of Article 2 warranties depended on finding at least part of the transaction to be in goods.22
A coin collection and a stripped credit are both traded as commodities, and only the coin collection is a good. Commodity-style trading therefore does not settle classification. What settles it is whether the thing is tangible and movable, and for currency the further question is whether the currency is the price or the thing bought.
Software marks a contested edge of the intangible line. A program is intellectual property, which is not tangible in the way a widget is, yet in Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp. the court applied Article 2 to a transaction in programs that also included hardware and training services. A careful answer to a software problem states both classifications and the facts that would support each.
Exclusion from the definition removes a subject from Article 2's text but leaves its reasoning available. Where Article 8 does not deal with a matter, courts have tended to apply Article 2 by analogy,23 and even when a transaction does not involve goods, a court may apply Article 2's rules by analogy to fill a gap in the common law.24 The common law itself remains in the background, because preexisting principles of law and equity supplement the Code unless a particular provision displaces them.25 Analogy is persuasive only. A litigant who argues that an Article 2 section's logic suits a gap has made a legitimate argument; one who says the section governs the transaction has misread § 2-105(1).
Goods Attached to Realty
A calf not yet born, a wheat crop still rooted in a field, and a stand of timber share a problem: none is a separate movable object when the parties contract. Section 2-105(1) solves it with a closing sentence that reaches past the movability test. Goods also include the unborn young of animals, growing crops, and other identified things attached to realty as described in § 2-107.27 Without that sentence, deals for such things would drift toward the law of land, though buyers want a commodity to harvest and ship. The official comment to § 2-105 explains the inclusion of growing crops by observing that they are frequently intended for sale.28
Section 2-107 sorts the remaining attached things into two groups, and for the first group the sorting turns on who severs. For minerals and other natural resources to be removed from realty, and for a structure or its materials to be removed, Article 2 applies only if the seller will sever them.29 When the buyer will do the severing, the contract is treated as one for an interest in realty, and land-contract rules govern instead of Article 2.30 The identity of the severer matters because it shows what the buyer is really getting. A seller who digs out the minerals delivers a movable commodity. A seller who lets the buyer do the digging grants a right to enter the land and do something likely to affect the value of the realty itself.31
Structures follow the same rule. In Condon Bros., Inc. v. Simpson Timber Co., the contract left the buyer to take up the materials of a railroad line, and that was enough to keep it outside Article 2, because the buyer rather than the seller would do the severing. For minerals and structures the question is who severs, not whether severance damages the land.
A different rule governs the rest. Section 2-107(2) treats a contract for growing crops, and a contract for timber to be cut, as a contract for goods whether the buyer or the seller does the severing.32 Other things attached to realty that are neither minerals nor structures are goods too, if they can be severed without material harm to the land. The contrast reflects what is being sold. A growing crop is a commodity frequently intended for sale,33 and a buyer who harvests it takes the land's product rather than acquiring power over the land.
The two rules ask different questions, and the usual error is to carry the first into the second. A student who sees that a timber buyer will do the cutting and concludes that land law governs has applied the minerals-and-structures rule to timber. For crops and timber the identity of the severer does not matter; for minerals and structures it decides the case.
Step one blocks a common misuse of § 2-107. That section, which concerns goods to be severed from realty, addresses things attached to land when the parties contract; it does not reclassify items that were movable when identified merely because they will later be attached. A homeowner who buys deck lumber at the store has bought goods, because § 2-105(1) tests movability at identification, and the plan to anchor the lumber in the ground changes nothing.34 A federal court took the same approach in Timken Co. v. MTS Systems Corp., declining to treat § 2-107(2) as controlling whether a test system was a good and looking instead to identification of the merchandise to the contract. A buyer who agrees to purchase an existing deck from the homeowner and tear it out is in a different position: that deck is a structure to be removed by the buyer, so the contract is treated as one affecting land.35