Concept
Why Identification Matters
Identification of goods
Why Identification Matters
A contract for goods begins as a promise, and identification ties that promise to particular goods. Under § 2-105(2), goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them can pass. Goods that are not both are “future” goods, and a purported present sale of future goods operates only as a contract to sell.1 The earlier sections showed how to sort goods into that category and when identification occurs. This section asks what changes once it does. Before identification, the buyer holds the seller’s promise to deliver goods of a described kind. After identification, the contract points at specific goods, and rights that need an object can attach to them.
The consequences fall into three groups. For the buyer, identification creates a protected interest in the particular goods. For the seller, it supplies tools after the buyer repudiates or otherwise breaches. And it leaves open two questions that students often assume it settles: who holds title, and who bears the loss if the goods are destroyed. Section 2-105(2) makes identification a threshold. Crossing it opens the door to the interests and remedies below, but title and risk of loss are governed by separate rules, and a student who treats identified goods as the buyer’s property or the buyer’s risk will misanalyze a problem the Code resolves on other grounds.
Buyer's Protected Interest
Identification of goods to the contract gives the buyer a special property and an insurable interest in those goods under § 2-501(1).2 The special property is the buyer’s interest in particular goods as the goods the contract refers to, and it frequently arises before title passes. In a shipment contract, for example, title to previously identified goods passes only at the time and place of shipment, and the special property fills the interval.3
The insurable interest rests on a rule of insurance law. A person may validly insure property only if its loss would cause that person a financial injury, and a policy on property the insured would lose nothing by losing is void as a wager. When a seller selects a particular car for a buyer, the buyer would lose the benefit of the bargain if the car were damaged or destroyed, so the buyer may insure it even though the buyer does not yet own it.4
Neither interest matters as a label. Title has minimal significance under the Code, and the special property has only limited significance of its own; what counts is what it unlocks. Because of it, the buyer has certain rights to the goods if the seller becomes insolvent, the seller’s unsecured creditors are subject to those rights, and the buyer may sue third parties who injure the goods. In some circumstances the buyer may even replevy the goods as against the seller’s unsecured creditors.5 Each of these rights operates on particular goods, which is why identification is the trigger. The two recovery rights come first, because the priority over creditors is built on them.
The first recovery right serves the buyer who has already paid. Under § 2-502, a buyer who has paid part or all of the price of goods identified to the contract may recover them from the seller, on making and keeping good a tender of any unpaid balance, if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receiving the first installment.6 A buyer who picks a particular dining-room suite from the showroom, signs a $1,000 contract, and pays $300 down is in that position. If the seller stops paying its debts as they come due eight days later and closes, the buyer may tender the remaining $700, keep the tender good, and take the suite instead of queuing with the seller’s other creditors for a share of the $300.
The rule is narrow by design. The goods must have been identified, so that the buyer holds a special property. The seller must fail within ten days after the first installment. And the buyer must make and keep good the tender. Even then the remedy is fragile. The buyer’s § 2-502 rights may rank behind those of a trustee in bankruptcy and of secured creditors, and at least one court has held them unenforceable in bankruptcy, finding § 2-502 inconsistent with and preempted by section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, which lets trustees accept or reject executory contracts.7
Replevin under § 2-716(3) is the buyer’s second route, and it requires neither prepayment nor insolvency. When a seller fails to deliver or repudiates, the buyer may replevy any goods identified to the contract if, after reasonable effort, the buyer is unable to effect cover, or the circumstances reasonably indicate that the effort would be unavailing.8 Cover means buying substitute goods elsewhere. Suppose S selects goods from inventory for a $1,000 contract, sets them aside, tags them for B, and then repudiates. B makes a reasonable effort to buy substitutes and cannot. B may replevy the tagged goods.9
The two sections are alternative doors with different keys. One opens on a payment followed by a quick failure of the seller; the other opens when the goods cannot be replaced. A court must grant a decree of replevin if the buyer’s case fits the narrow limits of § 2-502 or the somewhat more generous terms of § 2-716(3), and the principal condition of the latter, that cover is unavailable, looks suspiciously like “uniqueness” in new attire.10 The condition makes sense. A buyer who can purchase substitutes and collect the price difference from the seller already receives the value of the bargain, so taking the specific goods adds nothing, while a buyer who cannot replace them loses the bargain however damages are computed. The seller’s side mirrors this: B’s right to replevy identified goods when unable to cover is comparable to S’s right to the price when S is unable reasonably to resell.11 Replevin also lies only for identified goods, so a buyer whose seller never set anything aside is back to damages however thin the market.
The buyer’s right to the goods also decides a contest with the seller’s creditors. Under § 2-402(1), the rights of the seller’s unsecured creditors in goods identified to a sales contract are subject to the buyer’s rights under §§ 2-502 and 2-716.12 A merchant who contracts to sell goods and keeps them a few days with the buyer’s acquiescence therefore cannot defeat the buyer by letting an unsecured creditor attach them. The buyer’s interest prevails.13 The priority is only as good as the underlying right, however. A buyer with no right under either section to reach the goods against the seller has none against the seller’s unsecured creditors. A creditor may also treat the sale or identification as void if the seller’s retention of possession is fraudulent under state law, though a merchant-seller’s retention in good faith and in the current course of trade for a commercially reasonable time is not fraudulent.14
Secured creditors stand apart. The buyer’s § 2-502 rights may be subordinate to theirs, and when a debtor transfers collateral to another person, Article 9 governs the secured party’s rights against the transferee.15 Identification serves the buyer in one more setting. When a buyer selects goods and signs a conditional sales contract that doubles as a security agreement, the seller’s security interest cannot attach until the buyer has rights in the collateral, and identification supplies them by giving the buyer a special property and an insurable interest.16
Step one carries most of the weight, because the other steps operate only on identified goods. The usual way to lose the remedy is to treat a deposit, or a large share of the price, as a substitute for identification when no goods have been selected or set aside.
The 2001 revisions add a consumer rule. For goods bought for personal, family, or household purposes, the buyer’s right of replevin vests upon acquisition of a special property, which occurs on identification, even if the seller has not yet repudiated or failed to deliver.17 The rule matters only in a jurisdiction that has enacted the revision.
Seller's Rights After Breach
Identification also gives the aggrieved seller something to work with. When the buyer breaches, § 2-703 lets the seller withhold delivery, stop delivery of goods in the possession of a carrier or bailee under § 2-705, and identify to the contract goods unidentified at the time of breach under § 2-704.19 Under § 2-704 the seller may identify to the contract any conforming finished goods in its possession or control, regardless of their resalability.20 A seller holding such goods need not worry that setting them aside for the broken contract will count against it.
Unfinished goods force a choice. Section 2-704(2) lets the seller, in the exercise of reasonable commercial judgment for the purposes of avoiding loss and of effective realization, complete manufacture and wholly identify the goods to the contract, cease manufacture and resell for scrap or salvage value, or proceed in any other reasonable manner.21 The seller has express power to complete manufacture or procurement unless reasonable commercial judgment, on the facts as they appear when the seller learns of the breach, makes clear that completion will materially increase damages.22
The comments to § 2-704 shape the standard in three ways. The buyer bears the burden of proving that the seller failed to use reasonable commercial judgment. The decision is measured on the facts as they appear when the seller learns of the breach, not by hindsight after the market has changed in an unforeseen way. And the damages the seller would suffer serve as a preliminary test. A seller confronted with a repudiation after very little work, who would recover a $2,000 profit by stopping, acts unreasonably if it completes at a total cost of $10,000 while knowing the finished goods will bring less than $8,000, because completion has inflated the damages the buyer owes.23
Identified goods matter in a second way when the seller cannot find another buyer for them. Section 2-709(1) allows a seller to recover the price of goods the buyer has accepted, of conforming goods lost or damaged within a commercially reasonable time after risk of loss passed to the buyer, and of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that the effort will be unavailing.24 Only the third category depends on identification, and it fits the seller whose goods have been shaped for one buyer. A seller who affixes the buyer’s family crest to goods and sets them aside for delivery to the carrier has identified them, and when the buyer repudiates, the goods cannot reasonably be resold with the crest attached, so the seller may recover the full $1,000 contract price.25
The price action works differently from the seller’s other money remedies, and the difference explains why identification is required. Resale and market damages measure the gap between the contract price and what the goods bring elsewhere. The price remedy in effect lets the seller specifically enforce the contract, so a seller who sues for the price must hold for the buyer the goods identified to the contract and within the seller’s control. If the seller resells some or all of them before judgment, the net proceeds must be credited to the buyer, and a seller whose price action fails still receives damages for nonacceptance.26 Unidentified goods fall outside the remedy because there is nothing specific to hold. The right also mirrors the buyer’s replevin of identified goods: in each case a party may reach the particular goods only when no substitute transaction can deliver the value of the bargain.27
The reasonable-effort requirement was tested on real facts in American Seating Company v. Archer Plastics, Inc. Archer, a dealer in sports memorabilia that included used stadium seats, agreed to pay for and take away about 45,000 seats that a subcontractor of American Seating had removed, disassembled, and boxed at Camden Yards, and Archer breached when the market for used seats collapsed.28 American Seating resold more than 10,000 of the seats to another team and to a Florida county and sold the rest for scrap or salvage. Archer argued that American Seating had not tried hard enough to sell them. The court observed that Archer, whose business was selling used seats, could not explain how American Seating, whose business was new seats, had acted unreasonably when Archer itself had found them impossible to sell.29 The court held the salvage sales commercially reasonable given the lack of a market, the uncertainty of when it would recover, and the expense of storing thousands of seats. It awarded the contract price less what Archer had paid before breach, the resale proceeds, and the scrap proceeds, and the deductions are the credit rule at work.30
Identification is necessary for this branch of the price action but not sufficient. An exam problem that says only that goods were set aside has not yet supplied the decisive fact, which is whether the seller could reasonably resell.
The third use of identification concerns who bears the loss if identified goods are destroyed after the buyer has repudiated. Under § 2-510(3), the seller may, to the extent of any deficiency in its effective insurance coverage, treat the risk of loss as resting on the buyer for a commercially reasonable time if conforming goods have been identified to the contract and the buyer repudiates or is otherwise in breach before the risk of loss has passed to the buyer.31 The standard illustration is a shipment contract under which risk would pass when the goods are delivered to the carrier. The seller identifies the goods and sets them apart in its warehouse, the buyer wrongfully tells the seller not to ship, and a fire damages the goods. If the seller’s insurance covers only two-thirds of the loss, the remaining third rests on the buyer despite the contract term, but only if the fire occurred within a commercially reasonable time, because the seller cannot keep the risk on the buyer indefinitely.32 Under the ordinary shipment terms the whole loss would have stayed with the seller, since the goods had not yet reached the carrier, so the breach is what moves the uninsured portion.
The limits track the policy behind the rule: risk of loss falls, with qualifications, on the party who breached and on the party with effective insurance coverage.34 Conformity and identification confine the shift to goods the contract actually called for and the seller had committed to this buyer, so the ordinary hazards of the seller’s general inventory stay with the seller. The insurance limit keeps the buyer from paying for a loss that insurance was meant to cover, and the time limit keeps the seller from leaving the risk on the buyer indefinitely.
Identification, Title, and Risk
Section 2-105(2) states that goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them can pass.38 Title is an interest in goods, so the rule puts a floor under it: title cannot pass before the goods are identified to the contract. If a seller retains or reserves title when it ships or delivers the goods, that retention is limited to reservation of a security interest.39 The point surfaced in Ivey v. Wilson (In re Payne). Mrs. Wilson’s name remained on the certificate of title, but the bankruptcy court called that “irrelevant,” and because she had failed to perfect her security interest she was an unsecured creditor in Payne’s Chapter 7 case.40 Identification therefore marks the earliest moment at which title could pass and leaves the actual moment to other rules.
Those rules look to the seller’s delivery performance. When the parties’ agreement does not say how and when title passes, title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes its performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods. Under a shipment contract that is the time and place of shipment, and under a destination contract it is the time the goods are tendered at their destination.41 A seller who sets aside a particular machine on Monday and ships it on Thursday has identified the goods days before title moves under a shipment contract, and the buyer’s interest in the interval is the special property that identification creates.42
A New Jersey sales-tax decision traces the sequence. The seller’s contracts covered printed matter not yet in existence, so the goods were future goods. They became identified when they were made. Title passed later, when the seller completed its delivery performance at a post office in New Jersey, and the sale was therefore taxable there.43 The two events answer different questions. Identification asks which goods the contract concerns. Title asks who owns them, and the answer comes from where the seller’s delivery performance stands.
The Code keeps the questions apart because the old approach hung too much on a concept that courts could not locate reliably. Under § 22 of the Uniform Sales Act, the party who held title generally bore the risk of loss. A court deciding who lost the goods therefore had to decide who owned them, and who had title and what made it pass were often mysteries to lawyers and judges alike.44 Article 2 replaced that inquiry with a series of performance steps. It “deals with the issues between seller and buyer in terms of step by step performance or non-performance under the contract for sale and not in terms of whether or not ‘title’ to the goods has passed.”45 The lawyer’s order of operations flipped as a result. Under the Sales Act, title location was probably the first thing a lawyer looked to in resolving a sales problem; under the UCC it is the last.46
Title still decides questions that Article 2’s performance rules do not reach, such as liability for sales and use taxes, issues in bankruptcy, and whether an insurance policy covers the goods.47 The insurance setting arose in Gross v. Powell. The court held that title passed to the buyer no later than the time unrestricted possession of the car was delivered, so the buyer owned the car when the accident occurred, and Travelers, the insurer of the seller Proctor Motor, had no obligation to defend Powell.48 Title also matters when two parties each claim to own the same goods, the subject of § 2-403.49 Outside those settings, the fact that goods are identified, or that title has or has not passed, seldom settles an Article 2 question.50
Risk of loss rests on a principle different from both identification and title. Sections 2-509 and 2-510 place the loss on the party most likely to have insured against it, and that is usually the party who controls the goods. The drafters reasoned that a merchant who is to make physical delivery at its own place keeps control of the goods in the meantime and can be expected to insure its interest, while the buyer controls nothing and is unlikely to carry insurance on goods not yet in its possession.51
The buyer’s insurable interest means the buyer may insure the shoes, because losing them would cost the buyer the benefit of the bargain.52 A right to insure goods carries no duty to bear their loss, so the answer for the shoes turns on who controlled them, and identification adds nothing to that inquiry. Identification can appear as one condition inside a risk rule, as the breaching-buyer rule above showed, but it is never the whole rule. Section 2-509 sorts sales contracts into three basic categories and allocates risk differently in each, and those details belong to the risk-of-loss reading that follows.53
Identification at the time of contracting does matter in one place that has nothing to do with title or risk allocation: the excuse rule for casualty to identified goods. Section 2-613 applies where the contract requires for its performance goods identified when the contract is made, and the goods suffer casualty without the fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer.54 If the loss is total, the contract is avoided. If the loss is partial, or the goods have so deteriorated that they no longer conform, the buyer may demand inspection and either treat the contract as avoided or accept the goods with an allowance from the price, without further right against the seller.55 Avoidance means the seller’s failure to perform is excused and is no breach.56
The timing requirement follows from what the doctrine protects. A contract for goods designated only later is a bargain for a kind and a quantity, and a seller who loses one batch can supply another. For the same reason, a contract for fungible goods needs more than a description by kind and amount before § 2-613 applies; otherwise a seller could use the casualty rule to escape a contract for ordinary goods it could replace on the open market.57
The usual exam error is to treat every destruction of goods before delivery as an excuse. Excuse and risk of loss run on separate tracks. When § 2-613 or § 2-615 applies, the contract is avoided and the failure to perform is no breach, whereas a party who cannot invoke an excuse must still perform or be in breach. A seller that holds the risk when widgets are destroyed, and cannot satisfy either excuse section, must tender conforming widgets, and the buyer may sue for breach if it does not.58 The tracks meet at one point. The casualty must occur before risk passes to the buyer, so the risk rules mark the end of the period in which § 2-613 can operate.
Step one carries the identification issue. Elsewhere in this chapter identification may occur at signing or at a later moment under § 2-501, but under § 2-613 only identification at the time of contracting counts.