Concept
Timing and Notice
Rightful rejection
Timing and Notice
Two sentences in § 2-602(1) set the procedure for rejecting goods: “Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller.”1 The first sentence sets a deadline. The clock starts when the seller delivers the goods or tenders them, meaning offers them so that the buyer can take them, and the buyer must act within a reasonable time from that point. The second sentence demands communication and attaches a sanction: a rejection the seller does not hear about in good time has no effect. Neither sentence asks whether the goods were defective. That question belongs to the substantive grounds for rejection, so a buyer who wants to reject must satisfy those grounds and these two procedural requirements as well.
The two requirements measure different things, so a rejection can fail on either one. Timing measures the buyer's conduct against the calendar: how long the buyer took after delivery, given its chance to inspect. Notice measures what reached the seller: whether the seller learned in good time that the buyer would not keep the goods. A buyer who inspects at once and quietly sets the goods aside has acted promptly, but a seller who does not know the goods are refused cannot cure the defect or help limit the buyer's losses. A buyer who tells the seller only after a reasonable time has run has given notice, but too late. Either failure leaves the buyer holding goods it meant to refuse, because a buyer who does nothing is treated as having accepted.
This section takes timing first, because the starting point of the clock and the facts that stretch or shorten it must be settled before notice can be judged. Notice follows, with what the buyer must communicate. The last topic is how much the buyer must say about why it rejects, and what it risks by leaving a defect unmentioned.
Reasonable Time After Delivery
Section 2-602(1) gives no number of days. It fixes the starting point and leaves the endpoint to the circumstances.2 In EPN-Delaval, S.A. v. Inter-Equip, Inc., the buyer's forwarding agent received steel heads in Laredo, and the court treated that receipt as delivery under the purchase order, even though the heads did not reach Mexico City until later.3 The clock therefore started at delivery. But acceptance cannot occur until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect, so the reasonable time had to include the time inspection required, and in that case the inspection period began when the heads arrived in Mexico.4
A fixed number of days would serve neither a shipment of fresh produce nor a complex machine, so the Code ties a reasonable time to the nature, purpose, and circumstances of the action. For rejection, the action is giving notice, and its purpose is to tell the seller in time to cure and to help limit the buyer's losses.5 What is reasonable on particular facts is a question of fact.6 Revocation of acceptance, a separate remedy, measures time from when the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground,7 which is why a rejection deadline that runs from delivery is the tighter of the two.
Courts weigh four circumstances, which White & Summers suggested and later decisions have adopted:8
- How difficult the defect was to discover.
- What the contract says about inspection and rejection.
- How perishable the goods are.
- What the parties did between delivery and the formal rejection.
None is a separate hurdle. The court weighs them together, as EPN-Delaval shows. The heads were durable and the contract set no deadline for inspection, which favored the buyer. But the heads were a special order, and nothing passed between the parties from delivery until the buyer reported the nonconformity, which favored the seller. The court concluded that the buyer's notice did not come within a reasonable time, so the buyer had accepted the nonconforming heads.9
Difficulty of discovery can lengthen the period. In Integrated Circuits Unlimited, Inc. v. E.F. Johnson Co., the buyer had an independent laboratory test complex microprocessors and sent the seller an itemized list of rejected parts less than two weeks after the tests showed excessive flaws. The court held that time to test complex electronic parts must be afforded, so the rejection was timely.10 The extra time is the exception, though. White & Summers expect it to be a rare case in which a business buyer gets substantial additional time because the defect was hard to discover.11
The contract itself can settle the question. The parties may fix a reasonable time by agreement, so long as the term is not manifestly unreasonable.12 In re East Coast Brokers and Packers, Inc. involved a tomato grower whose shipping orders said that no claims would be accepted without a government inspection within 24 hours after arrival. The buyer obtained no such inspection, the court found that it never properly rejected the tomatoes, and the buyer owed the agreed price.13 A contract that is silent on timing leaves the question to the other circumstances. In EPN-Delaval, the absence of any inspection deadline counted for the buyer even though the buyer lost overall.14
Perishability compresses the period. In Traynor v. Walters, the trees in a December 7 delivery were baled, so neither the buyer nor its agents could tell whether they conformed until the shipment reached its destination and the trees were unbaled. The buyer telephoned the sellers from New York the same day to say that 440 trees did not conform, and the court treated that notice as reasonable.15 A five-day delay in telling a seller that shrimp were nonconforming, by contrast, was unreasonable in Mazur Bros. v. Jaffe Fish Co.16 Together the cases show perishability shortening the period: a same-day call was reasonable when inspection had to wait for unbaling, while five days was too long for shrimp.
The fourth circumstance, what the buyer does with the goods after delivery, decides many late-rejection cases, because handling and altering the goods destroys the very thing the seller would have taken back. In Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg & Beck Div., Borg-Warner Corp., the buyer stamped all of the steel into parts, stored the parts for over a month, and told the seller of the problem only after holding the steel for more than three months.17 The buyer argued that the defect was latent. The court answered that the reasonable-opportunity-to-inspect rule keeps a buyer's silence from being treated as acceptance too early, but it does not allow goods that the buyer has drastically changed and used to be rejected later. A buyer in that position is left with the remedies for accepted goods.18 Those remedies include revocation of acceptance only where the nonconformity substantially impairs the goods' value to the buyer.19 Heavy use before refusal points the same way in Rutland Music Service, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., where the buyer drove an automobile over 8,000 miles before telling the dealer it did not want the car.20 Rejection and revocation of acceptance have distinct definitions and requirements, so a refusal that comes this late belongs, if anywhere, to the separate doctrine of revocation.21
Conduct after delivery can also keep the period open. In Keller v. Inland Metals All Weather Conditioning, Inc., the buyers complained that a dehumidifier was not working, the seller kept working on it, and formal rejection came only later. The court recognized that the period for rejecting nonconforming goods can be extended when, after giving notice of the nonconformity, the buyer keeps and uses the goods on the understanding that the seller will cure, and it held the rejection timely.22 It also held that the buyers' continued use of the unit was not an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership, because shutting it off would have let humidity damage the club's facilities, so the use was necessary to mitigate damages.23 What separates Keller from Intervale is communication. The Keller buyers kept the seller informed while the seller tried to cure, and the Intervale buyer stayed silent while it transformed the goods.
On an exam, the dates carry the analysis. Mark the delivery date, the earliest date the buyer could reasonably have finished inspecting or testing, and the date the seller heard of the rejection, then weigh the four circumstances to decide whether that interval was reasonable. The next section turns to the notice that ends the interval.
Seasonable Notice to Seller
Notice turns the buyer's private decision into something the seller can act on. Under § 2-602(1), a rejection “is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller.”25 The buyer must act because silence does not reject: an inspecting buyer must decide whether to accept or reject, a failure to act amounts to acceptance, and affirmative action is necessary to reject. The Code can require action for rejection but not for acceptance because most tenders will be acceptable to buyers.26 A buyer who accepts the goods, or who fails to reject them under § 2-602(1), loses the right of rejection.27 The question of how soon the buyer must speak was covered above, so what remains is what the buyer must say, and that is where most failed rejections come apart.
The notice must tell the seller that the buyer will not keep the goods. Different messages call for different responses from the seller. A complaint or a repair request tells the seller to fix the goods and implies the buyer is keeping them, while only a refusal tells the seller to take them back. Gragg Farms and Nursery v. Kelly Green Landscaping draws the line within a single delivery. One shipment of trees contained both willow oaks and Japanese Black Pines. On the next business day after delivery, the buyer's representative telephoned the seller, called the willow oaks junk, and said the buyer would not pay for them. The court held that call a seasonable and effective rejection of the willow oaks.28 The buyer said nothing about the pines, so it had not rejected them and owed their price.29 The delivery, the parties, and the timing were the same for both species, so the only fact that changed the result was whether the buyer spoke.
Telling the seller that goods are defective is not the same as telling the seller they are refused. In Connecticut Inv. Casting Corp. v. Made-Rite Tool Co., the buyer notified the seller of two breaches, late delivery and 179 nonconforming latches, sent the latches back to be reworked, and pressed the seller in numerous conversations to deliver. The court held that none of this was a rejection. Notice of a breach may preserve a damages claim under § 2-607(3)(a), but rejection requires that the seller be told the buyer does not wish to keep the goods.30 Sending parts back for rework confirms the point, because it asks the seller to perfect goods the buyer means to keep. Having made no effective rejection, the buyer was held to have accepted the latches, and it owed the full contract price because it proved no damages from the breach.31
Punch lists fail for the same reason. In Audio Visual Artistry v. Tanzer, the buyer sent the seller several lists of repairs and adjustments to installed equipment. The court held that a punch list is not seasonable notice of rejection, because a request for repair is the opposite of a rejection: a buyer who asks for more work on an item signals that he intends to keep it.32 The buyer also kept all of the equipment except the items specifically rejected and hired another firm to maintain it, which the court called an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership.33 A buyer who pressures the seller to perform, or asks for adjustments, has said something, but what it said was that it is keeping the goods.
A refusal need not use the word reject. In ARB (American Research Bureau), Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., the buyer repeatedly told the seller that the equipment as delivered was unacceptable, even while it authorized a production run on the seller's assurances that the equipment would be made conforming. The court treated those communications as seasonable notice, because the buyer had taken the steps reasonably required to inform the seller in the ordinary course and had never accepted the equipment as delivered.34 Courts are hesitant to find acts inconsistent with the seller's ownership when buyer and seller are working the bugs out of a complex machine, because the parties should be encouraged to bargain and adjust and the buyer should not do so at its peril.35 The contrast with a punch list lies in what the seller learns. A statement that goods are unacceptable as delivered tells the seller the buyer is not taking them in their present condition, whereas a punch list takes them as they are and asks for finishing work.
The hypothetical also shows that § 2-602(1) prescribes no form. A telephone call gives the seller the same information as a letter, usually sooner. In Traynor v. Walters, the buyer telephoned the sellers the day after a second delivery to say that 200 Scotch Pine trees did not conform, and he coupled that report with a refusal of the sellers' offer of 600 more trees. The court treated the call as reasonable notice of rejection.36 The test is whether the seller was told the buyer would not keep the goods, and the medium of the message does not matter. When an exam stem says the buyer “called the seller to complain,” ask what the call said.
Notice of rejection is held to a tighter schedule than the notice that preserves a damages claim for accepted goods. White & Summers explain that rejection notice must come within a reasonable time after delivery or tender, whereas § 2-607 notice runs from when the buyer discovers or should have discovered the breach, and that it is fair to require a buyer who seeks to reject to give notice and act more quickly than one who seeks only damages.37 The difference tracks what each buyer asks of the seller. A buyer seeking damages leaves the goods where they are, while a buyer who refuses them requires the seller to deal with them. A buyer who gives no notice of rejection has not rejected at all. In Alarm Device Mfg. Co. v. Arnold Indus., Inc., the trial court found that the buyer never notified the seller of a rejection and concluded that the buyer accepted the goods when it failed to make an effective rejection.38 Once goods are accepted, the buyer owes the contract price and is left with a damages claim, which is worth little if the nonconformity cost it nothing.
Stating Reasons for Rejection
The freedom to give quick, informal notice has one limit, and it comes from § 2-605. A buyer who fails to state, in connection with the rejection, a particular defect that reasonable inspection would have revealed cannot later rely on that defect to justify the rejection or to establish breach, provided the seller could have cured the defect had it been told seasonably.40 Preclusion therefore requires two conditions together: a reasonable inspection would have revealed the defect, and timely word of it would have let the seller cure. The sanction is also narrow. Whether a rejection is effective is still decided under § 2-602(1), which asks only about timing and seasonable notice.41 A buyer who omits a reason has still rejected. What it loses is the chance to add the unstated defect as a further ground afterward.
The two conditions track the seller's interest in curing. The ascertainability condition spares a buyer from naming what no reasonable inspection would have shown. The curability condition confirms that the silence cost the seller something, because if the seller could not have cured the defect anyway, hearing about it would have changed nothing. A seller told only that the goods are unacceptable may assume that nothing is wrong that it can repair, or may repair the wrong thing, and then face a rejection resting on a flaw it never heard of. The rule leaves the buyer free to give quick, informal notice. What it penalizes is silence about a defect the buyer could have seen and the seller could have fixed.
A buyer who does state its reasons shows what full compliance looks like. In Integrated Circuits Unlimited, Inc. v. E.F. Johnson Co., the buyer sent the seller an itemized list of the rejected microprocessors less than two weeks after the laboratory tests revealed excessive flaws, and the court held that the list described the defect with enough particularity to let the seller cure.42 An itemized list is more than an effective rejection requires, but it leaves the buyer with nothing to lose under § 2-605.
A second preclusion rule operates between merchants and depends on a request. After a rejection, a merchant seller may ask the merchant buyer in writing for a full and final written statement of all defects on which the buyer proposes to rely. If the buyer then omits a defect that reasonable inspection would have revealed, it cannot rely on that defect to justify the rejection or to establish breach.43 The seller's interest here is a closed list of grievances that fixes the buyer's position for later litigation, so the curability condition drops out. The triggers are the written request and the merchant status of both parties. Without the request, only the first rule applies, and it carries both of its conditions.
In every version of the analysis, the consequence is the same. The rejection itself stays effective if it was timely and seasonably noticed, and the buyer loses only the right to rely on the omitted defect.