Concept
Cure After the Contract Time
Seller's right to cure
Cure After the Contract Time
A seller whose tender is rejected after the delivery date has a harder time earning a second chance than a seller rejected with time to spare. Section 2-508(2) governs that case. When the buyer rejects a nonconforming tender that the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable, with or without a money allowance, the subsection gives the seller a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender, provided the seller seasonably notifies the buyer.1
The perfect tender rule explains the added burden. A buyer may reject goods that fail to conform “in any respect,” and may reject late delivery even when time of delivery is not a material term, which is where the rule departs from the common law's materiality test for late performance.2 The UCC reduces the seller's exposure to strategic rejection by letting it take a second bite at performance, but § 2-508 imposes stricter limits on that second bite once the contractual delivery date has passed.3
The subsection protects a seller who is caught off guard. In T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., the New York Court of Appeals noted that the Official Comment describes the section's mission as safeguarding the seller “against surprise as a result of sudden technicality on the buyer's part.”4 In Bartus v. Riccardi, the court observed that the subsection in effect extends the contract period beyond the date written in the contract, unless the buyer requires strict performance by including such a clause.5
T.W. Oil read the subsection's conditions in the order they appear:
- The buyer rejected a nonconforming tender.
- The seller had reasonable grounds to believe the tender would be acceptable, with or without a money allowance.
- The seller seasonably notified the buyer of its intention to substitute a conforming tender within a reasonable time.6
Cure is a right the seller may use, not a duty it must perform.7 The three sections below take up the seller's belief, its notice, and the length of its extra time.
Reasonable Grounds to Believe
The first condition the seller must meet is a reasonable expectation that its tender would be accepted. By the time the buyer rejects, the delivery date has passed and the buyer has already lost the timely performance it bargained for, so the Code lets the seller try again only when the rejection is the kind of surprise the section exists to soften.8 A seller with good reason to think the buyer would take the goods, perhaps after a price adjustment, is surprised by a rejection. A seller with good reason to expect refusal is not.
The goods need not be defective to qualify. Nonconforming does not mean defective; it means only that the goods delivered are not what the buyer ordered.9 Bartus v. Riccardi shows how an apparent upgrade can be nonconforming. A buyer ordered a Model A-660 hearing aid. He was told that the A-660 had been modified and improved and was now called the A-665, and the A-665 was fitted to him. He complained about the noise but was assured that he would get used to it.10 The court recognized that the buyer was entitled to the model he had ordered even if it was the older type, yet it held that the seller had reasonable grounds to believe the newer model would be accepted. The seller notified the buyer within a reasonable time that it was tendering a conforming model, and the buyer had not bought a hearing aid elsewhere or otherwise altered his position.11 The buyer refused the seller's offer of a cure, and the court awarded the seller damages.12
Facts that make an expectation reasonable often come from the parties' relationship and their trade. The parties' course of dealing, course of performance, or the usage of trade may give the seller reasonable grounds to believe its tender would prove acceptable.13 The inquiry is objective. The question is whether the seller's belief was reasonable, tested objectively, so a seller's sincere hope that the buyer will take the goods does not carry the day by itself.14
The same sources can show what the seller should have known. A seller is charged with commercial knowledge of any factors in the sales situation that require strict compliance, such as the sale of precision parts or chemicals for use in manufacture. A buyer can signal that demand impliedly, through a prior course of dealing marked by rigorous inspections, or expressly, through a deliberate “no replacement” clause, and the seller is then held to rigid compliance.15 A seller told in advance, by the contract or the nature of the deal, that exact performance is required cannot claim to be surprised by a rejection for inexact performance.
That inference is not automatic. A no-replacement clause that appears in a form contract, is out of line with trade usage or the prior course of dealing, and was never called to the seller's attention may be enough to show that the seller had reasonable grounds to expect acceptance.16 The seller is held to rigid compliance when the buyer's demand for exactness was something the seller knew or was charged with knowing.
A question the exam is likely to press is whether a seller that never learned of the defect can invoke the subsection at all. The seller in T.W. Oil did not. The contract, following a trade custom of rounding sulfur specifications, described the oil as .5 percent sulfur, and the refinery certificate said .52 percent. During negotiations the seller learned that Con Ed was authorized to buy and burn oil with up to 1 percent sulfur and would mix oils to hold that figure.17 At delivery the oil tested at .92 percent, to the seller's surprise. After Con Ed finally rejected the cargo on February 20, the seller offered a conforming substitute cargo the next day, and Con Ed, determined to take advantage of an intervening drop in prices, rejected that offer the day after.18
Con Ed's position ran against the few decisions on the point, and it tried to treat them as exceptions. In Wilson v. Scampoli, a seller resold a manufacturer's unopened carton and was held within the statute even though it had no reason to believe the goods defective. In Appleton State Bank v. Lee, a seller mistakenly delivered a sewing machine of the wrong brand and was held entitled to cure by substitution although it did not know of its mistake.19 The court agreed with the commentators that a seller should have recourse to subsection (2) so long as it can establish reasonable grounds, tested objectively, for believing the goods would be accepted. It added that reasonableness in this context includes the Code's concepts of good faith and commercial standards of fair dealing.20
Applying that test, the court upheld the finding of reasonable grounds. The proof showed that .5 and .52 percent were trade equivalents, and the seller knew that Con Ed burned fuel up to 1 percent, so with a price adjustment even .92 percent oil would have suited Con Ed's needs. Con Ed's own readiness to take the oil at a reduced market price on February 20 put the matter beyond dispute.21 What counts is the reasonableness of the seller's expectation, and not whether the seller knew of the defect.
Because the test is objective, however, a seller's professed ignorance does not establish reasonable grounds by itself. The question remains whether a seller in its position could reasonably have expected acceptance.
Reasonable grounds opens the door without finishing the job. The seller must still notify the buyer seasonably of its intention to cure, which the next section takes up.
Seasonable Notice of Cure
Section 2-508(2) conditions the seller's extra time on seasonable notice to the buyer.23 T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. listed notice as the third condition: the seller must have seasonably notified the buyer of its intention to substitute a conforming tender.24 Seasonable means within a reasonable time, so a seller that wants to cure must tell the buyer of its intention to do so within a reasonable time.25
The content of the notice follows from the statute. It must tell the buyer that the seller intends to cure by substituting a conforming tender. A seller that answers a rejection only by asking the buyer to list its complaints, and says nothing about replacing or repairing the goods, has not communicated that intention.
The notice matters because the buyer must decide, after rejecting, whether to wait for a conforming tender or buy elsewhere. Bartus v. Riccardi took account of exactly that: the buyer had not purchased another hearing aid, and his position had not been altered by the original nonconforming tender.26 The Code asks the same promptness of the buyer. Rejection must come within a reasonable time after delivery and is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller,27 and rejection takes affirmative action, because a buyer's failure to act constitutes acceptance.28
Timing is where seasonableness is usually won or lost. In T.W. Oil, Con Ed finally rejected the oil cargo on February 20, and the seller offered the substitute cargo on February 21. The substitute was already on its way to the United States and was expected in about a week; it arrived on March 4, only four days later than expected. The buyer pleaded no prejudice, unless the drop in prices could be so regarded, and given the flexibility of the Code's definitions of “seasonable” and “reasonable,” the court found it almost impossible to quarrel with the finding that the notice was seasonable.29
The two scenes differ in what the buyer did while it waited. The T.W. Oil seller spoke the day after the final rejection, before the buyer could have acted on its silence. The oven seller spoke ten days later, after the buyer had committed elsewhere. For a decision applying the notice requirement, see National Fleet Supply, Inc. v. Fairchild.
Notice opens the extension; it does not complete the cure. The statute gives the seller a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender, and the seller must actually make that tender within it.30
A Further Reasonable Time
Once a seller has shown reasonable grounds and given seasonable notice, the last question is how long it has to deliver. The subsection answers with “a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender.”32 The grant is modest. Arguably it is both the most and the least the seller can and must do: substitute a second and conforming tender.33
No fixed number of days defines a reasonable time. It depends on the surrounding circumstances, and the New Jersey Supreme Court in Ramirez v. Autosport collected those that matter:34
- the buyer's change of position and the amount of inconvenience the delay causes the buyer;
- the length of time the seller needs to correct the nonconformity; and
- the seller's ability to salvage the goods by resale to others.
The first factor looks at the buyer's side of the ledger, since a buyer that has arranged substitute goods or reorganized its operations around the delay has lost more than one that has simply waited. The second measures what the seller needs. The third shows how much the seller stands to lose if no extension is allowed. The nature and purpose of the sale set the scale on which the factors operate. A reasonable time for substituting a conforming delivery can run from a few hours to days, and where delivery on the exact date is a material term of the contract, so that any delay would be a serious breach, there may be no reasonable time for cure.35
T.W. Oil shows the pattern at work. The substitute cargo was offered the day after the final rejection, was already in transit, and arrived on March 4, less than two weeks after the rejection and only four days later than expected. Because Con Ed pleaded no prejudice, unless the drop in prices could be counted, the court found it almost impossible to quarrel with the conclusion that the statute's requirements were met.36 Con Ed's real complaint was the falling market, since it had refused the substitute the day after it was offered.37 A buyer's wish to escape a bad bargain is not the kind of harm the buyer-protective factors measure.
The other end of the range is the contract on which exact timing is essential. There the buyer bargained for speed, every added day costs it more, and the extension may shrink to nothing.38 A seller that cleared the reasonable-grounds and notice conditions can therefore still lose on time, because notice only opens the extension and says nothing about how long it lasts.
These conditions all assume a buyer that rejected. Once the buyer has accepted, the analysis shifts, and courts differ on how far cure survives. At least one court, relying on the contrast between the proposed 2002 amendments to § 2-508 and the section's plain text, has held that there is no right to cure after revocation of acceptance.39 Courts that want to preserve the seller's right to cure sometimes find that acceptance had not yet occurred, for instance because the buyer had not yet had a reasonable opportunity to inspect.40 Cure after acceptance is taken up below.