Concept
Cure After Acceptance
Seller's right to cure
Cure After Acceptance
Section 2-508 gives a seller the right to cure, but it speaks only of rejection. Subsection (1) applies when a tender is “rejected because non-conforming” before the time for performance has expired, and subsection (2) applies when “the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender” that the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable.1 The word revocation appears nowhere in the text of § 2-508 or in its official comments.2
That silence matters because acceptance ends the buyer’s power to reject: “Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods accepted.” UCC § 2-607(2).3 A buyer can accept simply by failing to act. Rejection must come within a reasonable time after delivery or tender, and it is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller.4 A buyer that delays beyond a reasonable time or slips up procedurally is deemed to have accepted.5 The accepting buyer is not bound to keep the goods, but the way out is narrower. Revocation requires a nonconformity that substantially impairs the goods’ value to the buyer; acceptance either in the expectation of a cure that never came or without discovering a defect that inspection would not have revealed; and revocation within a reasonable time after the buyer discovered, or should have discovered, the defect.6 Whether a seller may still cure once the buyer has revoked is a question on which courts divide.
The cure right stops at acceptance because, as the New Jersey Supreme Court put it in Ramirez v. Autosport, “[a]fter acceptance, the Code strikes a different balance”: the buyer may revoke only if the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer.7 That different balance explains why cure matters less here. A seller needs a second chance against a rejection, which can rest on a minor defect. Revocation is harder to achieve. The substantial-impairment test and the timing requirements already screen out trivial complaints,8 and a defect serious enough to pass the test likely imposes real costs on the buyer, which leaves less reason to give the seller another chance to perform.9
Most courts therefore hold that a seller cannot cure after the buyer revokes acceptance, and they rest the holding on the language of § 2-508. In CB Aviation, LLC v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., a federal court applying Kansas law read the plain text to give the seller a cure right only when the buyer rejects delivery. A federal court predicting Illinois law in Economy Folding Box Corp. v. Anchor Frozen Foods Corp. reached the same result where the buyer revoked over a later-discovered defect, and the Minnesota Supreme Court held in Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co. that a seller has no right to cure defects that substantially impair the goods’ value.10 Defenders of the literal reading add that the drafters intended it and that acceptance is the line where the right to cure ends.11
Policy reinforces the text. In Grappelberg v. Landrum, a seller of a defective television set offered an identical replacement. The court reasoned that cure after revocation would let the seller maximize its profit at the buyer’s expense, because the seller would avoid the cost of storing the returned set and the expense and risk of reselling it, and that cure would undercompensate a buyer whose confidence in that brand and model the defect had shaken.12 Other courts view cure as a remedy only for minor defects, which excludes it from a revocation, where the defect is necessarily substantial.13
A minority of courts reaches the opposite result through § 2-608(3), which gives a revoking buyer “the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.”14 The argument runs that allowing the seller to cure is one of those duties, so a buyer who revokes must give the seller the chance that a rejecting buyer would have to give. A federal court applying New York law in David Tunick, Inc. v. Kornfeld described the opportunity to cure as a duty this subsection imposes on the buyer, although it found cure impossible on the facts before it. In a footnote in Fitzner Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac, Inc. v. Smith, the Mississippi Supreme Court said that the policy of minimizing economic waste strongly supports giving the seller a reasonable opportunity to cure.15 Critics find the reading a stretch. The duties § 2-608(3) most plainly carries over are those governing the buyer’s handling of the goods, such as the salvage and storage duties of §§ 2-603 and 2-604, and a duty to let the seller exercise a right is a different kind of obligation.16
Where the text divides courts, the choice turns on how one sees revoking buyers. If buyers tend to revoke strategically when they regret the bargain, rather than when the seller’s performance disappoints them, a cure right saves transactions even at this late stage. If revocations tend to reflect substantial defects, a cure right only gives the seller another chance to perform at the expense of a buyer already harmed by the breach.17
A second minority route runs through § 2-608(1)(a) rather than § 2-508. A buyer who accepted “on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured” may revoke only if the nonconformity “has not been seasonably cured,”18 so that buyer must give the seller a reasonable opportunity to cure before revoking. Some courts also stretch § 2-608(1)(a) to cover a hidden-defect revocation under § 2-608(1)(b), or find that acceptance had not yet occurred because the buyer lacked a reasonable opportunity to inspect.19
The argument for cure is strongest where the seller tendered early and offers conforming goods while the contract period remains open. That seller resembles the one § 2-508(1) protects, and only the buyer’s acceptance separates the two.20 Courts favoring cure can also point to the Code’s instruction that it be “construed liberally” in order “to promote its underlying purposes and policies.”21 The majority answers that those policies cannot supply a right the text does not contain.
Ramirez left the question open. Because the case involved a rejection, the court declined to decide whether a seller has a right to cure substantial defects that justify revocation, and it noted authority limiting any post-acceptance cure right to trivial defects.22 Proposed amendments to Article 2 would have settled much of the point. They would have given the seller in a nonconsumer contract a right to cure when the buyer justifiably revokes under § 2-608(1)(b), conditioned that right on the seller’s good-faith performance and, once the time for performance had expired, on the cure being appropriate and timely, and made the seller liable for the buyer’s reasonable expenses caused by the breach and the cure.23 The amendments were not adopted, and the court in CB Aviation relied on the contrast between them and the existing text in denying cure after revocation.24