Concept
Consequences of the Allocation
Risk of loss
Consequences of the Allocation
Risk allocation matters because of what it does to the two duties that § 2-301 assigns: the seller must transfer and deliver, and the buyer must accept and pay, each in accordance with the contract.1 A loss that nobody caused leaves one of those duties standing on each side of the contract, and the allocation rules decide who must still perform. The outcome is one of three. A buyer that bears the risk pays for goods it will never receive. A seller that bears the risk delivers replacement goods or answers in damages for nondelivery. In one narrow class of cases the contract is avoided, and neither party owes anything further.
The loss alone breaches nothing. Liability arises only when the party who bears the risk refuses the duty that remains. The subsections below take the three outcomes in turn: the buyer's duty to pay, the seller's duty to replace, and the excuse for casualty to identified goods.
When the Buyer Bears Risk
A loss that falls on the buyer does not discharge the buyer's duty to pay. Legally, to say that the buyer had the risk of loss when the goods were destroyed is to say that the buyer is liable for the price under § 2-709, even though it will never receive them.2 Section 2-709(1)(a) carries out that rule: the seller may maintain an action for the price when the goods were destroyed after the risk of loss passed to the buyer.3
The price action is the natural remedy because most of a seller's other remedies against a breaching buyer assume goods that still exist. The seller may withhold delivery, stop goods in transit, identify goods to the contract, or resell and sue for damages.4 Destroyed goods cannot be withheld, stopped, identified, or resold, so the Code lets the seller sue for the price itself.5
Section 2-709(1) allows a price action on three grounds: the buyer accepted the goods; the goods were destroyed after the risk passed to the buyer; or the goods are identified to the contract and the seller cannot resell them at a reasonable price.6 This subsection concerns the second ground. The grounds can overlap, as when the buyer accepted goods that the seller also could not resell.7
The Code can charge the buyer because, by the time the risk passes, the seller has done what the contract required of it. Under a shipment contract the seller has handed conforming goods to an independent carrier and no longer controls them. The buyer, who bears the loss, is the party able to pursue the carrier. Recovery therefore runs from seller to buyer to carrier: the seller collects the price, and the buyer pursues the carrier or its insurer for the default that destroyed the goods.8
The shipment contract shows the rule at full strength. Ajax Company agrees to sell 10,000 water flotation devices to Poseidon, Inc. for delivery no later than June 1, F.O.B. Gary, Indiana, where Ajax's plant is located; Poseidon's retail superstore is in Portland, Oregon. Ajax puts the devices into the hands of an appropriate carrier and promptly notifies Poseidon, and the truck carrying the shipment is then in an accident that destroys all 10,000 devices.9 The F.O.B. Gary term makes this a shipment contract, so the risk passed to Poseidon when the devices were delivered to the carrier, and Ajax may recover the price from Poseidon.10 Poseidon's recourse lies against the carrier or its insurer. Had the contract read F.O.B. Portland, the risk would have stayed on Ajax for the whole trip. Ajax would then have been liable in damages for nondelivery unless it tendered replacement devices, and it would have had no price action.11 Poseidon never receives the devices in either version, so receipt cannot separate the outcomes. What separates them is whether the risk had passed when the accident occurred.
That timing question decides every price action. A buyer who argues that the destruction of the goods makes payment pointless still owes the contract price if the risk of loss had already passed to it, and owes nothing if the risk had not.12 An exam stem in which the goods never arrive invites the answer that the buyer owes nothing because it never received them. Receipt matters only where a rule makes it the moment the risk passes, as the merchant-seller branch of the residual rule does. The working question is where the transaction stood when the loss struck.
The statute's time limit creates a wrinkle in carrier cases. The price action reaches goods lost within a commercially reasonable time after the risk passes, and a carrier can hold goods past that point.
The second reading is the one the scheme supports. The drafters did not intend the seller to bear a carrier's default; the seller should carry the risk only when its own actions cause the delay and it controls the goods.13 Courts have read the statute that way. In Brewer v. J-Six Farms, L.P., an Oklahoma court treated the commercially reasonable time language as describing when the risk of loss passes to the buyer, with no separate limit on the seller's ability to recover the price.14
The statute's reference to conforming goods raises a parallel problem. Suppose a seller ships goods that are part of an installment contract and contain an insubstantial defect, and the goods are destroyed after the risk would otherwise have passed. A defect that gives the buyer no right to reject cannot keep the risk on the seller, and the proper result is to let the seller recover the price. Only a nonconformity that would support rejection keeps the loss on the seller.15
When the Seller Bears Risk
A loss on the seller's side of the line leaves the seller's duty to deliver in place. A seller that has the risk of loss when the goods are destroyed is liable in damages to the buyer for nondelivery unless it tenders a performance in replacement for the destroyed goods.20 The position mirrors the buyer's in the preceding subsection: a buyer that bears the risk still owes the price, and a seller that bears the risk still owes the goods, each in accordance with the contract.21
The destruction itself is not a breach. Suppose Acme, which holds the risk of loss, has agreed to deliver 100 anvils to RRI, and the anvils are destroyed. Acme has not breached by losing them. It breaches only if it refuses to deliver another 100 on the ground that the first lot is gone.22 The line falls there because the seller promised conforming goods, and for interchangeable goods it can usually fill the order from other stock or from the open market. A fire or a wreck makes performance more expensive without making it impossible. If destruction ended the seller's duty, any seller could leave a contract by losing the goods, and the buyer, who never controlled them, would lose the bargain. Leaving the duty in place keeps the loss with the party that held the risk.
The buyer's practical remedy follows from the same structure. The seller may tender replacement goods, and if it does not, it is in breach for nondelivery and the buyer may sue.23
A contract for one particular vehicle comes out differently. Newman made a contract for the purchase and sale of a car previously owned by the actor Jon Voight. The car was destroyed through no fault of either party while Newman had the risk. Because the contract called for one particular vehicle with no replacement, Newman's performance is excused and his failure to deliver is no breach.24 In the orchard case and the car case alike, the party performing held the risk when the goods were lost, so the allocation cannot explain the different results. The difference is whether the contract presupposed those particular goods, and that is a question of excuse.
Risk allocation and excuse are therefore separate inquiries, taken in a fixed order. Where § 2-613 applies and the loss is total, the contract is avoided, so the failure to perform is no breach.25 A seller that has the risk and cannot satisfy § 2-613 or § 2-615 must tender conforming goods even though the original order was destroyed, and if it does not, the buyer may sue for breach.26 The excuse for casualty to identified goods requires a contract that calls for goods identified when the contract was made, a requirement the next subsection develops. An exam stem that destroys goods while the seller holds the risk invites two wrong answers: that the destruction is itself a breach, and that it discharges the seller. Neither follows from the Code. The correct analysis asks whether the seller replaced the goods or can establish a separate excuse.
Casualty to Identified Goods
Section 2-613 marks the one situation in which destroyed goods end the seller's duty to perform instead of leaving it standing. It applies when the contract requires for its performance goods identified when the contract is made, and those goods suffer casualty without the fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer. If the loss is total, the contract is avoided.29 Avoidance releases both sides: the seller's failure to deliver is excused, and there is no breach.30 Against the seller's ordinary duty to replace, this provision is the narrow exception.
Allocation and excuse both begin with destroyed goods, but they ask different questions. Allocation asks who absorbs the loss, and a seller who absorbs it must still perform, usually by supplying other conforming goods.31 Excuse asks whether performance remains possible at all. For goods that can be bought again it does, so the seller's duty survives the fire. Only when the bargain was tied to a particular thing does destruction leave the promise with nothing to attach to. That is why the statute demands goods identified when the contract is made. Section 2-105(2) draws a related line: goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them can pass, and goods lacking either quality are future goods.32 A seller who promises future goods can usually obtain them elsewhere. The excuse is therefore confined to goods whose continued existence the agreement presupposes, and it has no application to the garden-variety sale.33
Newman's contract shows the excuse at work. It called for one particular car, and when the car was destroyed through no fault of either party while Newman had the risk, his performance was excused because no replacement exists.34 The goods need not be famous or one of a kind. A farmer who contracts to sell the crop growing on a certain piece of land, with the risk to pass only when the crop is duly delivered to a carrier, is excused when bad weather causes that crop to fail, because the contract tied the promise to that land.35 The statute asks whether the agreement presupposes the continued existence of the identified goods, and uniqueness is one common way of showing that.36
The casualty must occur without the fault of either party, so a seller whose own fault started the fire cannot claim the excuse. The casualty also need not follow the contract. If the goods were already destroyed when the parties contracted, § 2-613 applies so long as neither party knew of the destruction.37
Where the bargain does not presuppose particular goods, the excuse fails even when the loss is total and the seller held the risk, and the decisions fail for two distinct reasons. In Clark v. Wallace County Cooperative Equity Exchange a farmer promised 4,000 bushels of corn, a fall freeze damaged his crop, and he delivered only 2,207 bushels. The Kansas court refused to excuse the remainder because the contract required corn from no particular land or grower, so the goods were not identified when the contract was made.38 Identification was the missing element there, and the same freeze would have fallen differently on a farmer whose contract named a specific tract. In Valley Forge Flag Co. v. New York Dowel & Moulding Import Co. a storm at sea destroyed 130,000 Ramin dowels while the seller still had the risk. The court denied the excuse because dowels are interchangeable and the seller admitted it could have bought replacements on the open market, so the buyer recovered the cost of cover.39 The missing element there was presupposition. For fungible goods, a description by kind and amount is not enough, and the added requirement keeps a seller from using the excuse to leave a contract for ordinary goods that it can replace on the open market.40
The excuse also ends where the risk of loss has already passed to the buyer. By its terms § 2-613 reaches only goods that suffer casualty before the risk passes.41 If the risk has passed to the buyer before the casualty, § 2-613 has no application, and under the rules of § 2-509 the buyer bears the loss.42 A contract for widgets delivered F.O.B. the seller's plant shows the point: conforming widgets destroyed in transit after due delivery to the carrier are the buyer's loss, and the buyer owes the price.43 The risk rules have already chosen the buyer to absorb a loss at that stage. Avoiding the contract would take that choice back and leave a fully performing seller without the price. The order of analysis follows from this: the risk rules come first, because the excuse is available only for a loss that occurs while the risk still rests on the seller.
A partial loss changes what the statute gives the buyer. If the loss is partial, or the goods have so deteriorated that they no longer conform to the contract, the buyer may demand inspection and then, at its option, treat the contract as avoided or accept the goods with due allowance from the price for the deterioration or the deficiency in quantity, but without further right against the seller.44 The buyer holds the choice because it is the one asked to take less than it bargained for. It should be neither forced to take goods that no longer serve its purpose nor forced to give up goods that still do. The seller faces no damages claim because no one was at fault, and the allowance against the price does the work that damages would do in a case of breach.
Had the collector already carried the painting home when the leak occurred, receipt would have passed the risk under the merchant branch of the residual rule, and the loss would be the collector's with no excuse available to anyone. Because the doctrine has several parts that must all be present, it is best run as a sequence.
The second step is where most claims fail, since sellers of ordinary goods rarely have a contract that presupposes particular goods. A seller who fails there owes what the preceding subsection described: replacement goods, or damages for nondelivery.