Concept
Death or Incapacity
Impossibility
Death or Incapacity
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 262 applies the general impracticability rule of § 261 to a recurring event, the loss of a person on whom performance depends. If the existence of a particular person is necessary for performance, that person's death, or such incapacity as makes performance impracticable, is an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.1 The section adds no new test. It names one event, treats the basic-assumption requirement as met once the person proves necessary, and leaves the other requirements of § 261 in place.
The principle is older than the Restatement and began with a thing rather than a person. In Taylor v. Caldwell, a music hall burned down shortly before the first scheduled performance, and the court excused the owner. It held that the hall was essential to performance and that the parties had contracted on the basis of its continued existence.2 The court rested that result on an implied condition. When the parties must have known from the nature of the contract that it could not be fulfilled unless a particular specified thing continued to exist, performance is excused if the thing perishes before breach, without default of the contractor.3 In its original form the doctrine reached the post-formation death of a person as well as the destruction of a thing, so long as the party seeking relief did not cause it.4 Section 262 is the person half of that principle.
The law singles out this event because of what the promisee bargained for. When a contract depends on one person's skill, judgment, or identity, a substitute would be a different performance, so the promisor cannot cure the problem by sending someone else. Death or disabling illness removes the performance from every would-be performer at once. Parties who contract for one person's work also rarely expect that person's estate to answer in damages for a performance only that person could give.5
The subsections below take the rule in four steps: what discharge requires, how a court decides whether a person was necessary, how fault in causing a disability bears on discharge, and whether a corporation's dissolution counts.
Death or Incapacity Discharges
When both parties understand that performance depends on one individual, they share a basic assumption that the individual will neither die nor lose the necessary capacity before performance is due. Death or incapacity therefore discharges the obligor's duty, subject to the qualifications stated in § 261.6 Because the assumption comes from the nature of the bargain, the party claiming excuse must show that the performance, as both sides understood it, required that person. No one needs to have mentioned mortality at signing.
The necessary person is usually the obligor, but the comment recognizes that it may be the obligee or a third person.7 Two illustrations show the first two possibilities on a single employment contract. An employer hires a confidential secretary for a year, and the secretary dies before the year ends. The secretary's duty to work is discharged, and the estate owes the employer nothing.8 If the employer dies instead and the secretary takes other employment, the secretary's duty is likewise discharged, and the secretary is not liable to the employer's estate.9 In the second case the person who disappears is the one who was to receive the performance, and the law treats that loss like the loss of the one who was to render it. The secretary's duty was to serve that employer.
Older authority shows that the person whose life matters need not be the one who made the promise. A father who covenants that an apprentice will serve seven years is not liable if the apprentice dies within the term, and the only reason is that the apprentice's death excuses him.10 The implied-condition reasoning of Taylor v. Caldwell explains the result.11 Buccini v. Paterno Construction Co. belongs to the same line of authority, and § 262 restates the result in the modern vocabulary of a basic assumption.
A personal obligor's death is the clearest case of objective impracticability. The difference between objective and subjective impracticability is the difference between “the thing cannot be done” and “I cannot do it,” and the First Restatement required the objective kind.12 A decedent who owed personal performance meets even that stricter test, because the decedent was the only one who could have performed a non-delegable duty.13 The comment says the same: when the obligor must perform personally, death or incapacity makes it impracticable for anyone to perform.14
Death is foreseeable in a trivial sense, since every person is mortal. But the mere possibility that an event may occur does not make it foreseen for purposes of the basic assumption; the parties must have had some reason to treat it as a probability.15 What usually decides the case is risk allocation, which is ordinarily the predominant and pervasive consideration in this defense.16
The Restatement answers the risk question with a presumption. It is so rare for a party to undertake a duty of personal service in spite of death or incapacity that an intention to do so must be clearly manifested before the contract will be read that way.17 The presumption fits the likely bargain. A promisee who chose a person for that person's skill knows that performance depends on that person's life, and a promisor asked whether the estate should pay damages for work only the decedent could do would likely say no. A promise that binds the estate has to be written into the contract.
Incapacity short of death discharges the duty when it makes performance impracticable, and the Restatement's fifth illustration shows how little physical disability that can take. A producer agrees with a theater owner to stage a play starring a famous actor in the owner's theater on December 16. Early in December, while the play is running elsewhere, the actor's throat condition worsens. It does not prevent performing, but the actor's doctor advises canceling further performances and having a minor operation, and on December 12 the producer cancels the December 16 performance for that reason. The producer's duty is discharged, and the producer is not liable to the owner for breach.18 The star is a stranger to the contract, which confirms that the necessary person need not be a party. Courts have gone similarly far. A school teacher's duty was discharged by the deterioration of his vision in Oneal v. Colton Consolidated School District No. 306. In Wasserman Theatrical Enterprise v. Harris the actor Walter Huston was excused from appearing because of a minor throat ailment, on the footing that even apprehension of illness may excuse.19
The requirement of impracticability keeps the rule from covering every ailment. Events short of absolute impossibility excuse performance only when they place such a great and unexpected burden on the party that fairness demands relief.20 In the Restatement's illustration, the doctor's advice to cancel produces that burden, although the actor could physically have gone on. A star who merely felt unwell would stand on weaker ground.
A disability that exists when the contract is made falls under § 266(1) rather than § 261, and § 262 also applies for purposes of that rule.21 Under either rule, a party whose own fault produced the disability, or who took the risk by contract, gains nothing from the loss of the person alone. Fault is taken up below. The effects of discharge on the other side's duty and on money already paid come at the end of the chapter.
Is the Person Necessary?
Section 262 discharges a duty only when the person's existence is necessary for performance, so every death-and-incapacity problem starts with that question.23 The parties can answer it themselves, because they may effectively provide that a particular person is or is not necessary. An agreement may, for example, require the obligor's personal service.24 A court applies such a term as written.
Most agreements are silent. The comment then directs the court to consider all the circumstances in deciding whether the duty, as the parties understood it, involves enough personal service or discretion to require performance by a particular person, and it allows resort to usage and course of dealing.25 The criteria come from another part of contract law. Whether a duty requires a particular person's performance is essentially the question that arises when a party tries to delegate the duty, and the same criteria decide it.26 The delegation rules belong elsewhere in the course, but the link tells a student what to ask: did the other side bargain for this individual's skill, judgment, or supervision, or only for the result? If the obligor can discharge the duty through someone else's performance, the obligor's own disability does not discharge it.27
Delegability controls because excuse presupposes that performance has become impracticable, and performance is not impracticable for everyone if another person can render it. The obligor or the estate can then arrange for the substitute, and the other party receives what it bargained for. Discharge would instead leave that party without the bargain and release the estate from a duty it can carry out. The point matches the earlier discussion of objective impossibility: a personal obligor's death qualifies because the decedent was the only one who could have performed a non-delegable duty.28 A duty to pay money is the limiting case, since an estate can pay as readily as the decedent could.
A contract to cut a tract of standing timber shows the claim failing. When the cutter dies and nothing suggests that personal service or supervision was needed, the duty is not discharged, and the estate is liable to the other party for breach.29 Cutting timber is work others can do, so the death takes nothing from the performance the other party purchased. The payment side comes out the same way. In Warner v. Kaplan, a buyer died before the close of escrow on a cooperative apartment, and the death did not discharge the contract to purchase. An estate can pay the price as well as the buyer could have.
The Restatement's firm of architects shows the claim succeeding. Two architects contract with a client to design a building, and the parties understand that both will render the services. One dies, and the survivor fails to complete the design. Both duties are discharged, and neither the estate nor the survivor is liable to the client.30 The shared understanding made each partner necessary, so the loss of one removed the performance the client had bought. A firm of contractors comes out the other way. It does extensive business in many localities and agrees to fill a tract of low land. One partner dies, and the other fails to finish. Neither duty is discharged, and both the estate and the survivor are liable.31 Both illustrations involve a partner's death, so the firm's form did not move the result. The work and the parties' understanding of it did. A design draws on the personal judgment of the named professionals, while filling land is work the firm can staff with others.
The necessity question is asked about the particular duty at issue, as the prospecting illustration shows. A is to devote full time to prospecting for coal on B's land, and if A finds coal, B personally is to finance and manage a corporation to exploit it. B is to pay A a salary and convey to him a one-quarter interest in any resulting corporation. A finds coal, and B dies before any corporation is formed. Whether B's duty became impracticable depends on whether that duty, as the parties understood it, could be performed only by B himself. If the court finds that it could, B's duty to convey an interest is discharged and B's estate is not liable.32 A may still have a claim under § 272(1), which comes with the effects of discharge at the end of the chapter.33 The person whose death matters is the obligor, and the court looks at what the financing and managing role required, not at the contract as a whole.
Two opposite instincts cause errors on this element. The first treats any death as the end of the contract on the theory that the dead cannot perform. That reasoning skips the question whether anyone else could, and it wrongly discharges the estate of a timber cutter or a buyer. The second assumes that a professional title makes the person necessary, when the contractors' firm shows that skilled work can pass to others if the parties understood the duty to be the firm's. A finding of necessity also establishes only the first link. The remaining requirements still apply, including that the obligor not be at fault and that the contract not have placed the risk on the obligor.
Fault and Self-Inflicted Death
The comment to § 262 adds a fault qualification. The general rule requires that the party seeking relief not have caused the event,35 and the comment agrees that an obligor's fault prevents a disability from discharging the duty. It then observes that the effect of conduct on health is often so difficult to foresee that fault in bringing about the disability must be clear before it prevents discharge.36 The standard tilts toward discharge. A death or illness that follows risky conduct is not fault merely because the conduct came first, and the party resisting discharge must show something plainer than a link between a person's choices and the person's health.
The comment's reason is foresight. A fire can often be traced to a particular act, such as arson. A death or illness usually has many causes, and a person who takes a health risk rarely can foresee whether it will cost his life or his capacity. A rule that treated every such risk as fault would turn each death into a dispute over blame.
CNA International Reinsurance Co. v. Phoenix tested the standard. The appellants argued for a fault exception to the impossibility defense in a case of death, asking the court to find support in the language of §§ 261 and 262. They conceded that no case authority supported their position.37 The trial court had ruled that the doctrine of impossibility applied even if the death were a suicide, although nothing in the record suggested it was, or the result of an intentional, self-inflicted act.38 If even an intentional, self-inflicted death does not stop the doctrine from applying, it is hard to see how a death that merely follows voluntary risk-taking could count as clear fault.
The other side of the line is a disability engineered to escape the contract.
The cellist's conduct falls squarely under the comment's clear-fault language, so discharge fails.39
Fault also bears on risk allocation. Even when the person was necessary and the death was a supervening event, the court must decide who carried the risk, and risk allocation is usually the predominant consideration.40 Foresight enters that inquiry only in a limited way. The mere possibility that an event may occur does not make it foreseen, and the parties need some reason to treat it as a probability.41
The usual exam error is to treat any voluntary risk, such as drinking, smoking, or drug use, as fault that defeats discharge. The comment demands more: the fault must be clear.
Corporate Dissolution
The comment to § 262 carries the death-and-incapacity rule beyond natural persons. It applies the rule, by analogy, to the dissolution of a legal person such as a corporation.43 Dissolution is the closest thing a corporation has to death, since afterward the entity that owed a duty, or was to receive performance, no longer exists. The same comment says the analogy seldom helps in practice. Dissolution ordinarily must not be due to the corporation's financial inability, and because the excuse requires the absence of fault, the dissolution must not be within the corporation's control.44 Those two limits are the objective-impossibility and absence-of-fault requirements applied to an entity whose existence, unlike a person's life, rests largely in its owners' hands.
Each limit has its own reason. A natural person ordinarily does not choose the death or illness that interrupts a personal-service contract. A corporation's existence depends on decisions by its directors and shareholders, who can vote to dissolve it. A duty that ended whenever the corporation chose to dissolve would bind it only as long as it wished to be bound, and the other party's reliance would be worth nothing. The financial limit rests on a separate principle, and the comment points to Comment b to § 261 for it: financial inability does not excuse.45
The Restatement's illustrations show where the line falls. A corporation contracts to employ a secretary for five years, and within that time the state legislature enacts a law requiring the dissolution of corporations engaged in the corporation's business. On dissolution the corporation's duty to employ the secretary is discharged, and it is not liable to the secretary for breach.46 If the corporation dissolves voluntarily, or because it has become insolvent, its duty is not discharged and it is liable to the secretary for breach.47 The employment contract is the same in both illustrations, and the cause of the dissolution decides the result. A legislative command is an external event that the corporation neither chose nor brought about through its finances. A vote to dissolve or a collapse into insolvency traces back to the corporation itself.
The legislative case is also a specific instance of the governmental-order category. Section 264 treats a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order that makes performance impracticable as an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, and the comment's third illustration cross-refers to it.48 The regulation section later in this chapter develops that category. Discharge also does not leave the secretary without recourse. The comment notes that the secretary may have a claim against the corporation under § 272(1), which comes with the effects of discharge at the end of the chapter.49
The usual error is to treat any dissolution as the corporate equivalent of death and stop there. Death discharges a personal-service duty because no one chooses it and no one else can perform. A corporation that dissolves by its own vote, by its own insolvency, or through its own default has no comparable claim. Only a dissolution that the law compels and the corporation did not cause fits the excuse.