Concept
Destruction of a Necessary Thing
Impossibility
Destruction of a Necessary Thing
Some contracts cannot be performed without one particular thing, and when that thing is lost the contract loses its footing. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 263 states the rule: if the existence of a specific thing is necessary for the performance of a duty, the thing’s failure to come into existence, its destruction, or such deterioration as makes performance impracticable is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.1 The section supplies the basic-assumption element for this event. The rest of the general test still applies: the loss must come after the contract is made, it must make performance impracticable without the promisor’s fault, and the language or circumstances of the contract must not indicate the contrary.2
This is the category in which the law of excuse began. In Taylor v. Caldwell, the contract was for the hire of a music hall that burned down after the contract was made and before the time for performance. Nothing in the contract qualified the obligation to provide the hall, yet the court found the hall’s continuing existence to be a basic assumption of the contract and implied a term that its destruction excused performance.3 Sales of goods have a counterpart in the Uniform Commercial Code, which applies when the contract requires goods identified when the contract is made and the goods suffer casualty without fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer.4 The Code’s rules for casualty to identified goods are taken up later in this chapter.
Three questions organize what follows. The first is whether the lost thing was the thing the contract required, since a duty that something else can satisfy survives the loss of any one item. The second is how far § 263 reaches beyond outright destruction, which depends on its other two events, failure to come into existence and deterioration. The third is why a builder whose work in progress is destroyed fares differently from a promisor whose necessary thing is destroyed.
Specific Thing Required
Section 263 reaches a duty only when the existence of a specific thing is necessary to performing it, meaning the contract cannot be carried out without that very thing.5 The promisor’s plan to use the thing, high regard for it, or lack of another supply settles nothing, because the question is what the contract required. A promisor whose chosen means of performing is destroyed, while the promise itself can still be kept another way, remains bound.
The limit follows from the strict-liability baseline that opened this chapter. Excuse is justified only when the promisor can no longer give the other side what it bargained for. If a lost item has an equivalent, the promisor can obtain it and the promisee still receives the promised performance, so discharge would strip the promisee of its bargain and let the promisor treat the loss of its own stock as an exit. When the contract names the thing, the reasoning reverses. The parties have shown that its existence was the foundation of the deal, and a silent contract is read as releasing the promisor when that foundation disappears. The previous section asked whether anyone else could render a personal performance. This one asks whether anything else could stand in for the lost thing.
The burned music hall in Taylor is the paradigm. The court held the hall itself “essential” to performance and the parties to have contracted “on the basis of [its] continued existence,” so its accidental destruction excused the duty to provide it.6 The case gets harder if a rival’s hall of the same size stands empty on the night of the concert and nothing in the contract makes the identity of the hall material. As originally formulated, the defense was confined to situations in which the change of circumstances made the contract objectively impossible to perform,7 and renting the other hall would make performance possible. Under the modern formulation, the question becomes whether performance has been made impracticable,8 so the lessor’s claim turns on whether the cost of arranging the substitute is heavy enough to meet that standard. That question belongs to the neighboring doctrines taken up later in this chapter, and it arises only because the first question, whether this hall was necessary, was answered no.
The court’s own illustrations were not limited to buildings. Where a sale transfers the property in specific chattels presently, to be delivered on a future day, and the chattels perish in the interval without the vendor’s fault, the vendor is excused from delivering and the purchaser must still pay the price.9 The word specific carries the weight, and a destroyed item qualifies only if the contract tied performance to it. In Bende & Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recreation, Inc., a seller of combat boots was not excused by a train wreck that destroyed boots it planned to deliver, because the seller did not show that the contract required those particular boots. A promise to deliver goods that match a description can be met with any goods that match it, so the wreck destroyed the seller’s chosen means of performing and left the promise performable.
A failed source of supply raises the same necessity question. Cases such as Selland Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. King ask whether the contract made a particular supplier necessary to performance. Foreseeability carries great weight in that inquiry. The rationale for requiring an unforeseeable occurrence rests on who assumed the risk of the source failing, and under ordinary circumstances the risk that the seller’s supply might fail is on the seller, who promises a product knowing the conditions of the market.10
The second step is where the contract’s words matter most, because the general rule withholds discharge where the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.11 A clause promising that the thing will be available, or placing the risk of its loss on the promisor, can therefore defeat discharge even for a necessary thing. Students err in two directions on this element. One error treats the loss of whatever the promisor intended to deliver as the loss of a necessary thing, which the unnamed ore and the wrecked boots show to be wrong. The other denies discharge because similar goods exist somewhere in the world, even though the contract picked out one roadster or one hall. A named thing has no equivalent for purposes of the promise, and that is what makes it necessary.
Failure to Exist and Deterioration
A thing that has not yet been made or grown when the contract is signed can fail without ever being lost in the ordinary sense, and § 263 covers that case by naming a thing’s failure to come into existence alongside its destruction.13 A contract to sell what a particular field will yield rests on a belief that the field will yield something. When blight, drought, or frost keeps the crop from maturing, that belief fails just as it fails when a hall burns. The promisor did nothing wrong, and the same crop cannot be bought elsewhere, because no crop from that field exists to be bought.
The Code’s own illustration is a farmer who contracts to sell crops growing on a certain piece of land when bad weather makes the crop fail. If the contract leaves the risk of loss on the farmer until the crop is delivered to a carrier, the farmer’s performance is excused. If the risk of loss had already passed to the buyer before the casualty, § 2-613 would not apply, and the buyer would bear the loss under the risk-of-loss rules.14 Two features support the excuse. The first is designation. Comment 9 to § 2-615 recognizes that crop failure may excuse a farmer who has contracted to sell crops to be grown on designated land,15 and § 2-613 is likewise limited to goods identified when the contract is made.16 The second is risk allocation. A grower has every incentive to avoid blight, so if it occurs it probably could not have been prevented, while a buyer who draws on many growers, not all of whom suffer blight in the same season, is better placed to absorb the loss.17
The exam question is what happens when the farmer promised corn and never said whose field it would come from. In Clark v. Wallace County Cooperative Equity Exchange, a farmer was not excused from a contract to sell a quantity of corn after a freeze severely damaged his crop, because the corn to be delivered was not specified to come from his land.18 A promise of that kind can be kept with corn from any source, so the freeze destroyed the farmer’s chosen means of performing and left the promise performable. Courts have a reason to hold the line in such cases. Judicial excuse may significantly reduce the incentive of those best able to avoid a risk to use their position to do so,19 and a farmer can avoid this risk by tying the promise to designated land or by writing a clause.
Deterioration, the third event, applies when the thing survives but is damaged so badly that it can no longer serve the contract. The Restatement sets the limit in its own words: the deterioration must be such as makes performance impracticable, so damage that leaves the thing deliverable in the condition the contract called for discharges no one.20 Serious damage is treated like destruction because the other side bargained for the named thing in a condition that could do its job. When damage destroys that condition, the promisor cannot cure the problem by repair or substitution without delivering something the contract never described.
Damage that can be repaired at ordinary cost leaves performance possible, and the question then becomes whether the cost of repair is heavy enough to count as impracticability, a matter for the neighboring doctrines later in this chapter. For goods identified at contracting, the Code sorts the loss by degree. If the loss is total, the contract is avoided.21 If the loss is partial, or the goods have so deteriorated as no longer to conform to the contract, the buyer may demand inspection and then either treat the contract as avoided or accept the goods with due allowance from the price for the deterioration or deficiency, but without further right against the seller.22 The casualty section later in this chapter develops those rules.
A failed crop or a damaged thing opens the analysis and does not end it. The loss must still follow formation, the promisor must be free of fault, and the contract must not have placed the risk on the promisor, as a guarantee that the crop will be delivered would. A builder whose own labor brings a building into existence stands differently from a farmer at the mercy of the weather, and the next subsection takes up that difference.
Contracts to Build
A builder who watches a half-finished building burn seems at first to fit § 263, since the work in progress is a thing that was destroyed without anyone’s fault.24 The standard illustration shows why the claim usually fails. Builder contracted to construct a house for Owner, and shortly before completion a fire destroyed the entire structure. Builder likely can prove that the fire made timely performance extreme and unreasonable, that the fire’s non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract, and that Builder was not at fault for it. Builder likely cannot prove that it did not bear the risk, because it controlled the construction site and should have taken greater precautions against such a fire. Builder is therefore liable to Owner for not completing construction on time.25 Three of the four requirements are met, and the claim is lost on risk allocation.
Control explains where the risk lands. During construction the builder holds the site and can secure it against fire, while the owner can do little of that. Courts have a reason to leave such a loss with the party best able to avoid it, because judicial excuse may significantly reduce the incentive of those best able to avoid risks to take the precautions that avoid them.26 The promise was also for a finished house, and the burned structure was only the builder’s way of reaching it, which separates this case from the named hall or the chosen roadster.
The pair isolates the variable that matters, which is whether the thing exists or is being built. The reshingling duty acts on an existing house, the specific thing that § 263 describes, and its destruction leaves the duty with nothing to act on. The garage is a thing the contractor’s own labor is still bringing into being, and the contractor holds the site where the loss occurred. Students err in two directions here. One error discharges the builder because the work in progress burned, ignoring that the builder controlled the site and bears the risk. The other denies discharge in the repair case on the theory that a new house could be built, when the contract called for work on the house that existed. The same contrast separates the builder from the farmer in the previous subsection, because a farmer cannot summon a crop from a field that failed, while a builder holds the means of producing the building a second time.
A builder who wants protection for the schedule can write it into the contract. A force majeure clause says that a party need not perform in the event of fires, floods, “Acts of God,” war, civil unrest, labor strikes, and the like. The danger of crafting such a list is that a court may find that the party impliedly assumed the risk of anything not stated there.27 Without such a clause, the illustration leaves the builder answerable for the late completion.