Concept
Neighboring Doctrines
Impossibility
Neighboring Doctrines
The Restatement's three classic categories already speak the language of impracticability. Section 262 discharges a duty when a necessary person's death or incapacity makes performance impracticable, § 263 does the same for a necessary thing whose destruction or deterioration makes performance impracticable, and § 264 reaches performance made impracticable by compliance with a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order.1 A performance can therefore stay physically possible and still be excused. The Surrey Gardens music-hall case, Taylor v. Caldwell, makes the same point from the other side. Even after the hall burned, the defendant could have written a cheque to cover the plaintiff's losses, and nothing is easier or “less impossible” than that. The question was therefore whether the parties intended that he should.2
Two doctrines carry this reasoning beyond the classic cases. Impracticability reaches a performance that can still be rendered, but only at a cost so extreme that the law treats it as unavailable. Frustration of purpose reaches a performance that can be rendered at ordinary cost, but whose value to the party who is to receive it a supervening event has destroyed. Both concern events that arrive after the contract is made; a disability that already exists at formation falls under § 266(1) rather than § 261.3 Exams ask for exactly this sorting: given a deal that has gone wrong, which doctrine does the claimant actually have?
The answer turns on what the event took from the party seeking excuse. A fire that destroys the hall leaves the owner unable to perform, which is impossibility. A jump in the price of materials, with the work still doable, raises at most a claim of impracticability, and that claim usually fails. A cancelled event that leaves the hall standing and the rent payable leaves the renter holding a performance worth nothing, which is frustration. The barge example shows the same sort. A supplier who cannot furnish barges argues impracticability, while a shipper with no product to ship argues frustration, because paying is still perfectly possible but buys nothing.4 The UCC divides the ground in the same way. Section 2-613 covers casualty to goods identified when the contract is made, much as the common law excused performance when unique goods were destroyed, and § 2-615 expands that rule to performance that has become impracticable.5 Impracticability comes first, because it extends the excuse this chapter has already built. Frustration follows, because it asks a different question: not whether the promisor can still perform, but whether the performance is still worth anything to the party who receives it.
Impracticability
In Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, the defendants had agreed to take from the plaintiff's land the earth and gravel needed for a bridge. Gravel lay on the land, but it was so situated that the defendants could not take it by ordinary means, or except at a prohibitive cost.6 The court excused them, reasoning that to all fair intents taking it was impossible.7 The case fits the missing-thing pattern from the casualty cases. A contract to take gravel assumes the gravel can be taken, and gravel reachable only at a prohibitive cost is, for the contract's purposes, gravel that is not there. The court drew the limit in the same passage. A promisor cannot excuse itself by showing that performance has become more expensive than anticipated or will entail a loss. Relief followed because the difference in cost was so great that it made performance impracticable, and the situation was then no different from a total absence of earth and gravel.8
Modern law generalized the point. During the twentieth century, impossibility in its original form came to seem too restricted, because some events place so great and unexpected a burden on a party that fairness demands relief even though performance is not absolutely impossible. The doctrine broadened, took the name impracticability, and now appears in UCC § 2-615 and Restatement (Second) §§ 261 to 272. The provisions differ in details, but their basic concepts are the same.9 For sales of goods, § 2-615 excuses a seller whose agreed performance has been made impracticable by a contingency whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.10 A party that establishes the excuse is not in breach; the contract is avoided.11 The death, destruction, and governmental-order cases are the recurring, well-defined instances of this broader rule.12
Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States shows where the doctrine stops. A shipping company had agreed to carry wheat from Galveston to a port in Iran for $305,000, a price that reflected the shared assumption that the ship would pass through the Suez Canal. When Egypt closed the canal while the ship was at sea, the ship went around the Cape of Good Hope, adding about 3,000 miles, and the company sued for the extra $43,000, arguing that the original performance had become impracticable.{{cite:3e85cd32-e3d6-4ba0-8854-3f6b3f7ab5}} The court applied three steps: an unexpected contingency must have occurred, the risk of it must not have been allocated by agreement or custom, and its occurrence must have made performance commercially impracticable.{{cite:3e85cd32-e3d6-4ba0-8854-3f6b3f7ab5}} The closure counted as the unexpected contingency, but the claim failed on the rest. The extra expense was under 15 percent of the contract price, and an experienced carrier was better placed than the cargo owner to estimate what an alternative route would cost, so it could be presumed to have accepted some abnormal risk on a route that might close. The court did not hold that increased cost can never suffice, but it required “more of a variation between expected cost and the cost of performing by an available alternative than in the present case.”{{cite:3e85cd32-e3d6-4ba0-8854-3f6b3f7ab5}}
Set side by side, the two decisions mark the line. Performance stayed physically possible in both, so possibility does not separate them. In Mineral Park, the cost of reaching the gravel was so far out of proportion to what the parties expected that the court treated the gravel as absent. In Transatlantic, an available alternative route existed at a modest added expense. The fixed price explains why the law demands so much. A price agreed in advance is how the parties allocate the risk that costs will move: the seller keeps the gain if costs fall and absorbs the loss if they rise, and the buyer plans around that figure. Excusing the seller whenever costs rose would let it keep the advantages of the fixed price in good times and shift the losses to the buyer in bad ones, depriving the buyer of the good bargain it struck. Swings in market price therefore do not make out impracticability, and increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise comes from an unforeseen contingency that alters the essential nature of the performance.13
The usual exam error treats proof that performance now costs more, or that the promisor will lose money, as proof of impracticability. The test asks whether the burden is so extreme, and so far outside what the contract allocated, that the performance is effectively unavailable. The three steps of unexpected contingency, unallocated risk, and commercial impracticability supply the answer.
Frustration of Purpose
Frustration of purpose, stated in Restatement (Second) § 265, discharges a party's remaining duties to render performance when, after the contract is made, that party's “principal purpose is substantially frustrated” without its fault by an event whose nonoccurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.16 The condition of the promised performance sets this doctrine apart from everything earlier in the chapter. The performance is neither impossible nor impracticable, and it can still be rendered at ordinary cost, yet it has become useless to the party who is to receive it.17 Impracticability asks whether the promised act can still be given at a tolerable cost; frustration asks what that act is now worth to the party who bargained for it.
The usual claimant differs too. In a claim of impossibility or impracticability, the party who raises the defense promised the act now said to be impossible. In a claim of frustration, it is the party to whom the duty is owed, the recipient of a performance that remains possible and is probably still being tendered.18 A seller who cannot supply goods argues impracticability, while a buyer or any other party obliged to pay ordinarily argues frustration.19 The reason lies in what each defense can reach. Impracticability measures how hard a performance is to render, and a payer's performance is not hard to render, since paying remains perfectly possible. The payer's grievance is that the payer gets nothing for the money, so the defense must measure the value of what the payer receives.20 English law uses the single word “frustration” for both ideas, so an English decision labeled frustration may be an impracticability case in American terms.21 The first move on any fact pattern is therefore to identify who is asking for excuse and what the event took from that party.
The model case is Krell v. Henry, decided by the English Court of Appeal in 1903. By a written contract of June 20, 1902, the defendant agreed to hire the plaintiff's flat in Pall Mall for June 26 and 27, the days on which the coronation processions of Edward VII had been officially announced to pass along that street. The contract never mentioned the coronation, and a deposit was paid when it was made.22 The King fell seriously ill, the processions did not take place on the days fixed, and the defendant refused to pay the balance of the rent.23 The flat stood untouched and payment remained possible, so performance was impossible for neither side, yet the court held the defendant discharged from the duty to pay.24
Because the writing was silent, the court read the contract against its surroundings. The owner had posted an announcement that windows to view the coronation procession were to be let, the defendant had applied because of it, and the rooms were offered for the daytime of both days but not the nights.25 The apartment had been advertised as one with a good view of the festivities, and the price was suitably enhanced.26 Vaughan Williams L.J. concluded that “the use of the rooms was let and taken for the purpose of seeing the Royal procession.”27 Both sides understood the purpose, so the use of the flat on those days was worth the price only if the procession passed. The reasoning extends the logic of the burned music hall: the doctrine reaches a foundation assumption that fails, even when no physical thing is destroyed.
The same flat shows how the two doctrines sort by event and by party. Had fire destroyed the flat after the contract was made, the owner would have claimed impossibility, because the owner's own promised performance would be gone.28 The cancelled procession leaves the owner's performance intact and hands the defense to the renter, who is the payer and who was charged a premium rate for an extraordinary use that has become worthless.29 Courts accept the defense in that setting because holding the renter to the rate would let the owner keep a premium for a performance that has lost the one feature that made it valuable.
The doctrine stays narrow because a broad rule would free every party whose bargain has simply turned sour. Both parties must understand the purpose for which the contract is made, and the failure of that purpose must leave the performance totally or almost totally valueless to the party seeking relief.30 Tenants who sought relief from long-term service-station leases when a highway was moved, or when gas and tire rationing was imposed, almost invariably failed. The purpose of the lease survived, and only the profit the tenant had expected suffered. Courts call this economic or commercial frustration and deny relief.31
The line between a purpose destroyed and a purpose narrowed runs through Lloyd v. Murphy. A tenant had leased premises for selling new automobiles, and government restrictions limited those sales. The court denied relief on findings that the premises sat on a main traffic artery, carried gasoline pumps, and were adapted to a service station. They also included a one-story storeroom adapted to many commercial purposes. The lessors had waived the lease's use restrictions and allowed any legitimate use and subleasing, and the tenant went on selling and servicing automobiles at two other places.32 Even more clearly for leases than for ordinary contracts, frustration depends on the total or nearly total destruction of the purpose for which, in the contemplation of both parties, the transaction was entered into.33 On those findings the lease's purpose had been restricted, not destroyed.
Krell and Lloyd differ on a single fact. In both, an outside event left physical performance possible, and the party seeking excuse was the payer. In Krell nothing remained of what the renter had bargained for; in Lloyd the use had narrowed, but a valuable use survived. The only moving fact is how much of the purpose is left.
Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co. confirms the label. Paonessa had contracted to buy the remaining sections of median barrier, and nothing prevented it from honoring that contract whether or not the state department approved the sections for use in road construction. Performance was therefore not literally impossible, and the court called frustration of purpose the more accurate label for the defense.34 Section 265 shares the structure of § 261, with a supervening event, no fault, a basic assumption, and an exception for contrary language or circumstances, so what earlier subsections said about timing, fault, and risk allocation carries over.35 What the doctrine adds is the demand that the frustration be total or nearly total. The modern phrasing, a principal purpose totally or substantially frustrated, is akin to the line between impossibility and impracticability.36