Concept
Contractual Terminating Events
Impracticability
Contractual Terminating Events
When a contract says that a particular event ends a duty, the court has no gap to fill. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 230(1) provides that, except as subsection (2) states, if under the terms of the contract the occurrence of an event is to terminate an obligor's duty of immediate performance or one to pay damages for breach, that duty is discharged if the event occurs.1
Impracticability works the other way around. It exists to handle omitted terms: the contract is silent about the event that upset the deal, and the court must decide whether to supply an excuse.2 A terminating clause leaves no silence, because the contract itself says that this event ends this duty. Subsection (1) therefore asks only whether the named event occurred. The elements taught above (a basic assumption, an extreme burden, absence of fault) do not decide whether the clause operates, and only the limits in the rest of § 230 can stop it from working.
Courts honor a terminating clause for the reason they respect any express allocation of risk: the parties decided in advance who would bear the consequences of the event, and a decision they made themselves leaves nothing for a court to second-guess. The clause also lets each side plan, because the buyer knows when it must look elsewhere for supply and the seller knows when it may sell to others. Sales contracts show how far parties can go. One form clause provides that if either party is partially excused from performance for the reasons it states, "this contract shall be automatically terminated" and "[n]o allocation of performance shall be required or permitted."3 The parties there chose a clean termination over the allocation of performance that the Code's excuse rules, taken up later in this chapter, otherwise contemplate.
Finding a clause that names the event completes only half of the § 230 analysis. Subsections (2) and (3) identify three situations in which a written termination does not operate, and each guards against a different way of turning the clause into a weapon.4 The first limit looks at how the event came about, the second at preventability and burden, and the third at what the obligor promised beforehand.
The first limit denies discharge when the event is the result of the obligor's breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing.5 A termination clause benefits the party whose duty it ends. If that party could bring about the named event itself, the clause would become an exit it controls, and the other side's bargain would last only as long as the obligor chose to stay in it. The good-faith limit removes that temptation by denying discharge to an obligor whose own breach produced the event. The clause thus shields the obligor from events that happen to it and withholds the shield when the obligor arranged the event. In sales of goods, the UCC makes good faith in performance an obligation of every contract that cannot be disclaimed, so a sales contract cannot waive the duty on which this limit rests.6
The second limit appears in subsection (2)(b), and the safest way to apply it is to work from its words. The duty is likewise not discharged if the event "could not have been prevented because of impracticability and continuance of the duty does not subject the obligor to a materially increased burden."7 Three ideas drive that wording: whether the event could have been prevented, impracticability, and whether continuing the duty would subject the obligor to a materially increased burden. The vocabulary echoes the impracticability elements taught earlier, but the provision answers a different question from § 261, namely whether a duty that the clause terminated nevertheless stays alive. A student applying it should quote the wording and test each part against the facts, without adding conditions the text does not state.
The third limit, in subsection (3), concerns what the obligor said before the event. The obligor's duty is not discharged if, before the event occurs, the obligor promises to perform the duty even if the event occurs and does not revoke the promise before the obligee materially changes position in reliance on it.8 That text contains two timing gates: the promise must come before the event, and it stays revocable only until the obligee materially changes position. Reliance explains the second gate. An obligee that rearranges its affairs because the obligor promised to stand firm has been invited to count on the duty surviving, and letting the obligor withdraw the promise after that point would let it profit from the trust it solicited. Before any change of position, revocation leaves the obligee where it would have stood had the promise never been made, so the clause then operates as written.
Together the three limits let § 230(1) do what the parties wrote while keeping the clause from serving an obligor's opportunism. An express term naming an event is the most direct allocation of risk a contract can contain, and when it applies it takes the place of gap-filling by the court. If the event that occurred is not the one the clause names, the analysis returns to the elements of § 261. If a limit in § 230 applies, the clause cannot discharge the duty.