Concept
Later Events and Prior Breach
Impracticability
Later Events and Prior Breach
The sections so far have asked whether an event that struck before performance was due discharged a duty. This section reverses the order: the breach comes first, and the event arrives afterward. The comment to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 draws the boundary. The impracticability rule discharges a duty to render a performance; it does not affect a claim for breach that has already arisen. Later events bear on the amount of damages under the rules on remedies, and they bear on a claim for anticipatory repudiation under the rules on discharge.1
A party who fails to perform while its duty is still in force has already breached, and the claim exists from that moment. Discharge relieves a party whose performance an event has made impracticable, and the duty it removes is the duty to render that performance.2 An event that had not yet occurred could not have made performance impracticable when the failure came. The later event is therefore no defense to the breach itself.
Later events still matter in two ways. After a non-anticipatory breach, the better view is that impracticability or frustration will ordinarily limit damages without erasing the breach, and the remedies rules govern the details.3
After an anticipatory repudiation, a later event is measured against performance that is not yet due. A repudiation is a clear statement, before performance is due, that the party will not perform. It breaks the contract at once, but the performances it concerns still lie in the future, so later facts can show what would have happened. Section 254 supplies two rules of discharge for this setting. Each cuts off the repudiator's duty to pay damages for total breach, and they differ in whose performance they examine: subsection (1) examines the injured party's, and subsection (2) the repudiator's own.4
Injured Party's Later Inability
Under § 254(1), a repudiator's duty to pay damages for total breach is discharged if it appears after the breach that the injured party would have totally failed to perform its return promise.5 The injured party holds a claim from the day of the repudiation. Subsection (1) then asks, on whatever the record later shows, whether that party would have kept its own promise had the repudiation never occurred. If it would not have, the claim for total breach disappears, even though the repudiation was wrongful when made.
The rule rests on one idea about damages and one about timing. Damages for repudiation stand in for what the injured party lost by not receiving the repudiator's performance, and that loss is real only if the injured party would have given what it promised in exchange. An injured party that could never have performed would collect more through an award than performance would have brought. The words appears after the breach supply the timing. Facts about what would have happened often emerge only after the repudiation, and the better rule takes into account all facts known at the time of trial.6 Some authority holds instead that the parties' rights became fixed by the repudiation, but that view ignores what the trial record now shows.
Death supplies the standard example. A and B contract for A to serve B for a year. B repudiates before the time for performance arrives, and A then dies, also before that time. A had a cause of action for the repudiation, but A's estate cannot recover, because it would have to show that A would have been ready, willing, and able to perform but for the repudiation, and A's death forecloses that showing.7 The death is the event § 262 describes. When the existence of a particular person is necessary for performance, that person's death is an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract.8 Impracticability and frustration are the ordinary reasons an injured party cannot perform, and the elements taught earlier in this chapter decide whether a given event qualifies.
The fire fits § 263, which treats the destruction of a specific thing necessary for performance as an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract.9 Both buyers repudiated, and both sellers held a claim from the first day. The claims diverge only on what the record later shows about each seller's own performance, and that difference decides liability although nothing the buyers did differs.
Students most often err by treating the claim as complete the moment the repudiation occurs. The text of § 254(1) points the other way, because it looks to what appears after the breach.10 The later inability must also amount to a total failure. An event that leaves the injured party able to perform, even at greater cost or lower profit, does not discharge the repudiator's duty, since the earlier elements do the sorting and a rise in expense qualifies only if it is extreme and unreasonable. If B repudiates and A stays ready, willing, and able to perform through the date set for performance, no later event shows that A would have failed, and B's duty to pay damages stands.11
Subsection (1) tests the claimant's side of the contract. Subsection (2), taken up next, asks the mirror question about the repudiator's own duty.
Repudiator's Duty Would Have Been Discharged
Section 254(2) examines the repudiator's side of the contract. A repudiator's duty to pay damages for total breach is discharged if it appears after the breach that the duty it repudiated would have been discharged by impracticability or frustration before any breach by non-performance.13 Subsection (1) asked whether the injured party would have performed. This subsection asks whether the repudiator would have been released from the promise it disowned. The comment to § 261 assigns the effect of later events on a repudiation claim to the rules on discharge, which is the language § 254(2) uses.14
The rule follows from what damages for repudiation replace. They stand in for the performance the injured party would have received had the repudiator kept its promise. If the repudiator's duty would have been discharged before it came due, the injured party would never have received that performance, repudiation or not. A full award would then pay for an exchange that was never going to take place. For the same reason the date of the repudiation cannot freeze the parties' rights, and the better view takes into account everything known at trial, so that impracticability or frustration discharges an anticipatory breach.15
The rule has two limits. First, the repudiated duty must be one that impracticability or frustration would have discharged, so the later event has to satisfy the ordinary elements of this chapter: an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption, an extreme and unreasonable burden, no fault in the party claiming relief, and no assumption of the risk by that party.16 A hardship that would not have excused performance cannot excuse the repudiator after the fact, because the contract left the risk of that hardship with the repudiator. Discharge fills a gap for an event the parties never allocated, so a later event counts only if it would have opened such a gap.17 Second, the timing clause, before any breach by non-performance, preserves the claim for as long as the duty would have stayed in force. The injured party keeps its claim for the period before the event would have ended the duty and loses it only for the period after.
The standard illustrations use a personal-service contract in which the later event is the repudiator's death. The existence of a particular person is necessary to a personal-service duty, so that person's death is an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract, and the duty is discharged.18 In each illustration A promises to serve B for a year and then repudiates, and the date of death decides how much of B's claim survives:
- If A repudiated and then died before the time for performance arrived, B recovers nothing, because A's duty would have been discharged before any performance was due.19
- If A repudiated and died one month after performance was to begin, B recovers damages for that one month, the period in which A's duty would still have been in force.20
- If A performed for two weeks, then repudiated and died two weeks later, B recovers damages for the two weeks between the repudiation and the death.21
In all three, the death follows the repudiation and B's claim existed on the day of the repudiation. Each result equals the span during which A's duty would have remained in force. The same reasoning reaches the destruction of a specific thing necessary for performance and a prohibition imposed by law, which the Restatement likewise treats as events whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption.22 Death does nothing for a repudiator whose duty another person could have performed, because the existence of a particular person was then not necessary and § 262 does not apply.23
A repudiating party will often point to some later misfortune and argue that it could not have performed profitably. Misfortune alone does not meet the test, because § 254(2) credits only an event that would have discharged the duty under the ordinary rules.
That result applies two rules together: the text of § 254(2), which credits only an event that would have discharged the duty, and the fixed-price principle from the cost-increase discussion earlier in this chapter. The Code's seller excuse likewise requires a contingency whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract, and ordinary price movement is not one.24 The death and the cost surge share a sequence, since both arrive after the repudiation and both burden the repudiator. They differ in what the ordinary rules say about them: death discharges a personal-service duty, while a price movement leaves a fixed-price duty in force.
Subsections (1) and (2) of § 254 therefore ask mirror questions after the same repudiation. Subsection (1) asks whether the injured party would have totally failed to perform its return promise.25 Subsection (2) asks whether the repudiator would have been released from the promise it repudiated. A showing under either one discharges the duty to pay damages for total breach.