Concept
Frustration Existing at Formation
Frustration of purpose
Frustration Existing at Formation
Section 266(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts lets a party claim frustration even though the purpose was already dead when the contract was signed. Where, at the time of contracting, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without its fault by a fact of which it has no reason to know, and the non-existence of that fact is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, the party's remaining duties are discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.1 The four elements taught in the preceding sections (principal purpose, substantial frustration, basic assumption, and absence of fault) and the contrary-agreement qualifier all carry over. Two things change. The frustrating cause is a fact already in existence when the parties signed, not an event that happened afterward, and the claimant must show that it had no reason to know of that fact.
The Restatement sends existing-fact cases to § 266 and keeps them out of the supervening-event rule. Its commentary states that cases of existing, as opposed to supervening, impracticability are governed by § 266 rather than by the section the comment accompanies.2 The sorting matters because the supervening-event rule assumes the world changed after the parties signed, while a claimant under § 266(2) says the world was never what the contract assumed. The rationale for relief is the same in both situations. A contract built on an assumption the facts do not bear out has failed to provide for the case that actually arose, and a court must decide that omitted case. Ordinarily, the just way to decide it is to hold that the obligor's duty is discharged, in the case of changed circumstances, or has never arisen, in the case of existing circumstances, and to shift the risk to the obligee.3 The text of § 266(2) speaks of discharge, while the rationale describes the existing-fact claimant as someone whose duty never arose. Either way, the claimant is freed.
The date of the frustrating fact therefore comes first, because chronology is the usual line between mistake and frustration. Mistake arises from a serious factual error made at the time of contracting, so that the contract is premised on incorrect information. Impracticability and frustration arise when nothing false was assumed at signing but events after formation upset the parties' expectations.4 A sale of a beachfront cabin shows how much the date matters. If a tidal wave destroyed the cabin before the parties signed, both were mistaken about its existence. If the wave struck after the contract was made but before the seller delivered, nobody was in error at formation, and the question becomes whether the supervening event lets the seller escape liability for failing to deliver.5 The wave is the same in both versions, and the date of the signing decides which doctrine applies.
The line is not airtight, and § 266(2) sits on it. One account insists that impracticability and frustration should always concern supervening events, which leaves pre-formation facts to the law of mistake.6 Another acknowledges that these doctrines are usually thought of as involving changes in circumstance between making the contract and performing it, but adds that in some cases the circumstance already existed at contracting and was discovered only later.7 Section 266(2) addresses those cases, and for it the controlling date is when the frustrating fact came into existence, not when the claimant found out about it.
The coronation cases fall on both sides of the line. In Krell v. Henry, the agreement was made first, and the coronation was then cancelled because the King was stricken by perityphlitis. The defendant was discharged from the duty of payment even though payment remained possible.8 In another coronation case, an agreement to hire a room to view the procession was made one hour after the decision to operate on the King, and that case is described as really one of existing mistake.9 The second renter wanted the same thing as the first, a view of a procession that would never take place. The fact that defeated the purpose, however, already existed at formation. If that renter had no reason to know of the decision, the facts also fit § 266(2), because the purpose was substantially frustrated by an existing fact.
The requirement that the claimant have no reason to know of the fact is what separates this rule from supervening frustration. With a supervening event, neither party can see the future, and the dispute is over who carried the risk of what neither could see. With a fact already in existence, one party may hold the information that makes the contract pointless. A party who knew when it signed that the purpose was dead cannot say it contracted on the assumption that the fact did not exist. The rule treats a party with reason to know the same way. Its test is reason to know, which is a broader inquiry than what the claimant in fact knew.
A claimant who had no reason to know the fact still faces the closing clause of § 266(2). If the contract's language or the circumstances indicate the contrary, discharge is denied.10 The inquiry is the same one developed in the earlier discussion of express and implied risk allocation, and a party who agreed to bear the chance that the fact existed cannot invoke surprise.
Existing-fact frustration overlaps with mutual mistake, and an essay answer on such facts should discuss both. Mistake is grounds for avoiding the contract, while impracticability and frustration excuse performance and are commonly raised as a defense to a claim of breach.11 Some transactions fit more than one frame. In the Alcoa litigation, the court treated a pricing index that the parties wrongly assumed would track Alcoa's costs as a mistake. It discussed impracticability as an alternative, because the oil embargo and tougher environmental regulations were supervening events that overturned a basic assumption of the contract.12
Steps two and three do the work particular to this rule. A claimant who fails the knowledge step never reaches the later elements, and a claimant who passes it must still prove each of them.