Concept
Temporary Frustration
Frustration of purpose
Temporary Frustration
An obstacle that blocks performance may eventually go away, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 269 tells the law what to do when it does. Impracticability of performance or frustration of purpose that is only temporary suspends the obligor's duty to perform while the impracticability or frustration exists. It does not discharge the duty or prevent it from arising, unless performance after the obstacle ends would be materially more burdensome than it would have been had there been no impracticability or frustration.1 The rule works in two stages. While the obstacle lasts, the duty is suspended, so the obligor does not breach by waiting. When the obstacle ends, the law compares the burden of performing then with the burden of performing had the obstacle never occurred, and that comparison decides whether the duty revives or the suspension hardens into discharge. The standard definition of temporary frustration has the same shape: an occurrence that prevents performance suspends the duty for the length of the event, and if the burden or circumstance is substantially different afterward, the duty may be discharged.2
A temporary obstacle postpones the exchange without destroying it, and that is why the rule has two stages. Immediate discharge would strip the other party of a bargain that can still be carried out. No excuse at all would punish the obligor for a delay it could not avoid. Suspension excuses the interval of delay and holds both sides to the deal, and discharge is reserved for the case in which the delay has changed what performance would cost. The § 269 comparison looks at the burden after the obstacle ends because suspension already covers the burden during it. If the later burden is not materially greater, the obligor usually must perform in full and is entitled to an appropriate extension of time.3
The rule can also run the other way. A man under contract with a studio served in the army, and his non-performance during that service was excused. The delay had also made his performance substantially more burdensome, so he was relieved of all his obligations under the contract.4 What separates him from the stadium is the effect of the delay on the cost of performing, not the delay itself. The § 269 test asks whether performance after the obstacle would be materially more burdensome than it would have been with no obstacle. A long interruption that left that burden unchanged would only extend the time, and a short one that raised the burden materially could end the duty. Some authority goes further and treats discharge as automatic when the impracticability actually extends beyond the contract period.5
The obstacle also affects the party waiting for performance. Suppose A falls ill on November 23, and it is unclear how long the illness will last. A's illness is a defense to any claim for breach that B, the other party, might bring for the period of the illness, and B undoubtedly may suspend its own performance during that time. In the standard illustration, however, B did more than suspend: it cancelled the contract. The question became whether cancellation was justified, and it was, because A's prospective inability to perform was serious. The answer would probably change if it had been clear on November 23 that the illness would last only two or three days.6
The illustration yields a general rule. A temporary obstacle on one side lets the other party suspend its own performance, and a serious prospective inability to perform may justify that party in cancelling the contract altogether. The judgment turns on what was known when the party acted, which is why an illness of uncertain length differs from one known to last two or three days. The examples arise under impracticability, but the same rules apply to temporary frustration, so a party whose purpose is interrupted rather than destroyed follows the same two stages.7
The coronation cases present the frustration version of the problem. The licensor of the apartment charged a very high rate for an extraordinary use, and that use became worthless. Yet the King would recover and be crowned on some other day, and the apartment would again command a high rate.8 Those facts make the obstacle look temporary and raise the § 269 question: would the licensee's performance after the postponement be materially more burdensome than it would have been had there been no postponement? The answer is debatable, and an exam answer should work through the comparison instead of assuming a result.
Each of these rules gives way to a contrary allocation of risk. A party that has assumed the risk of the delay, by agreement or otherwise, cannot invoke suspension or discharge.9
Step four decides most cases. It fixes both the moment of comparison, after the obstacle ends, and the baseline for it, a world with no obstacle. The burden during the obstacle does not enter that comparison, and delay matters only through its effect on the later burden.