Concept
Leases and Government Action
Frustration of purpose
Leases and Government Action
Section 265 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts supplies the test for every frustration claim, and it does not change here. Where a party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrated, without that party’s fault, by an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract, the party’s remaining duties are discharged unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.1 Two settings press that test hardest: a lease that confines the tenant to a single use, and a contract disrupted by a government order issued after signing.
Each setting gives the claimant a head start on one or two elements. A use clause writes the tenant’s purpose into the lease, so the landlord cannot claim surprise at what the premises were for. A government order comes from outside the contract, so the claimant seldom bears fault for it, and the order can make a use unlawful and not merely unprofitable. The remaining elements then decide most cases: courts ask whether a serviceable use survived, and whether the contract left the risk of the change with the claimant. The lease comes first, where a majority rule gives the analysis a firm start; government action in contracts generally follows.
Leases and Prohibited Uses
Most jurisdictions end a tenant’s duty to pay rent when the lease restricts the premises to one use and a later law prohibits that use, and the landlord may then recover possession.2 The elements of § 265 line up with the facts. The use clause records the tenant’s principal purpose. A statute enacted after signing comes from outside both parties, so the tenant is not at fault. And the rent now buys premises that the tenant may not lawfully use for the only purpose the lease allows.
Take a lease that stipulates that only liquor may be sold on the premises, followed by a change in the law that makes liquor sales illegal. The tenant’s purpose is completely frustrated, and many courts will allow the tenant to terminate the lease.3 Those courts are avoiding the harsh result of the traditional common-law rule, under which the tenant would have kept paying rent.4
The theory behind that result is frustration, not rescission. The landlord has breached no duty, so there is nothing to rescind for. Instead, an object of the agreement that was fundamental to the tenant, if not to both parties, has been frustrated, and the law excuses the tenant’s whole performance. The landlord’s performance is excused as well, because the landlord suffers a total failure of consideration.5 The theory comes from the law of contracts, one more example of contract law’s growing influence on landlord-tenant relations.6
A minority of courts refuse the discharge. They reason that a lease conveys an estate to the tenant and that an estate carries all risks with it, so the tenant bears the risk of a later ban on its use.7 Imbeschied v. Lerner held a tenant “liable upon his covenant to pay rent, notwithstanding the adoption and ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment during the term of the lease,” and a 1910 decision reasoned that a tenant who wanted protection against a change in the law had to stipulate for it, so that the omission was the tenant’s own fault.8 In some jurisdictions even complete or almost complete frustration leaves the duty to pay rent intact.9 Modern decisions nonetheless recognize that the defense may be available in a proper case, even in a lease.10
Even the majority rule is narrow. The frustration must be almost complete, so the use that the law prohibits must be the main use to which the tenant is restricted.11 When the lease allows several uses and the prohibition reaches only one, the lease continues unabated.12 When the prohibition reaches the main use, most courts excuse the tenant even though minor uses remain lawful.13 The general statements of the rule make the same demand, and they make it more clearly for leases than for ordinary contracts: frustration depends on the total or nearly total destruction of the purpose for which both parties entered the transaction.14 The Restatement (Second) of Property is stricter yet on rescission. The tenant must suffer extreme hardship from an unforeseeable supervening action, and even then may rescind only if the landlord knew of the intended use when the lease was executed.15
A law that merely makes the tenant’s business less profitable discharges nothing.16 A Restatement illustration makes the point with a gasoline station. A leases the station to B, and a change in traffic regulations so reduces B’s business that B can operate only at a substantial loss. B stops paying rent. B remains liable, because B can still operate the station, so B’s principal purpose of operating a gasoline station is not substantially frustrated. The result would be the same if the loss came instead from a government regulation rationing gasoline or from termination of the franchise under which B obtained gasoline.17
Mel Frank Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Di-Chem Co. states the lease rule in both directions. A later ordinance that bars the tenant from legally using the premises for the intended purpose substantially frustrates that purpose and ends the duty to pay rent. But the tenant stays liable when a serviceable use consistent with the lease’s use provision remains, and a use that has become less valuable, less profitable, or even unprofitable has not been substantially frustrated.18 Di-Chem leased a building to store and distribute chemicals, and the city told it that it could not legally store all of its inventory there without extensive alterations. Di-Chem bore the burden of proving frustration and offered no evidence that all of its inventory was hazardous, so storing and distributing nonhazardous chemicals remained a use the lease permitted.19
The tenant in Lloyd v. Murphy ran a car dealership in leased quarters, and federal wartime orders sharply restricted sales of new cars. He withheld rent, his landlords sued to enforce the lease, and the court analyzed his defense as one of frustration.20 A dealer whose sales a regulation curtails has lost profit, and a tenant whose business is made less profitable by a law, rule, regulation, or order is not relieved of the lease.21
Frustration requires a change after signing, and a defect that exists on the first day belongs to a different doctrine. When land and improvements are leased for a particular purpose and a structural defect or other violation of law bars every use the lease authorizes, the tenant may rescind or avoid the lease, which is treated as illegal and unenforceable by either party.22 Frustration covers the other case, in which the intended use was legal and plausible at the start and became unlawful or impossible only because the law later changed.23 A tenant who pleads illegality may seek to avoid rent altogether or to withhold it until the landlord makes the premises habitable, and the tenant’s risk is that the landlord boards up the premises and takes them off the market, especially if repair would cost more than any rent the premises could bring.24 In residential tenancies, some courts add an implied warranty that the landlord will deliver and maintain premises that are safe, clean, and fit for human habitation, a warranty that reaches latent and patent defects in the essential facilities.25
Government Action Beyond Leases
The elements of § 265 stay the same when the supervening event is an order of government, but the claim receives a warmer reception. Courts have been much more willing to grant relief when the event is governmental regulation than when it is war, natural disaster, or a change in the market.27 The impracticability rules share that attitude, since Restatement § 264 and UCC § 2-615 treat good-faith compliance with a governmental regulation or order as a basis for excuse.28
Two decisions show that receptiveness at work on the performing side of a contract. In Harriscom Svenska, AB v. Harris Corp., government regulations on transfers of military equipment to Iran led to a compromise with the United States that required the seller of radio equipment to stop selling to its distributor, and the seller was excused for impracticability. The court did not insist that the law indisputably prohibit the sales, so long as the seller acted in good-faith compliance with the government’s clear determination to prohibit them.29 In M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. New Jersey DOT, revised OSHA regulations for refurbishing bridges painted with lead-based paint would have produced a substantial, unanticipated increase in the cost of performance, and the contract was excused for impracticability.30 In both cases the regulation burdened the party who had to supply goods or work. The same kind of event supports frustration when it strikes the party whose only task is to pay, and the Massachusetts highway case shows how.
In Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., Paonessa, a highway contractor, contracted to buy precast concrete median barriers from Chase for state highway projects. Residents protested the barriers and sued to stop the work, and the highway department settled with them on the term that no additional concrete median barriers would be installed. The department then deleted the barrier item from its contracts with Paonessa.31 Chase had already produced about half the barriers and delivered most of them to the construction sites. Paonessa had paid for all that Chase produced, at the contract price, and Chase suffered no out-of-pocket expense from the cancellation of the rest.32 The trial judge ruled for Paonessa, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, agreeing with the Appeals Court that frustration of purpose described the basis of the decision more accurately than impossibility.33
The label matters because nothing had become impossible. As the Appeals Court observed, “[p]erformance was not literally impossible. Nothing prevented Paonessa from honoring its contract to purchase the remaining sections of median barrier, whether or not the [department] would approve their use in the road construction.”34 The deletion left the promise performable and took away its reason.
The deletion came from a public agency, after the contract was made and under pressure from citizens, so the dispute narrowed to the closing clause of § 265: did the contracts leave the risk of the deletion with Paonessa? Paonessa’s contracts with the department contained a standard provision allowing the department to eliminate items or portions of work found unnecessary, and Chase’s purchase orders contained no similar provision. The court said that this difference did not mandate the conclusion that Paonessa assumed the risk of a reduction in quantity. Chase knew that the barriers were for department projects and was aware of the department’s power to decrease quantities of contract items.35 One standard formulation asks whether the contingency was one the parties could reasonably be thought to have foreseen as a real possibility, and one of those risks they tacitly assigned to the promisor by failing to provide for it explicitly; if so, performance is required, and if not, it is excused.36 A government order thus supplies the event, and the allocation evidence supplies the result. Paonessa was excused because the surrounding circumstances failed to show that it had accepted the risk.
The receptiveness has limits, and they are the ordinary limits of § 265. Courts impose stringent requirements on frustration claims based on governmental action, as on any others. The first is substantial frustration: the rule addresses a change that makes one party’s performance virtually worthless to the other, and it is not enough that the transaction has become less profitable for the affected party or even that he will sustain a loss.37 In Wheelabrator Environmental Systems v. Galante, a court decision invalidating mandatory municipal waste-disposal ordinances made a waste-to-energy resource-recovery contract less profitable, and relief was denied because the contract’s principal purpose was not utterly defeated.38 The second limit is foreseeability. In City of Starkville v. 4-County Electric Power Ass’n, a possible change in eminent-domain law that would make the contract less profitable was foreseeable when the contract was made, the party seeking excuse had not guarded against it, and the excuse failed.39
The two cases fail at different elements, and the difference tells you where to look. In Wheelabrator the loss was a loss of margin that left the contract’s purpose standing, like the gas station whose traffic rules changed while its pumps kept running. In Starkville the change could be imagined and the contract left it unaddressed, which suggests that the claimant took the chance. Starkville and Chase Precast both involve a foreseeable government change, yet the contracts’ silence cut in opposite directions. In Chase the court refused to read silence as Paonessa’s acceptance of the risk, because the supplier resisting excuse also knew of the department’s power to cut quantities. In Starkville the party seeking excuse was the one who could foresee the change and left the contract silent.
A rezoning that follows a contract to buy land engages every one of those steps.
The early elements favor Bob. The rezoning followed the contract, came from the zoning authority, and Bob opposed it, so nothing suggests that he caused it. Principal purpose also leans his way: Sally knew of the shopping-center plan because Bob told her, and the six-month closing period existed so that Bob could assemble the tenants and financing the project required, which shows that both sides built the contract around it.
Substantial frustration is where the problem becomes hard. Bob’s best argument is magnitude: the tract lost four-fifths of its value, and a developer who bought commercial land now holds land suited only to a use that he has no interest in. Sally answers that the land retains a serviceable use, so the rezoning reduced its value without destroying it. The strict formulations favor her. The Restatement comment asks whether the performance has become virtually worthless, Wheelabrator asks whether the principal purpose has been utterly defeated, and land that keeps a fifth of its value is far from worthless. The lease cases point the same way: the tenant confined to one use loses everything when it is banned, while Bob is confined to no use and buys land that keeps an ordinary one.
Basic assumption and risk allocation can decide the case even if Bob clears substantiality. That the tract would stay zoned for commercial use was plausibly a premise of the deal, since both parties understood the project and the price. The contract is silent, however, and Sally will argue, as the Starkville court reasoned, that a buyer who could have bargained for a zoning condition and did not has accepted the risk. Bob will answer that the opposition arose only after signing, so the rezoning was no real possibility when he contracted, and that Sally knew the premise on which her price rested. If Bob is excused, Sally keeps a tract worth about $200,000 and returns his deposit. If he is held, he must take the tract at $1 million or answer in damages, and a court weighing the equities could reasonably place that loss on the developer, who had the expertise and the time to protect himself. On these facts Sally has the better argument.
Drafting would have removed the doubt. A closing condition requiring commercial zoning on the closing date, with the deposit refundable if the condition failed, would have settled the deposit by the contract’s terms. A clause making the buyer assume the risk of rezoning would have defeated the defense under the closing clause of § 265, because language indicating the contrary controls.43 Timing matters too. Had the rezoning been adopted and publicly reported before signing, Bob would likely have had reason to know of it, and § 266(2) would give him no discharge.44 And a successful court challenge to the rezoning would make the obstacle temporary and move the claim into the suspension analysis of § 269.45