Concept
Substituted Performance
Substituted contract and substituted performance
Substituted Performance
A creditor owed $7,000 may take fifty tons of hay instead, and the law must then say whether the debt survives. The answer turns on what the creditor accepted. In a substituted contract, the obligee accepts a new agreement in satisfaction of the existing duty. The old duty is discharged at once, and a breach of the new agreement does not revive it.1 In substituted performance, the obligee accepts an actual performance rather than a promise of one.
That change in the object of acceptance removes one problem and leaves two. Because the obligee holds the performance itself, there is no new promise to break, so the question of what follows a default on the substitute never arises. What remains is whether the obligee accepted what was tendered, and whether the obligee took it in satisfaction of the duty or kept it while the claim continued. The second question concerns the obligee's purpose, and the words “in satisfaction” carry it.
The tendering party divides the material. The obligor may offer the different performance itself, or a third person may offer it. The Restatement treats both in a single section,2 and the two subsections below follow that division.
Accepting a Different Performance
Section 278(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reduces the doctrine to one sentence: if an obligee accepts in satisfaction of the obligor's duty a performance offered by the obligor that differs from what is due, the duty is discharged.3 The obligee receives an actual performance, and the old duty ends when the obligee accepts it.
The third step does the real work, because the first two describe what the obligor did and the third describes what the obligee meant. Receipt is a physical fact: the goods arrive, and the obligee holds them. Acceptance in satisfaction is a statement about the purpose for which the obligee took them, and the rule discharges the duty only when that purpose is present. No new promise by either side is needed.
Does a debtor who delivers fifty tons of hay on a $7,000 debt escape the debt? That depends on what the creditor did with the hay. Where A owes B $7,000, A offers the hay in place of the money, and B takes it in satisfaction, the duty to pay $7,000 is discharged.
The two scenes share the first two requirements and part only on the obligee's acceptance. That difference also marks the line with the previous section. A promise accepted in satisfaction is a substituted contract, and a performance accepted in satisfaction is substituted performance.4
What the obligee holds afterward explains why acceptance alone can discharge the duty. A substituted contract leaves the obligee holding a promise that may be broken, so the law must say what a breach does: it does not give the obligee a right to enforce the original duty.5 A substituted performance leaves the obligee holding the performance itself. Nothing remains to be performed or breached, so the old duty has nothing left to protect.
The same idea sits inside the familiar phrase accord and satisfaction. An accord is an agreement to substitute some alternative form of discharging a debt, and the satisfaction is the actual discharge of the debt through the substituted performance.6 The satisfaction half of the phrase is substituted performance under another name. If A has first agreed with B that hay will replace the money, delivery of the hay is the satisfaction, and it discharges both the duty to pay $7,000 and the duty to deliver the hay.7 Until the satisfaction occurs, however, the original obligation is not discharged,8 and a later section takes up what an unperformed accord does to the original duty.
Performance by a Third Person
Section 278(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts carries substituted performance to a payor who is a stranger to the contract. If an obligee accepts in satisfaction of the obligor's duty a performance offered by a third person, the duty is discharged, but an obligor who has not previously assented to the performance for the obligor's benefit may, within a reasonable time after learning of it, render the discharge inoperative from the beginning by disclaimer.10 A disclaimer is the obligor's refusal to take the benefit of the third person's performance. The two subsections divide substituted performance by who does the tendering: the obligor in the first, a stranger in the second.11
The base rule follows § 278(1). An obligee who takes a performance in satisfaction has accepted it as the discharge of the duty, so the duty ends at the moment of acceptance, whoever delivered the performance. The obligor's consent is not a condition of that discharge. The obligor may never have heard of the offer, and the discharge still follows the obligee's acceptance. The burden of undoing the result then falls on the obligor, through disclaimer. As under § 278(1), the obligee's purpose controls, so a stranger's payment that the obligee keeps toward some other debt does not discharge this one.
The disclaimer gives the obligor a choice that the obligor never made, since someone else selected the third person. The power therefore carries a condition: the obligor must not have previously assented to the performance for the obligor's benefit. An obligor who asked a friend to cover the debt, or who agreed beforehand that the friend would pay on the obligor's behalf, has already made the choice. No disclaimer is then available, and the discharge becomes final once the obligee accepts in satisfaction. An obligor who learns of the payment only afterward had no chance to choose, and the disclaimer supplies one.
Two further features fix the result. The disclaimer must come within a reasonable time after the obligor learns of the performance, which bounds how long the obligee's reliance on the discharge stays at risk. A timely disclaimer then renders the discharge inoperative from the beginning, so the duty is treated as though the acceptance had never discharged it, and the obligee's original claim against the obligor stands.12
An exam fact pattern in which a stranger pays the debt calls for two questions in order. First, did the obligee take the performance in satisfaction of the obligor's duty? Without that acceptance nothing is discharged. Second, did the obligor assent in advance, or fail to disclaim within a reasonable time after learning of the performance? Either answer leaves the discharge in place. A student who treats the obligor's consent as the trigger for discharge has the default backward, because the rule discharges the duty first and gives the obligor an after-the-fact veto.