Concept
Telling Them Apart
Substituted contract and substituted performance
Telling Them Apart
A creditor who agrees to take something other than the promised performance may have made a substituted contract, accepted a substituted performance, or entered an accord, and on the face of the agreement the three look nearly identical. In each, the obligee takes or agrees to take goods, services, or a smaller sum in place of what the contract required, and in each the obligee says something that sounds like “that settles it.” The difference appears only when the obligor stops performing.
On a default, a substituted contract leaves the obligee with a suit on the new promise and nothing more, because it discharged the original duty when it was made.1 An accord leaves the original duty suspended; if the obligor then commits a breach that discharges the obligee's duty to accept the performance, the obligee may enforce either the original duty or any duty under the accord.2 A substituted performance leaves nothing to enforce, because the duty was discharged when the obligee accepted the different performance.3
Classification therefore decides which claims survive a default, and a wrong label either gives the obligee a claim it does not have or takes away one it does. Two questions make the classification: what the obligee accepted, and when the parties meant the old duty to end. The first subsection works through those questions; the second applies them to compromises of disputed claims and to workouts among several creditors.
Sorting by Intent
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts supplies three categories, each defined by what the obligee accepts in satisfaction of the obligor's existing duty. A substituted contract is a contract that the obligee itself accepts in satisfaction.4 A substituted performance occurs when the obligee accepts in satisfaction a performance that differs from what is due, and the duty is then discharged.5 An accord is a contract in which the obligee promises to accept a stated performance in satisfaction of the existing duty, and performance of the accord discharges the original duty.6 The object of acceptance differs in each: the new contract, a performance already rendered, or a promise to take a performance later.
The first question can end the analysis. If the obligee was handed a real performance and took it in satisfaction, the obligee holds what it accepted, no promise remains outstanding, and the duty is discharged on acceptance. If the obligee took a promise, two classifications remain, and they differ only in timing: a substituted contract discharges the old duty when the new promise is made, while an accord discharges it when the promised performance arrives. Only the second question, about the moment of discharge, tells those two apart.
The terms of the agreement and the surrounding circumstances answer the question in step three. If the obligee agrees to accept the substituted performance but does not agree to an immediate discharge, the agreement is only an accord; if the parties clearly manifested an intention that discharge be immediate, it is a substituted contract.7 The circumstances matter most when the terms are silent. A debtor who is having difficulty performing, or is already in breach, usually faces a creditor who accepts an alternative performance in an effort to salvage whatever it can, and an accord is the most likely reading of that arrangement. Ultimately one looks to the entire circumstances and asks whether the parties intended an immediate discharge.8
When the circumstances leave the question open, a presumption fills the gap. Contract law presumes that a settlement agreement in which the debtor promises to pay part of what is owed is an executory accord and not a substituted contract, because a rational creditor would not accept a mere promise to pay only part of a debt in place of a promise to pay the full amount.9 An agreement to take less is therefore presumed to be an accord, and the creditor keeps the original duty until the smaller performance arrives.10 The presumption yields to a clear manifestation that the parties meant an immediate discharge.11
The print shop's duty to pay is suspended while the thirty days run, so the mill cannot sue for the money in the meantime.12 If the print shop commits a breach that discharges the mill's duty to accept the machine, the mill may enforce either the $12,000 duty or the promise to deliver the machine.13
That result follows because breach of a substituted contract does not give the obligee a right to enforce the original duty.14
A third version needs no promise at all. If the print shop trucks the machine to the mill's dock and the mill signs for it as full payment, the mill has accepted a different performance in satisfaction. The $12,000 duty is discharged on acceptance, and nothing remains on which the print shop could default.15 Across the three versions the debt and the parties stay the same; only what the mill accepted and when it meant to let go of the debt change.
A fact pattern that says only that a creditor agreed to take goods or a smaller sum will rarely announce its category, and the word “substitute” in the facts does not make the agreement a substituted contract. For a settlement for less, begin with the accord. Move to substituted contract only when the facts show an intention of immediate discharge, such as a term releasing the debt on signing. Without such facts the presumption controls, and the obligee keeps the original duty as a fallback.
Courts sometimes use novation as a synonym for substituted contract, but most academic writers and both Restatements reserve the word for a substituted contract in which at least one obligor or obligee was not a party to the original contract.16 A substituted contract proper is made between the parties to the earlier contract. Novation, as traditionally defined, requires a third person to take the original obligor's place, and the original agreement is discharged immediately when the obligee accepts that third person.17
Settlements and Workouts
Settlements and workouts put the sorting method under its heaviest load, because the creditor in each has agreed to take less than the full claim and the two labels then lead to opposite results on default. If the agreement is only an accord, the original duty is suspended until the accord is performed, and a breach that discharges the creditor's duty to accept the performance lets the creditor enforce either the original duty or any duty under the accord.19 If it is a substituted contract, the original duty was discharged when the agreement was made, and the debtor's breach gives the creditor no right to enforce it.20 Two settings generate most of the disputes: the compromise of a disputed claim between two parties, and the out-of-court workout between a debtor and several creditors.
A compromise of a disputed claim is frequently found to operate only as an accord, which is satisfied, and all obligations discharged, when the agreed sum is paid.21 If no payment is made, the creditor may sue on the accord for the compromise sum or bring an action for the full amount the creditor claims was due.22 The making of the accord does not itself discharge the original obligation; under the better rule it suspends that obligation until the obligor has had time to perform, so the creditor cannot sue on the original claim before that time has run.23
Suppose a freelance designer bills a client $5,000, the client disputes the bill, and they settle for $3,000, payable within thirty days, without saying when the original bill is released. The settlement is presumptively an accord. If the client pays within thirty days, the bill is discharged. If the client refuses to pay, the designer may sue for the $3,000 or for the $5,000 originally claimed.
Frequently does not mean always, because intent still controls. If the settlement agreement releases the claim at once in return for the debtor's promise to pay, the parties have clearly manifested an immediate discharge and have made a substituted contract.24 The creditor who then goes unpaid may sue only on the promise to pay the compromise sum, because the larger claim was discharged when the settlement was made.25
A workout raises the same question with more creditors at the table. The consideration in a workout agreement is the creditors' mutual promises to one another to accept less than full payment and to forbear from further collection efforts against the debtor, which is why a workout needs at least two creditors.26 That consideration explains why the agreement binds the creditors who join it. It leaves open what they hold if the debtor performs only part of the agreement, and the sorting method answers that: the question is again whether the parties meant the workout to replace the original claims at once or to discharge them only on performance.
The circumstances usually point toward an accord when the debtor is in financial difficulty and the creditors accept less in an effort to salvage what they can.27 Agreeing to take less does not by itself make a workout a substituted contract, and a reader who reasons that way skips the intent inquiry on which the classification depends.
Under the suppliers' draft, the agreement is an accord, and once the default discharges each supplier's duty to accept the installments in satisfaction, each supplier may enforce its original claim or the installment promises.28 Under the manufacturer's draft, the agreement is a substituted contract, the original claims were discharged on signing, and each supplier is confined to the unpaid installments.29 Drafting therefore serves each side differently: the creditors' lawyer writes the term that keeps the original claims alive until full performance, the debtor's lawyer writes the release that removes them, and the parties' manifested intention controls the classification either way.30
Assenting creditors also need protection against holdouts. They must include an express condition in the workout agreement requiring a set percentage of the creditors to accept, because courts will not imply such a condition and will discharge the claims of the agreeing creditors even if other creditors refuse to assent.31