Concept
Buyer's Market-Price Damages
Expectation interest (including direct, incidental, and consequential damages)
Buyer's Market-Price Damages
Section 2-713(1) lets a buyer recover without buying a substitute. When the seller fails to deliver or repudiates, the buyer recovers the difference between the market price when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price, plus incidental and consequential damages under § 2-715, less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.1 The formula is the expectation formula in sales vocabulary: the market-contract differential supplies the loss in value, and the incidental, consequential, and saved-expense terms work as they did in the general formula. It serves a buyer who has not accepted the goods or has justifiably revoked acceptance; § 2-711 indexes those remedies, and § 2-714 governs the buyer who has finally accepted.2
A seller who agrees to deliver goods for $10,000 and then refuses illustrates the pieces. If goods of that kind sell for $12,000 when the buyer learns of the refusal, the differential is $2,000. The buyer adds proven incidental and consequential damages and subtracts expenses the breach saved. A buyer who prepaid part of the price recovers that part as well.3 The arithmetic is the same for a seller who reneges on a promise to sell shares of stock for $10,000: the buyer recovers the difference between the contract price and the shares' market price.4 When the market price does not exceed the contract price, the differential is zero, and the goods themselves earn the buyer nothing.
The differential prices the deal itself, not every loss the breach causes. In one dispute, the plaintiff's four-day factory shut-down bore on consequential damages, while lost profit turned on what the plaintiff could have earned on the deal as a whole.5
Why a buyer who did not cover can recover
A buyer need not show a failed attempt to cover before turning to § 2-713.6 A buyer who entered no substitute transaction may sue for loss measured by a hypothetical substitute valued at the market rate, which the buyer establishes through testimony, typically from an expert witness.7 Each route carries its own cost. Cover and resale require the victim to spend money that goes uncompensated unless the spending qualifies as incidental damages. Market price requires proof costs but no cover or resale costs, and those proof costs can exceed what cover or resale would have cost.8
Market price works as a convention. Courts often compute damages from the market value of the promised goods because it gives an acceptable structure for an award, even though it may only imperfectly reflect full compensation.9 Contract remedies offer the same choice of routes elsewhere: the cost of completing performance is an alternative to the value of full performance minus the value of what was received, and each, with incidental and ensuing losses, aims to leave the plaintiff where performance would have.10 In sales terms, cover is the cost route and the market differential is the value route.
A buyer who makes the substitute goods itself sits between the routes. One court let a buyer, unable to find another supplier of steel tubing, recover the difference between its in-house manufacturing cost and the contract price, treating the manufacture as cover; other courts disagree.11 Where a court refuses to call in-house manufacture cover, the market formula remains available, because the buyer never had to cover to claim it.
The date for measuring market price
At common law the market price was measured on the date performance was due. Section 2-713 substitutes the date the buyer learned of the breach.12 The change matters when the seller was to ship the goods. The buyer may not learn of the breach until the goods fail to arrive, or until defective goods arrive late, and sellers often breach in rising markets, so the price on the two dates can differ greatly.13
When the seller does not repudiate in advance, the day the buyer learns of the breach and the last day for performance coincide, and no timing problem arises.14 Anticipatory repudiation is harder, because scattered Code language has raised doubts about how to treat it.15 Three dates compete: the day the buyer learns of the repudiation, a commercially reasonable time later, and the day performance was due.
In Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft, the Fifth Circuit applied Texas's version of Article 2 and affirmed a measure of buyer's damages taken a commercially reasonable time after the seller's repudiation, though it remanded to modify damages on another point.16 The hypothetical shows what rides on the choice.
The place for measuring market price
Market price is determined as of the place for tender or, when the buyer rejects after arrival or revokes acceptance, as of the place of arrival.17 The official comment's baseline assumption explains the first branch. The buyer is assumed to search for a replacement at the shipping point, where freight on a replacement would roughly equal freight on the original contract, so measured against such a replacement the breach saves no expenses.18
A Chicago seller ships $20,000 of nonconforming goods F.O.B. its plant to a San Diego buyer, who rejects them on arrival. The goods are worth $25,000 in California when the buyer learns of the breach, and shipping would have cost the buyer $4,000. Damages are the $5,000 differential less the $4,000 the breach saved, or $1,000, which is the same figure covering in San Diego that day would have produced.19 The freight is subtracted because the buyer would have paid it to bring the goods to San Diego under the contract.
Proving the market price
Comment 2 to § 2-713 points first to the general market price for goods of the same kind. Commodity and securities markets fit that description, and widely sold goods such as new and used cars usually have a general market too.20 For goods without one, § 2-723 allows reasonable leeway in time, in place, and in kinds of substitutes, and Comment 3 approves evidence of spot sale prices where no market is available.21 In Egerer v. CSR West, LLC, a buyer of fill material proved market price with the price of similar fill sold after the breach.22
Section 2-723(2) lets market price be measured before or after the time of tender, or the time the buyer learned of the breach, when evidence of the prevailing price at those dates is difficult to obtain. It also allows another measure of market price when trade usage countenances it. If trade usage lets Charlottesville widget prices measure New York widget prices, Charlottesville prices can prove the New York market.23 The leeway answers a difficulty of proof or a usage of the trade, not a preference for a more convenient date or city.
When the formula and the buyer's actual loss diverge
Because market price stands in for the buyer's loss, the award may not match what the buyer actually lost. In Tongish v. Thomas, a Kansas court called the market-damages remedy of § 2-713 the majority rule and the preferred measure. It conceded that the rule may not reflect the buyer's actual loss, but reasoned that it encourages a more efficient market and discourages breach of contracts.24 On an exam, apply the formula as written.
How the measure fits the rest of Article 2
Article 2 builds the seller's remedies on the same pattern. The Code balances remedies even-handedly, so sellers generally reach the same categories of damages, with incidental damages added and expenses saved subtracted.25 Like the common law, Article 2 treats specific enforcement as a limited and secondary remedy, available only when damages are inappropriate; § 2-709 lets the seller claim the price only for goods the buyer accepted or goods that cannot be resold because they are lost, damaged, or otherwise unresalable.26 Later sections take up the buyer's remedies for accepted goods and then the seller's side in full.
Running the formula
An error in the second or third step makes the evidence gathered in the fourth irrelevant, even when the arithmetic in the fifth is perfect.