Concept
Causation as a Threshold
Causation and foreseeability
Foreseeability Limits on Damages
Causation as a Threshold
Every item of expectation damages must first pass a causal test. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 awards the injured party's loss in the value of the promised performance, plus "any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach," less any cost or other loss the injured party avoided by not having to perform.1 The words "caused by the breach" make causation the first filter, and it works item by item. The plaintiff must tie each claimed loss to the breach, and a loss that would have happened anyway, or that comes from some other source, drops out of the award. Analysis therefore runs in a fixed order: ask whether the breach produced the loss, then ask whether the breaching party should have foreseen it. The two questions blur easily, but they do different work.
Causation comes first because of what expectation damages compensate. They compensate for the loss of reasonable expectations, so a loss that performance would not have prevented was never taken away by the breach, and awarding it would hand the plaintiff a windfall. Causation asks a factual question: did this breach produce this loss? Foreseeability asks an evaluative one: should the breaching party answer for a loss that the breach did produce? The limits on damages are, for the most part, not external checks. Each expresses a principle inherent in the goal of compensating for the loss of reasonable expectations.2
Causation in fact seldom troubles a claim for general damages, because withholding the promised performance is itself the loss. It demands real proof once the plaintiff reaches for consequential damages, since the breach must be directly related to those losses and be their cause.3
The proof has two parts. A buyer in a sale of goods must show a causal link between the seller's breach and each item of claimed damages, and must show that the breach was a cause in fact of the loss.4 The seller may answer with proof that an intervening concurrent cause produced the loss in whole or in part. When the buyer's own negligence is the proximate cause of the damage, the buyer may recover no consequential damages, although comparative fault rules sometimes apportion the loss instead, particularly where there is personal injury or property damage.5
A tree-trimming business shows the filter at work inside a single claim. The business buys an aerial lift, and the lift malfunctions. The seller repairs it in July, and the buyer, instead of resuming work, sells the lift and claims lost profits for the whole year. The profits lost between the malfunction and the repair trace to the breach. The profits lost after the repair trace to the buyer's own decision to sell, so the breach did not cause them.6 Those later profits fail before foreseeability is ever reached.
A long chain of consequences can still satisfy causation. If an actor withdraws from a movie, the entire film might be cancelled, and the loss of profit on the film, not just the loss on the actor's contract, would ensue from the breach. Likewise, a tort that cut off electricity to a factory might reduce annual production, so that the lost profits of the venture, not just the value of the electricity, are needed to make the plaintiff whole. As losses sit further from the wrong, however, courts grow more skeptical that the defendant actually caused them. Causation, certainty, foreseeability, and avoidable consequences then intervene to limit the claim to the loss fairly attributable to the defendant.7 Satisfying causation therefore does not end the inquiry. The cancelled film may trace to the breach and still raise the separate question whether the breaching party had reason to foresee it.
Defendants sometimes argue that the plaintiff would have suffered the loss whatever they did. Casebooks set Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, where the seller of a vaccine argued that no effective vaccine had been available to the buyer anyway, beside Chatlos Systems v. National Cash Register Corp., where a seller's similar claim that no other computer system in that price range could have delivered the promised performance did not prevail. Treat both as contested illustrations of causation raised as a defense, not as settled law. The casebook's Campbell problem presses the same inquiry into what the breach actually cost, in the specific-performance setting: if Campbell was still receiving the very carrots it contracted for, only at an inflated price, why would a monetary award equal to the excess not suffice?8
A loss that survives the causation filter has cleared only the first hurdle. In Hadley v. Baxendale, the court acknowledged that the carrier's delay did in fact directly result in the mill's lost profits, yet it refused to award them. The carrier had not been told that the broken shaft was the mill's only one and had no way of knowing that a delay would leave the mill idle.9 Causation was satisfied, and foreseeability was not. Section 351(1) of the Restatement states that second filter: damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made.10 The rest of this chapter takes that limit apart.