Concept
The Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale
Causation and foreseeability
The Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale
Not every loss a breach causes is a loss the breaching party must pay for, and Hadley v. Baxendale drew the line. The Court of Exchequer ordered a new trial and, because juries left without guidance may reach great injustice, stated the rule the next jury was to follow, calling a definite rule “of the last importance.”1 Recoverable damages are those that may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, according to the usual course of things, from the breach itself, or reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach.2
The dispute arose from a broken mill shaft. The millers sent it by carrier, the carrier breached its duty, and the millers sought the profits lost from the closing of the mill.3 The question was whether the carrier answered for that loss, and the court’s rule has two limbs that answer it:
- Loss arising naturally from the breach, according to the usual course of things, is recoverable without special notice. A party who breaks a contract can be supposed to have contemplated at least the injury that arises generally in the great multitude of cases not affected by special circumstances.4
- Loss that the parties may reasonably be supposed to have contemplated at the time of contracting, as the probable result of breach, is recoverable too. Whether a special loss was contemplated turns on whether the special circumstances behind it were communicated to or known by the party who broke the contract.5
Communication therefore decides the outcome for special losses. If the plaintiffs told the defendants of the special circumstances when the contract was made, so that both sides knew them, the damages the parties would reasonably contemplate are the injury that would ordinarily follow a breach under those circumstances. If those circumstances were wholly unknown to the breaching party, it is supposed to have contemplated only the injury arising generally in the great multitude of cases, and the special loss flows neither naturally from the breach nor from anything communicated to or known by the defendant.6
Applied to the millers’ claim, the rule excluded the lost profits, but the reasoning depends on what the carrier knew. Lord Justice Asquith pointed out in Victoria Laundry, Ltd. v. Newman Indus., Ltd. that the report’s headnote wrongly says the carrier’s clerk knew the mill was stopped and the shaft had to be delivered immediately. The Court of Exchequer must have rejected that statement, he reasoned, because the carrier’s only knowledge was that the shaft was broken and that the plaintiffs were the millers; otherwise the court would, one would suppose, have decided the case the other way round.7 On those facts the judge ought to have told the jury not to count lost profits unless the special circumstances causing them had been communicated to and known by the defendants. Without that notice, damages were limited to those arising in the ordinary course of events from breach of a carrier’s duty.8 Lost profits were not barred as such; the millers lacked notice of the circumstances that would have made those profits the probable result of delay.9
A later decision applied the same logic to a wedding. A suitor, whose betrothed broke the engagement after the wedding was delayed, sued for five hundred dollars spent uselessly on the ceremony. He sued the defendant who had failed to deliver two gowns ordered for the bride. The judge asked whether the parties must have contemplated that the wedding would never occur if the gowns were late, and answered that, “in the absence of specific warning,” it was hardly to be contemplated that the bride would refuse forever to wed. The damages were too remote.10
The time for measuring contemplation is the time of contracting. Foreseeability is fixed at formation because that is when the parties assume their obligations and determine the performance reasonably contemplated; later events, such as changes in market conditions, do not affect it, and a court asks whether the breaching party reasonably should have contemplated the type of risk when the bargain was made.11 A plaintiff who explains the mill’s plight after the breach has therefore explained it too late. Commercial parties can also settle the question themselves: they may “contract around” foreseeability by limiting or excluding liability for consequential damages, and UCC 2–719 expressly authorizes such limits.12
This limit is stricter than the one that governs tort claims. Farnsworth observes that the rule imposes a more severe limitation on recovery for breach of contract than applies in tort or for breach of warranty, where substantial or proximate cause is the test.13 A loss that is causally tied to the breach can therefore still fall outside it. The size of the bargain also bears on what the parties contemplated. One court, citing Restatement § 351, treated the great disparity between a classification society’s $85,000 fee and the $264,000,000 in damages sought as strong evidence that the parties never intended the fee to cover that liability.14
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 carries both limbs into current law. A loss counts if it follows in the ordinary course of events15 or results from special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the party in breach had reason to know.16 Although Hadley speaks of both parties’ contemplation, the focus is really on the reasonable contemplation of the party who breached, and the Restatement’s reason-to-know language says so directly.17 The sections that follow take each limb apart in turn.