Concept
Loss in the Ordinary Course
Causation and foreseeability
Loss in the Ordinary Course
Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of breach because it follows from the breach in the ordinary course of events. That is the first of the two routes in § 351(2)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and it requires no special information from the plaintiff.1 The test is whether the breaching party should reasonably have expected the loss to be a likely consequence of breach.2
Hadley v. Baxendale states the same idea in its first limb. Damages are recoverable if they arise naturally, “according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself.”3 The mill owner’s lost profits in that case show where the limb stops. The delay in fact caused the loss, but the carrier had not been told that this was the mill’s only shaft and had no way of knowing that delay would leave the mill idle.4 Causation was established and recovery still failed, because the loss was not one the carrier could predict from the contract.
Predictability is why ordinary-course loss needs no announcement. One court explains that general damages are a natural consequence of breach, and that because their occurrence is sufficiently predictable the parties are “deemed” to have contemplated them when they contracted.5 A plaintiff need not tell the breacher what it could predict anyway.
An emergency roof repair shows the route at work on a consequential loss.
A machine with an obvious use value supplies a second illustration. In Hector Martinez & Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. a carrier delayed delivery of a dragline, and the shipper sought the value of the machine’s use during the delay. The carrier called that loss special and said it required notice. The court disagreed.
The dragline differs from Hadley’s shaft in how much the carrier could read from the object itself. A shaft in transit does not announce that a mill will stand idle without it. A dragline announces its own use: it is a machine whose use has a value, which may be measured by its rental value or by interest on its market value. A carrier can foresee loss of that use during delay without being told anything about the shipper’s plans. The loss fits the first limb of Hadley, which reaches damages arising naturally, “according to the usual course of things,” from the breach itself.6
The carrier also argued that the dragline might just as well have been shipped for sale as for use. That argument proved too much. The plaintiff need not show that the actual harm was the most foreseeable one, only that it was not so remote as to be unforeseeable to a reasonable person when the contract was made. The court also treated a market-value measure as one way to compute delay damages, not as a ceiling on what is foreseeable.
Ordinary Does Not Mean Inevitable
A loss can follow in the ordinary course without following every time. Some courts find foreseeability only when the loss was nearly inevitable. That reads too much into “the ordinary course of events,” because it treats anything short of the inevitable as unusual.7 The same source adds a practical point: once the plaintiff has mentioned the loss, the defendant may have difficulty persuading a court that it was unforeseeable merely because it was not inevitable.8 The roofer cannot escape the water damage by arguing that the rain might never have fallen before a substitute arrived. Section 351(1) asks whether the breacher had reason to foresee a probable result of breach, and probable does not mean certain.9
The setting of the contract decides what is typical. Abandoning a roofing job, delaying a mill shaft, and delaying heavy machinery each produce different likely consequences, and each is judged from the position of a party in that line of work. On an exam stem, name the kind of contract and its commercial setting before deciding what follows from its breach.
Ordinary also does not stretch to every harm that traces back to the breach. In one case, a suitor’s bride broke their engagement after her wedding was delayed because the defendant failed to deliver two gowns, and the suitor sued for the five hundred dollars spent uselessly on the wedding. The court denied recovery. Absent specific warning, it said, the parties could not be taken to have contemplated that she would forever refuse to wed if the dresses were late: “The damages are too remote.”10
The Cover Assumption
Goods contracts add a recurring trap. Cover means buying substitute goods elsewhere after the seller fails to deliver, and courts generally assume that a buyer in a functioning market can do so. From that assumption it follows that inability to cover is not what a breach ordinarily produces. Where substitutes are for sale, the typical cost of nondelivery is the price gap and the trouble of buying elsewhere. A prolonged shutdown depends on facts about the market and the buyer that the seller is unlikely to know. The seller is chargeable with such loss only if it knew facts that made the inability to cover foreseeable.
The Uniform Commercial Code builds the same premise into its rule for buyers. Consequential damages include loss from the buyer’s requirements and needs of which the seller had reason to know at contracting “and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.”12 The section on UCC § 2-715 below treats that rule in full.