Concept
Loss From Special Circumstances
Causation and foreseeability
Loss From Special Circumstances
A loss outside the ordinary course of events can still be foreseeable by a second route. Section 351(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reaches a loss that results from special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the party in breach had reason to know.1 The ordinary-course route in § 351(2)(a) does not depend on anything the plaintiff disclosed. This route runs entirely through information: what did the breacher know, or have reason to know, about the facts that made this plaintiff's loss unusual? It restates the second limb of Hadley v. Baxendale. If the plaintiff communicated the special circumstances when the contract was made, so that both sides knew them, the damages the parties would reasonably contemplate are the injury that ordinarily follows a breach under those circumstances. If the breaching party knew nothing of them, it answers only for the injury arising generally in the great multitude of cases.2 The carrier in Hadley had not been told that the broken shaft was the mill's only one and had no way of knowing that delay would leave the mill idle, so the mill's lost profits fell outside the second limb.3
Two elements are at work. The first is a special circumstance: a fact particular to the contract or the parties that makes the loss unusual, such as a business's dependence on a single machine. The second is reason to know that fact when the contract was made. The text says reason to know, not was told, so direct communication by the plaintiff is the common way to satisfy the second element without being the only way. The California Supreme Court's statement of the rule shows both paths. In Lewis Jorge Construction Management, Inc. v. Pomona Unified School Dist., special damages, which are secondary or derivative losses arising from circumstances particular to the contract or the parties, were recoverable if those circumstances were actually communicated to or known by the breaching party, or were matters of which it should have been aware at the time of contracting.4 The first path is a subjective test and the second an objective one, and a plaintiff who fits either has met the requirement.
A roofer who agrees to make an emergency repair on a storm-damaged roof within three hours, and then reneges, shows how much turns on that second element. The owner's extra cost of hiring a substitute and the rain damage to the interior are ordinary-course losses. Now place an extremely expensive and sensitive piece of electronic equipment beneath the broken section, bolted to the floor, used daily and crucial to the owner's business, and the analysis changes. Unless the roofer was told, or otherwise had reason to know when the contract was made, that this vital and immobile equipment sat under the damaged section, it would not be fair to hold the roofer liable for damage to the equipment or for the resulting disruption of the owner's business.5 A roofer who learned of the equipment before agreeing carries that exposure, because the loss then lies within what the roofer had reason to expect from a missed repair. The roof, the promise, and the breach are the same for both roofers; only what the roofer knew at formation differs.
The burden of disclosure falls on the plaintiff because only the plaintiff knows the facts that make the exposure unusual, and the defendant can act on them only if it learns them before it is bound. A roofer told of the equipment might decline the contract, or take the work only at a higher price that compensates for the greater risk of liability.6 Those choices belong to a longer list, since a defendant aware of the size of the potential loss may also add a clause limiting or excluding recovery, buy insurance, or take extra precautions to reduce the risk.7 An owner who holds back the information deprives the roofer of the means to make a rational decision about risk and of the chance to take added steps against breach, so charging the roofer afterward would impose a cost that no price ever reflected. The rule also works on the owner's side of the table. An owner who knows that an unusual loss is recoverable only after notice has a reason to supply adequate information, which is likely to make dealing more efficient and may even lessen the chance of breach.8
A plaintiff who deliberately keeps the facts back cannot later claim the loss that disclosure would have made probable. In Marcus, the buyer's agent told the seller that the buyer wanted additional ovens for immediate delivery and that a prospective purchaser wanted them by May 15, but he admitted that he withheld the true state of the resale prospects for fear the seller would ask twice the price.9 The New Jersey court found no evidence that either contract was made under peculiar circumstances entitling the buyer to the special damages it claimed.10 The agent's own explanation supplies the reason for the result. The silence kept the price low, and a buyer who took the lower price that silence bought has no claim to the protection that disclosure would have cost.
Special circumstances usually arrive as a bundle of facts, and the breacher must have had reason to know the ones that link the breach to the loss. Suppose a manufacturer holds a government contract for uniforms that stipulates a charge for each day of late delivery, and buys materials from a supplier who then fails to deliver. To recover the charge the delay triggers, the manufacturer probably must show that the supplier knew of the government contract, knew of the delay clause, and knew that late materials would make the manufacturer late.11 A supplier missing any one of those facts had no reason to anticipate a loss of that kind. A seller of a reaper and thresher who knew at contracting that the buyer's wheat would be ready on the delivery date, had to be harvested promptly, and could not be harvested with any other machine obtainable in time is in the opposite position, and the moisture damage from a month's delay is recoverable.12 The last of those facts also limits the claim, because a buyer who could have obtained another machine in time would have had to do so and could not recover a loss that reasonable steps would have prevented.13
Because notice is a fact the plaintiff must prove, these cases turn on what the record shows the defendant knew. Lost profits on a plaintiff's contracts with third parties are special-circumstances claims, since the third-party contract is the unusual fact. In Florafax International, Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., an Oklahoma court reviewed a jury award of two years of lost profits that the plaintiff claimed from a collateral contract with a third party, which was canceled allegedly because the defendant breached.14 Against a carrier, the shipper must prove that the carrier had notice of the special circumstances that caused the loss, and while shippers by rail and truck have carried that burden, marine cargo shippers generally have not.15 In either setting, the plaintiff's practical task is to prove what the defendant knew or had reason to know at formation.
The fourth step reflects a point in the three-rule summary of Hadley that the Arkansas court quoted in Hooks Smelting Co. v. Planters' Compress Co.: once special circumstances are known, recovery still extends only to damage that flows naturally from the breach under those circumstances.16 Notice therefore opens the door to a special loss without making every consequence of the breach recoverable.
The information the breacher held at formation is what turns a special loss into a recoverable one. The bare possibility that such a loss might occur does not do it, because hindsight makes every unusual loss look possible. The Hadley court limited the carrier to the injury arising generally because the circumstances that would have made the mill's loss a natural consequence were never communicated to or known by it.17 On an exam, then, put one question to any special loss: what did the breaching party know, or have reason to know, when the contract was made? Facts that surfaced afterward, or that the plaintiff kept to itself, do not count.