Concept
Disproportionate Compensation
Causation and foreseeability
Disproportionate Compensation
A foreseeable loss is not always a recoverable loss. Section 351(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts gives the court a final, discretionary check that operates after foreseeability has been satisfied: a court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation.1 The subsection adds no second foreseeability test. It speaks only to a loss that has already cleared § 351(1) and (2).
The losses that provoke this check are typically consequential ones. Consequential damages result as a secondary consequence of the defendant's non-performance, in contrast to general damages, which rest on the value of the performance itself. If a supplier fails to deliver cattle feed, general damages track the value of the feed, while consequential damages track the cattle lost to starvation or the profits lost because the cattle could not be fattened before sale. Whether such consequential damages are recoverable depends on several limiting rules, and subsection (3) supplies one of them.2
The check exists because foreseeability and price measure different things. Foreseeability asks what the breaching party had reason to foresee when it contracted. It does not ask whether the price the party charged was large enough to carry that exposure. A seller who earns $120 on a sale may have reason to foresee that a defective part will idle a customer's plant, and the customer's loss may run to $850,000. A price is what the seller receives for taking on risk, so a price that small is some evidence that the parties never meant it to cover exposure on that scale. Subsection (3) lets the court respond to that mismatch.
The classic trigger is a huge foreseeable loss set against a tiny price. In Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American Bureau of Shipping, a shipowner sought $264,000,000 from a classification service that had charged an $85,000 fee. The court held that the owner could not treat the classification certificate as a guarantee that the vessel was soundly constructed. It called the great disparity between the fee and the damages strong evidence that such a result was not intended by the parties. Citing § 351, it concluded that the small fee could not have been intended to cover the risk of such liability and that the ship classification industry could not continue to exist on such terms.3 The court read the price as evidence of how the parties allocated risk, and it also asked what liability on that scale would do to everyone who sells that kind of service.
A smaller version of the same problem arises when a contractor agrees to make minor repairs to a restaurant's furnace before a big weekend. Breach may produce very large consequential damages that were quite foreseeable. Even so, recovery may be denied if the amount is out of proportion to the contract price, and a court that denies it usually reasons that liability of that magnitude was not within the parties' contemplation when they contracted.4 The pattern matches Sundance: a modest job priced like any other repair, and a claim whose size reflects the plaintiff's business and not the work done. If the court acts, the plaintiff might be confined to what it spent in reliance on the contract, or denied the lost profits for the weekend.
A large gap between price and loss invites the court's discretion but does not compel it. A variation on the mill-shaft case, Hadley v. Baxendale, shows why. In the original, the delay directly caused the mill's lost profits, yet the court refused to award them because the carrier had not been told that this was the mill's only shaft and had no way of knowing that delay would idle the mill.5 That was a failure of foreseeability. Now suppose the miller tells the carrier, before it takes the shaft for $100, that the mill cannot run until the shaft is repaired. The carrier delays, the mill sits idle, and the lost profits reach $100,000. Foreseeability is satisfied, so the carrier's argument reduces to this: a $100 fee could never have carried $100,000 of risk. A court may accept that argument and exclude lost profits or confine the miller to reliance recovery, and Sundance treated a gap of this kind as strong evidence of what the parties intended. But subsection (3) says "may," and the miller has an answer: the carrier knew exactly what depended on timely delivery and could have declined the job, raised its price, or limited its liability in the contract. Whether justice requires cutting the claim back is a judgment on all the circumstances. A foreseeable loss does not shrink automatically because the fee was small.
Because relief under subsection (3) rests on a court's judgment about what justice requires, no party can count on it. The dependable protection is a term in the contract. In a commercial setting, the parties may "contract around" the foreseeability problem by limiting or excluding liability for consequential damages, and a treatment of the sales rules identifies the same risk that motivates this section: that including lost profits in the damage calculation may overcompensate buyers.6 UCC § 2-719 expressly authorizes such limits, with separate treatment of consumer goods in § 2-719(3).7 A courier's airbill shows the technique. It disclaims liability for any damage, whether direct, incidental, special, or consequential, in excess of the declared value of a shipment, whether or not the courier knows such damages might be incurred, including loss of income and profits. For untimely delivery it offers, at the shipper's request and with some limitations, a refund or credit of transportation charges.8 The clause ties the carrier's exposure to the value the shipper declares, whatever the carrier knows about the shipper's likely loss. Exclusion clauses appear earlier in this chapter. Buyer's remedies for the seller's breach are indexed in UCC § 2-711 when the buyer has not accepted the goods or has justifiably revoked acceptance, and in § 2-714 once the buyer has finally accepted; the next section takes up the sales and international parallels.9
When a problem raises disproportion, work it in this order:
- Establish causation and foreseeability, since § 351(3) applies only to loss that passes those filters.
- Compare the size of the claim with the price the breacher was paid, and treat a large gap as evidence about how the parties allocated risk, not as a rule that decides the case.
- Check whether the contract already limits or excludes the loss.