Concept
Sales and International Parallels
Causation and foreseeability
Sales and International Parallels
Section 351 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the foreseeability limit for contracts in general: damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made.1 Subsection (2) names two routes by which a loss qualifies. It may arise in the ordinary course of events, or it may result from special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course, that the breaching party had reason to know.2 That is the common law. A sale of goods puts the question under different words: Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code for a domestic sale, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) for many sales across borders. Each text restates the limit in its own vocabulary, and neither repeats the Restatement's word probable.
The three texts share one idea. A party answers for unusual loss only if it could see the risk when the contract was made, because that is the last moment at which it can still refuse the deal, raise its price, or limit its liability. On a sales problem, identify the governing regime first, apply its words, and use the Restatement test to understand what those words protect.
UCC Section 2-715
Section 2-715 carries the limit into sales of goods and divides a buyer's extra recovery into two kinds. Subsection (1) covers incidental damages. Subsection (2) defines consequential damages to include “any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise,” together with “injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.”3 Three features of that text carry most exam answers. Paragraph (a) conditions recovery on the seller's reason to know and on the buyer's inability to prevent the loss. Paragraph (b) contains no foreseeability element. And the provision belongs to buyers, because the Code gives sellers no counterpart.
The line between incidental and consequential damages follows where the loss arises. Incidental damages are normally incurred when a buyer or seller repudiates the contract or wrongfully rejects the goods, and the other party incurs expenses such as transporting, storing, or reselling them. Consequential damages arise outside the immediate buyer-seller transaction, from the nonbreaching party's dealings, often with third parties, and they must have been a proximate result of the breach and reasonably foreseeable to the breaching party at contracting.4 Foreseeability is therefore built into the incidental category, which consists of the ordinary costs that any reasonable party would likely incur in responding to a breach.5
Hadley's two rules reappear in this structure. Direct damages compensate for the value the contract itself promised and go no further than the confines of the contract.6 For a buyer they are indexed in § 2-711 when the buyer has not accepted the goods or has justifiably revoked acceptance, and in § 2-714 once the buyer has finally accepted them.7 Consequential damages follow the second rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. They are the losses that do not flow in the ordinary course from the seller's breach, and even then the buyer recovers only if they result from needs the seller had reason to know of at contracting, and not if the buyer could have prevented them by cover or otherwise.8
How much the seller must have known depends on the kind of need. A buyer's particular needs must generally be made known to the seller, while its general needs rarely have to be.9 A seller who sells to a merchant therefore needs no briefing to know that the buyer will resell, and the buyer's lost resale profit is consequential loss it may claim. The same reasoning reaches manufacturers. As Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp. put it, a seller who supplies goods to a manufacturing enterprise knowing they will be used in production should know that defective goods will disrupt production and that lost profits are a natural consequence, so those profits are recoverable.10
Particular needs that the buyer keeps to itself fare worse, and an early common-law decision shows Hadley's logic at work. A disappointed suitor sued for the five hundred dollars he had spent on a wedding that was postponed when two gowns ordered for the bride were not delivered; the bride then broke the engagement. The court denied recovery. In the absence of specific warning, it was hardly to be contemplated that she would forever refuse to wed if the gowns arrived late, and “the damages are too remote.”11
The Code's test of reason to know is objective. Comment 3 makes the seller liable whenever it had reason to know of the buyer's general or particular requirements at contracting, and it adds that no conscious acceptance of an insurer's liability is necessary.12 That comment rejects the older tacit-agreement test, which required proof that the breaching party had agreed to assume liability for the particular damages. The Code still preserves the common-law requirement that the damages arise from facts the breaching party had reason to know when the contract was made.13 Most modern courts apply this less restrictive objective approach.14 The burden of self-protection stays with the seller, who can use the Code's provision on contractual limitation of remedy if it wants no part of the risk.15
Abandoning the tacit-agreement test does not make every buyer's loss recoverable. In Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central New Mexico Elec. Co-op., Inc., the court formally replaced its tacit-agreement standard with one derived from Restatement § 351, a straight application of Hadley that requires “special circumstances,” and it observed that the two standards may not differ much. It then held that it was not foreseeable that cutting off electricity to a hydroponic tomato farm would damage the crops.16
Foreseeability is only one of the buyer's burdens. The buyer must also prove causation, meaning a causal link between the breach and each item claimed and a showing that the breach was a cause in fact of the loss, and it must prove the amount of its damages with reasonable certainty, though not with mathematical precision.17 The commentary calls the Code's foreseeability test “relaxed,” and that relaxed reading enlarges the buyer's duty to mitigate.18
The mitigation duty is written into the statute itself, because paragraph (a) reaches only loss that “could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.”19 Cover means a reasonable purchase of substitute goods, made in good faith and without unreasonable delay after the seller's breach.20 The limit exists because a buyer who can replace the goods controls how much of the seller's breach turns into lost profit. Without it, a buyer could leave a shortage unfilled and bill the seller for everything that followed, and the lost profit would trace to the buyer's own decision, with the breach serving only as the occasion. The words or otherwise reach past substitute purchases to any reasonable step that would have prevented the loss.
The cases turn on effort. The buyer of an infrared oven in Barry & Sewall Industrial Supply Co. v. Metal-Prep of Houston, Inc. chose not to replace a defective oven for a year and recovered no lost profits for that year. The farmer in Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. fared better: when a defective tractor failed, he hired neighbors to plant his soybeans, and although the late planting left his yield low, the court credited the attempt to mitigate and awarded consequential damages. Mitigation that proves only partly effective does not forfeit the claim, but doing nothing does.
Paragraph (b) works on a different footing. A buyer may recover for injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty, and damages for that injury are not subject to the foreseeability test.23 The difference tracks what the limit protects. A seller cannot price an exposure it cannot see, and the exposures it cannot see are usually facts about the buyer's own business or plans, such as a pending resale or a dependence on one machine. Harm to people and property from a defective product depends on no such hidden fact, so every seller carries that exposure whatever the buyer plans to do. The control on the claim is proximate cause, which fails when the buyer's own conduct breaks the chain between the breach and the injury.
The third feature of the text concerns who may claim consequential damages at all. Sellers generally have access to the same categories of damages as buyers, with some differences in nomenclature, and each basic remedy is complemented by incidental damages for expenses reasonably incurred because of the breach.25 That symmetry stops at consequential damages. Section 2-715(2) is a buyer's provision, the Code lists no counterpart among a seller's remedies, and some courts have refused to award consequential damages to sellers for that reason. In Dietec Co. v. Osirius Group, LLC, a seller of goods sought consequential damages that Article 2 stood in the way of, and the court noted that had the contract been characterized as one for services, the common law would have applied and nothing would have barred the claim.26 How a court characterizes the contract can therefore decide whether a seller's consequential loss is recoverable at all.
CISG Article 74
Article 74 of the CISG sets the damages formula for an international sale, and its second sentence supplies the foreseeability cap. Damages equal the loss, including lost profit, that the other party suffers as a consequence of the breach, but they may not exceed the loss that the breaching party foresaw or ought to have foreseen when the contract was concluded, in light of the facts and matters it then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach. The cap should look familiar. “Ought to have foreseen” is an objective standard like reason to foresee, the conclusion of the contract is the moment of contracting, and the facts the breacher knew or ought to have known do the work that special circumstances do in § 351(2)(b).28 All of it descends from Hadley, which tied recoverable loss to what the parties may reasonably be supposed to have contemplated “at the time they made the contract.”29 Fixing the ceiling at conclusion lets each side price, insure, or limit a risk while it can still decline the deal.
Courts read the Convention through that lens. In Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., a dispute between an Italian maker of air conditioners and a New York supplier of compressors that failed to meet the contract's specifications, the Second Circuit treated Article 74 as limiting damages by the familiar foreseeability principle of Hadley and upheld an award of lost profits. It added that decisions under UCC Article 2 may inform a court where the Convention's language tracks the Code's.30 The overlap is incomplete, though, and the commentary warns that critical differences between the two regimes present pitfalls for the unwary.
One difference in wording deserves a flag in any careful answer. Hadley and § 351(1) speak of a probable result of the breach,31 Article 74 speaks of a possible consequence, and the Code asks instead what needs of the buyer the seller had reason to know. Read broadly, “possible” could reach remote events, because any loss that actually occurred was necessarily possible, and it is unclear how much the requirement that the breacher have known particular facts restrains its exposure. Whether the difference in wording changes outcomes is an open question, so treat it as a comparison to mention and not as a settled rule. On a Convention problem, apply Article 74's words. On a common-law problem, apply § 351's.