Concept
Governing Standards
Liquidated Damages or Penalty
Governing Standards
Two texts supply the test for whether a stipulated sum survives, and the type of contract decides which one governs. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) covers contracts generally; UCC § 2-718(1) covers sales of goods. A clause in a contract to renovate a building or sell land is therefore measured under the Restatement, and a clause in a contract to deliver machinery under the Code.1
The stakes are concrete. A clause that fails leaves the injured party to prove its actual damages.2 A clause that passes fixes the recovery, and at least one court has held that the non-breaching party then has no duty to mitigate.3
Each text pairs a grant of freedom with a ceiling. The parties may liquidate damages, but only at an amount reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss and the difficulties of proving it, and an unreasonably large sum is a penalty.4 The UCC adds one further consideration, taken up below. A third formulation, the older common-law test, splits the inquiry into two parts. An exam problem that quotes a judicial opinion is likely to use that language rather than the Restatement's or the UCC's.
Reasonableness unifies all three. Each measures the stipulated sum against the loss the breach is likely to cause or has caused, and each allows the parties more room when that loss is hard to pin down, since the usual reason to liquidate is to avoid proving the loss in court. A sum that reasonably approximates the loss is compensation; a sum that departs far from it is punishment.5 One court has concluded that the common-law and Code tests reflect the same essential factors and the same type of reasonableness test,6 so on most facts the formulations point to the same result. They differ chiefly in vocabulary and in the few places where the texts diverge. An analysis therefore begins by classifying the contract, with goods bringing in § 2-718(1) and other contracts bringing in § 356(1), whatever terms the court's own opinion uses. The Restatement comes first because its two measures of reasonableness give a base against which the UCC's addition and the common-law test can be compared.
The Restatement Standard
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) governs every contract that is not a sale of goods, and it speaks in two sentences. The first lets the parties liquidate damages in their agreement, but only at an amount that is “reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss.” The second states the consequence of overreaching: a term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.7
Either party's breach may be liquidated, so the same limit governs a buyer's promise to pay a set sum for failing to close and a builder's promise to pay a set sum for finishing late. The test demands a reasonable amount, not a precise one. Parties liquidate because loss resists exact measurement, and a rule requiring exactness would defeat every clause for the very uncertainty that justified writing it.
Two measures supply the reasonableness, and they do different jobs. The loss tells a court how large the sum may be; the difficulty of proving that loss tells it how closely the sum must track it. The first measure is disjunctive, “anticipated or actual,” so a court may judge the sum by the forecast the parties could make at formation, by the loss the breach in fact caused, or by both.8 The later sections on anticipated and actual harm work out how courts use each view.
The comment to § 356 says the two factors combine in deciding whether a sum is so unreasonably large as to be a penalty, and the combination works as a sliding scale.9 If the difficulty of proving loss is great, considerable latitude is allowed in approximating the anticipated or actual harm. If the difficulty is slight, less latitude is allowed. In the extreme case where it is clear that no loss at all has occurred, a provision fixing a substantial sum is unenforceable.10
The scale follows from what a clause saves. When loss is hard to prove, the clause spares the parties a costly and uncertain trial, and a wide gap between the sum and any later reconstruction of the loss reads as the ordinary imprecision of forecasting. When damages are readily ascertainable, the clause saves no proof, and a significant deviation between the stipulated and ascertainable amounts appears unreasonable.11 At the far end, loss that is clearly zero is as easy to prove as any loss can be, and a substantial sum cannot be compensation for nothing.
The Restatement's illustrations show the scale at work. Acme promises to complete a racetrack grandstand by April 1 and to pay $1,000 for each day of delay, and it finishes on April 10. If $1,000 a day was a reasonable estimate of the owner's anticipated loss and actual damages are hard to prove, the clause is valid and enforceable.12 Now suppose the owner could not have opened the track earlier anyway, because its operating permit was delayed a month. The loss is clearly zero, and a clause fixing a substantial sum for it is unenforceable.13 The forecast at signing is the same in both versions; what changes is the actual loss and how easily it can be proved.
Section 356(1) lists two factors where § 2-718(1) lists three. The UCC also measures the sum against the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.14 The Restatement omits that factor, viewing it as already expressed by the difficulty-of-proof language, since a party unable to prove its loss has little chance of obtaining an adequate remedy.15 The final factor is thus the only difference in the two tests, and the next subsection takes it up.
Courts treat § 356(1) as a working test. In Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletown, the New Jersey Supreme Court quoted the section as its statement of the standard for stipulated damages.16 The second sentence of § 356(1) speaks only to unreasonably large sums, so the penalty rule polices the upper end of the range. A sum that falls short of the loss raises a different problem, which a later section addresses.
The UCC Standard
UCC § 2-718(1) governs liquidated damages in sales of goods, and it follows the Restatement's design with one added consideration. Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement, but only at an amount reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.18 A buyer or seller of goods thus holds the freedom the Restatement offers, to set the price of breach in advance, subject to a ceiling that the three considerations define.
The grammar of the text decides how it applies: reasonableness is the single test, and the three considerations are the circumstances a court consults in judging it. Kvassay v. Murray makes the point. The court described a rule under which damages must be reasonable and also difficult to ascertain as clearly a two-step test, and it stressed that under the UCC reasonableness is the only test. Section 2-718 measures it by three criteria: the anticipated or actual harm, the difficulty of proving loss, and the difficulty of obtaining an adequate remedy.19
The structure has a practical reason behind it. If difficulty of proof stood as a separate gate, a clause covering a loss that could be estimated with some effort would fail even when the sum closely matched that loss, and the parties would forfeit a sensible forecast for want of a threshold showing. Treating difficulty of proof as one input lets the court ask the question that matters: whether the sum is a fair price for the harm this breach is likely to cause or has caused. The third consideration works the same way, since a clause may be justified when the ordinary remedy would be impractical or inadequate for that transaction. The three considerations feed one judgment, and each contributes something different:
- The anticipated or actual harm ties the figure to the injury the breach does, and it excludes the amount that would best frighten the promisor into performing.
- The difficulties of proof set how much imprecision the figure may carry, since a clause exists to spare the parties from proving damages at trial.
- The inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy asks whether the injured party has another practical way to be made whole, such as buying substitute goods or compelling performance.
Kvassay also shows what the test measures. The trial court had used Kvassay's previous income as a yardstick for the stipulated sum, and the appellate court held that this was error. The sum must be measured against the anticipated or actual loss under the baklava contract itself, as § 2-718 requires.20 The traditional aim when a buyer breaches a manufacturing contract is to put the seller in the position he would have occupied had the buyer performed,21 and earnings from earlier, unrelated work do not measure that position.
Courts applying the Code to liquidated damages also draw on the older common-law test. Garden Ridge, L.P. v. Advance International, Inc., a Texas decision, compared the common-law test from Phillips v. Phillips with the language of the state's version of § 2-718. It concluded that the two reflect the same essential factors and the same type of reasonableness test, so common-law decisions still inform the analysis.22 The two decisions stress different things. Kvassay declines to treat difficulty of estimation as a separate prerequisite in a goods case, while Garden Ridge finds the older test's ingredients inside the Code's factors. Together they support presenting the Code standard as one reasonableness judgment, informed by the three considerations, with older cases useful for weighing them.
Set beside § 356(1), the Code's test differs in substance only by the third consideration. Its penalty sentence differs in wording, calling an unreasonably large term void where the Restatement calls it unenforceable on grounds of public policy.23 A party who cannot prove its loss usually has no convenient adequate remedy either, so the Restatement's two-factor text captures most of what the third factor adds.24 The penalty sentence in each text speaks only to unreasonably large sums. An unreasonably small amount raises a different problem, because a court may be asked to strike it as unconscionable under § 2-302 rather than as a penalty.25
The Traditional Two-Part Test
Restatement § 356(1) and UCC § 2-718(1) each frame the inquiry as one question, whether the stipulated sum is reasonable in light of the loss and the difficulty of proving it.27 Many courts nonetheless still decide these cases with an older common-law test that splits the question in two. As the Garden Ridge court quotes Phillips v. Phillips, a court enforcing a clause must find “that the harm caused by the breach is incapable or difficult of estimation,” and “that the amount of liquidated damages called for is a reasonable forecast of just compensation.”28 The two requirements are cumulative: a clause that satisfies only one fails, and the injured party must then prove its actual damages. Both are judged as of contracting, a feature the modern texts relax, as the end of this subsection shows.29
Each prong answers a different question about the clause. The first, difficulty of estimation, asks why the parties needed a clause at all. A stipulated sum earns its place when real uncertainty would keep a court from computing the loss by ordinary proof. Where the loss is easy to calculate, the clause spares no one any proof, and a figure that departs from the calculable loss has no explanation except its power to pressure the promisor. The second prong, a reasonable forecast of just compensation, is the compensation principle applied to the clause. Contract damages exist to make the injured party whole, so the figure must be an honest attempt, made when the contract is signed, to price the loss a breach would probably cause.
Phillips supplies the failing pole. The clause there called for liquidated damages of ten times the amount a limited partner lost through a breach of trust. The court held that a provision under which one party agrees to pay a multiple of actual damages meets neither part of the test, and it declared the clause unenforceable as a penalty on its face.30 The reasons show on the face of the clause. A formula keyed to the actual loss assumes the loss can be determined, which undercuts any claim that it is incapable or difficult of estimation, and a figure ten times the compensation cannot be a forecast of just compensation.
A home sale shows the test at work. A buyer agrees to pay $200,000 for a house and posts a $10,000 deposit that the seller may keep as liquidated damages if the buyer defaults. Specific performance is usually the best remedy for breach of a land sale contract, because it gives the non-breaching party exactly what she bargained for,31 so the deposit clause matters when the seller keeps the land and the money instead. The seller can argue that its loss from a failed closing was hard to predict at signing and that five percent of the price is a modest forecast of it; the buyer can answer that the sum exceeds any probable loss. Whether the deposit survives when the seller resells at a higher price and loses nothing is a question about actual loss, taken up in a later section.
Some courts add a third element, that the parties must have intended to provide for damages rather than a penalty, which yields a three-part version of the test.32 The intent inquiry connects to the role of labels and is developed in a later section. Whichever version a court recites, the criterion that generally decides the case is whether the stipulated sum is a reasonable pre-estimate of the probable loss.33
The prongs sit in tension. If the loss is impossible to determine when the contract is signed, it is hard to see what makes an estimate of it reasonable. The sliding scale eases the tension: the more uncertain the loss, the more room the parties have for an estimate no one can verify to the dollar,34 so difficulty of estimation works less as an independent gate than as a factor that loosens the forecast standard.
The modern formulations fold the two prongs into one reasonableness judgment. Garden Ridge concluded that the common-law and Code tests reflect the same essential factors and the same type of reasonableness test.35 Restatement § 356(1) measures the sum against the anticipated or actual loss and the difficulties of proof of loss, so difficulty of proof enters as one input to a single judgment.36 The word “or” in its first factor adds flexibility the traditional test lacks, because a court may judge reasonableness by what the parties anticipated at formation or by what the loss turned out to be.37 An answer that quotes the older test should therefore name both prongs, note that the reasonable pre-estimate criterion generally decides the case,38 and then state that the Restatement governs contracts generally and the UCC governs sales of goods under a single reasonableness standard.